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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous research has shown that in both non-human and human primates a network of neural 
regions exists that is engaged not only when we perform an action but also when we observe that 
same action being performed.  This coupled action-perception system is argued to play a role in 
several areas of cognitive functioning, with this system being at least partially responsible for the 
prediction of observed actions.  Despite much research surrounding this action-observation 
system (AON), there continues to be a large debate regarding the principal function of such a 
system.  On the one hand, it is argued that the system allows the prediction and monitoring of 
one’s own actions for fine-grain motor control and kinematic adjustment.  On the other hand, 
researchers argue that the system evolved for the monitoring of others’ actions, for social 
interaction purposes. 
Using dynamic transitive actions in the first person perspective (1PP) and third person perspective 
(3PP), in the series of studies that follow, we aim to determine whether the prediction system 
functions at an advantage when observing these dynamic images which map closely onto the 
observation of self-generated as opposed to other-generated actions. 
In all, the series of studies primarily highlight the importance of motor experience, enabling us to 
draw upon our motor repertoire to effectively simulate and accurately predict observed actions.  
Behavioural and EEG studies using a psychophysics method provide evidence that 1PP actions are 
advantageous to the prediction system following motor priming, suggesting the underlying neural 
mechanisms may have predominantly emerged for self-monitoring purposes.  However, using a 
converging method, somewhat opposing results are found, which suggest motor experience can 
facilitate 3PP actions. When interpreting results to inform theories it is always essential to 
consider the experimental task employed to interrogate the matter at hand, and determine which 
underlying mechanisms the method may be drawing upon.   
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction and Literature Review 
 
1.1 Shared representations for action and perception 
From the late 1980s it was realised that overt action had an apparently covert counterpart.  Any 
overt action could be represented covertly and have the same characteristics.  That is, imagined 
action was shown to maintain the same temporal characteristics as the same overtly executed 
action (Decety, Jeannerod, & Prablanc, 1989).  For instance, the time to respond whether or not a 
reach-to-grasp action is plausible is a function of the object-to-be-grasped orientation, and 
corresponds to the time taken to overtly reach and grasp the object, suggesting a mental 
representation of arm movement is played out before a response can be given (Frak, Paulignan, & 
Jeannerod, 2001).  It was consequently suggested that mental imagery of action likely involves the 
same motor regions of the brain that are employed when executing the same action (Jeannerod, 
1994, 1997).  On a similar line, the observation of action by a third person also constitutes 
another means by which covert actions are elicited (Jeannerod, 2001).  It was thus posited that 
covert actions (mental imagery or observed actions performed by another) involve the motor 
system as a means to emulate, simulate, or internally re-enact (Prinz, 2006) action in a manner 
highly similar to when overtly executing the same action, through ‘motor resonance’ (Gallese, 
2005).  
The theory that perception and action are inextricably entwined has generated an extensive body 
of research, which has strengthened support for the notion that they share common 
representations - the common coding principle (Prinz, 1997).  Studies have demonstrated that we 
non-consciously and automatically imitate people we interact with (the chameleon effect) 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004), and even 
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mimic and synchronise facial expressions (the emotional contagion effect) (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & 
Rapson, 1994).  Furthermore, research demonstrates that one’s own actions are modulated by 
the perception of others’ actions (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Brass, Zysset, & 
von Cramon, 2001; Bach, Peatfield & Tipper, 2007), and that perception of action can be 
influenced by our own actions (Tipper & Bach, 2008).  Perception and action, therefore, would 
apparently be tightly coupled.  Whether this can be evidenced neurally has been a major topic in 
cognitive neuroscience for more than a decade. 
1.1.1 The discovery of cells coding both perception and action 
Theories and research relating to this simulation theory of action perception exploded following 
the discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ in the macaque monkey.  In a series of single cell recordings, di 
Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti (1992) found that a set of neurons within area F5 
(ventral premotor cortex) of the macaque monkey were responsive when the macaque being 
recorded executed a reach-and-grasp action as well as when it observed a similar action being 
performed by a conspecific or experimenter.  The ‘mirror’ properties of neurons in area F5 have 
been reaffirmed by subsequent studies (Caggiano et al., 2011; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & 
Rizzolatti, 1996; Kraskov, Dancause, Quallo, Shepherd, & Lemon, 2009; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & 
Gallese, 2001; Umiltà et al., 2001).  It was further observed that F5 neurons coded not for 
individual movements (i.e. individual muscle group contractions), but rather specific motor acts; 
that is, they code for action sequences with specific short-term goals, such as grasping, holding 
and tearing (Rizzolatti et al. 1981; Rizzolatti et al. 1988; Okano & Tanji, 1987).  Visuo-motor 
properties of neurons were also later discovered within area PF (inferior parietal lobule) of the 
macaque (Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese et al., 2002;).1  The discovery appeared to provide a neural 
mechanism matching perception and action and marked a ground-breaking point in research for 
                                                          
1
 It is, however, worth noting that both regions also contain neurons with motor-only and visual-only 
properties (Gallese et al., 1996, 2002). 
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several areas of psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including motor cognition, social 
cognition, empathy, imitation, and indeed perception in general. 
1.1.2 Evidence for shared representations for action and perception in humans   
1.1.2.1 fMRI 
Given the invasive nature of single cell recordings, research in humans has had to turn to 
alternative methods to explore the potential existence of a human mirror neuron system.  Several 
studies have employed blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI).  In fMRI research, an increase in BOLD response in a particular neural region is 
interpreted as that region being active and involved in the task at hand.  FMRI studies have 
followed the logic that an increase in activation in motor planning regions during the mere 
observation of action demonstrates the presence of mirror neurons in a region.  Several studies 
have demonstrated just this and concluded that the findings provide evidence of a human mirror 
neuron system by observing such activation in frontal and parietal regions homologous to the 
macaque F5 and PF (Buccino et al., 2001; Buccino et al., 2004; Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, 
Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Grèzes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 
2003; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Molnar-Szakacs, Kaplan, Greenfield, & 
Iacoboni, 2006). 
However, many researchers would argue that it is important that activation be recorded for both 
execution and observation of action; that is, a crossmodal response across the visual and motor 
modalities is necessary to demonstrate the presence of mirror neurons in a region.  A smaller 
number of studies have demonstrated this (Chong, Cunnington, Williams, Kanwisher, & 
Mattingley, 2008; Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009; Oosterhof, Tipper, & Downing, 
2012). 
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Homologous to the monkey brain, three regions in the human brain have been proposed to 
represent both execution and observation of action, described as the human mirror neuron 
system (hMNS) or action-observation network (AON): the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) together 
with the posterior inferior frontal gyrus (IFGp)/; the inferior parietal lobule (IPL); and the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS) (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010), (despite neurons 
in STS of the macaque not being considered mirror neurons as they did not fire when the 
monkeys performed actions without visual feedback (Rizzolatti et al., 1988)). Several other studies 
suggest that additional areas outside of the three typical AON regions also play a part in action-
observation representation, constituting an extended AON. The core and extended AON are 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.1. Representation of the core and extended AON. In red, the core AON is presented 
comprising: the ventral premotor cortex (PMV)/posterior inferior frontal gyrus (pIFG), the anterior 
inferior parietal lobule (aIPL) and the superior temporal sulcus (STS). In pink, the extended AON is 
presented comprising: the anterior inferior frontal gyrus (aIFG), the dorsal premotor cortex (PMD), 
the superior parietal lobule (SPL), the anterior intraparietal sulcus (AIP), the somatosensory cortex 
(S1) and the occipito-temporal cortex (OTC), also including STS. Adapted from Turella, Wurm, 
Tucciarelli, Lingnau (2013). 
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1.1.2.2 MEP/TMS Studies 
TMS is a technique involving the electrical stimulation of the nervous system. When TMS is 
applied to the motor cortex, at appropriate stimulation intensity, motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) 
can be recorded from corresponding muscles in the extremities. The amplitude of these 
potentials is modulated by the behavioural or experimental context.   Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & 
Rizzolatti (1995) stimulated the motor cortex of participants with TMS and recorded motor 
evoked potential (MEP) patterns from hand muscles whilst participants i) observed an 
experimenter grasp commonly used objects, ii) looked at the same static objects for three 
seconds, iii) observed an experimenter trace shapes in the air with his arm, and iv) detected the 
dimming of a light stimulus on a computer screen (to rule out interpretations in terms of 
attention effects).  MEPs significantly increased during the observation of movements (conditions 
i and iii).  These patterns were very similar to muscle contraction patterns when participants 
executed the same movements themselves.  Authors ruled out the possibility of a preparatory 
response for an impending action by the two conditions which did not represent action (ii and iv).  
Observation of an object, even if it can be considered the possible target for a movement, did not 
elicit an effect that was comparable to that elicited during movement.  From the study, authors 
concluded that there is an action-observation matching system, similar to the one found in 
primate studies (di Pellegrino et al., 1992). 
Gangitano, Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone (2001) expanded on the Fadiga et al. (1995) study by 
exploring the temporal dynamics of cortico-spinal excitability during observation of reach-to-
grasp movements.  They demonstrated that the action-observation mirror system compares the 
observed action with the internal representation in terms of temporal coding. Similar to Fadiga et 
al. (1995), they found that MEPs were modulated by the observation of grasping movements, but 
furthermore, found that MEP patterns were modulated by the different phases of the grasping 
action; MEP amplitude increased with increasing finger aperture, and became smaller during the 
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closure phase. In the macaque, distinct populations of neurons have been shown to have 
different peaks of activity in response to the phase of movement (Rizzolatti et al., 1988).  
Gangitano and colleagues demonstrated a similar effect in humans in the absence of movement. 
The authors thus suggested that the AON/hMNS has detailed (timing) properties.   
1.1.2.3 Electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography studies 
The electrophysiological and magnetophysiological response associated with the human action-
observation network is the suppression of the alpha/mu and beta rhythms.  Electrophysiological 
oscillations in the 8-12/13Hz frequency range over the sensorimotor cortex (mu), and in the 15-
30Hz (beta) range, are at their highest amplitude during rest.  Cortical oscillatory power decreases 
during execution of an action.  The attenuation of oscillatory amplitude has generally been 
associated with desynchronisation of the underlying neural populations, which may reflect an 
increase in neural activity or increased load on the cells (Pfurtscheller, 1997).  Several studies have 
demonstrated, however, that mu and beta suppression occurs not only during action 
performance but also during observation of action (Babiloni et al., 2002, 2009; Cochin, 
Barthelemy, Lejeune, Roux, & Martineau, 1998; Cochin, Barthelemy, & Roux, 1999; Frenkel-
Toledo, Bentin, Perry, Liebermann, & Soroker, 2013; Marshall, Young, & Meltzoff, 2011; 
Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 2004; Perry & Bentin, 2009; Pineda, 2005; Southgate, 
Johnson, Osborne, & Csibra, 2009). Thus, mu and beta wave power suppression is argued to be 
the electrophysiological response associated with human mirror neuron system activity.  
To illustrate, Cochin et al. (1999) recorded EEG activity in seven frequency bands over 14 
electrode sites whilst participants were at rest, whilst observing an experimenter perform index 
finger and thumb pincer movements and whilst performing the same movements themselves.  
Compared to rest, participants showed a decrease in spectral power for the observation and 
execution condition within the 7.5-10.5Hz range in nine of the fourteen sites, demonstrating low 
alpha band suppression across posterior frontal and motor regions.  Cochin and colleagues 
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posited that this was demonstration that both observation and execution of an action recruit the 
same neural regions.   
Similar results have been observed throughout the EEG literature. EEG mu wave attenuation has 
been found in adults when observing single-limb hand and foot actions (Pfurtscheller et al., 1997); 
during aimless finger movements (Babiloni et al., 2002; Cochin et al., 1999); when observing 
skilled/expert complex movements (Babiloni et al., 2009, 2010);  during object-oriented actions 
(Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004; Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2004); during non-transitive 
actions (Babiloni et al., 2002; Cochin et al., 1999; Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004); and when 
imagining an action (Pfurtscheller, Brunner, Schlögl, & Lopes da Silva, 2006).  Spectral power 
suppression has also been observed in young infants observing goal-directed acts (Marshall et al., 
2011; Southgate et al., 2009). 
Although very few studies have examined action observation-action execution matching systems 
with magnetoencephalography (MEG), very similar results to those obtained with EEG have been 
replicated with this technique (Hari et al., 1998; Kilner, Marchant, & Frith, 2006; Kilner, 2009; 
Nishitani & Hari, 2000).  In addition, however, MEG has enabled source localisation of the cortical 
oscillatory activity, therefore providing rich temporal detail of the sequencing of activation of the 
cortical areas of the AON.  To examine the temporal dynamics of cortical activation of motor 
regions during action observation and perception, Nishitani and Hari (2000) recorded cortical 
activity with MEG whilst participants executed a reach-to-grasp action on a manipulandum, 
imitated an experimenter, or purely observed an experimenter perform the grasp action.  They 
found that for each of the conditions, posterior IFG/ ventral premotor cortex was active 100-
200ms prior to precentral motor cortex activity.  From the results, Nishitani and Hari (2000) 
claimed that the posterior IFG is an orchestrator for the action observation network. 
The notion of a human MNS/AON has not been without criticism (Hickok, 2009; 2014; Jacob & 
Jeannerod, 2005; Mahon & Caramazza, 2005).  In particular, it has been highlighted that whilst 
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single cell recordings have enabled key properties of individual neurons to be characterised, 
caution should be taken in extrapolating such properties to the human brain to make inferences 
about system level processes.  Non-invasive techniques such as fMRI and M/EEG examine the 
summative or averaged activity of groups of hundreds and even thousands of neurons.  Within a 
population of cells there will be groups of neurons that code visual-only properties, motor-only 
properties, and a proportion that code for both (Gallese et al., 1996, 2002; Caggiano et al., 2011).  
Any activity recorded for both execution and observation of action in humans may be due to 
groups of neurons coding different features but found within the same region.  
Nevertheless, it is clear from several lines of research with differing techniques that motor 
planning and motor control regions of the human brain are recruited during the observation of 
action without overt motor output.  This may indicate that we in some way experience motor 
resonance with the actor being observed, internally simulating the actions unfolding before us. 
1.2 The emergence and function of shared representations for action execution and 
observation 
1.2.1 A system evolved for social adaptation 
Evidently, there is a substantial amount of research demonstrating the existence of shared neural 
representations for action execution and action observation.  The function of such a system, 
however, has been greatly debated and no definitive conclusion has been drawn at present.  Two 
opposing views have dominated the literature over the last decade, with one in particular gaining 
great favour.   In this view, the shared representations for action execution and observation are 
underpinned by the neural AON, which according to many, has evolved as a consequence of 
increasing social communication and social dependency and the requirement to understand the 
behaviour and intentions of conspecifics.  The evolvement of such a common-coding system is 
argued to have brought about the adaptive advantages of gaining insight into the internal states 
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of others (Hurley, 2008; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006, Ramachandran, 
2000); to facilitate empathy with others (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; 
Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005; Wicker et al., 2003; Leslie, Johnson-Frey, & Grafton, 2004); 
to detect deception (Sebanz & Shiffrar, 2009); as well as to predict the actions of others 
(Blakemore & Frith, 2005), or their goals and intentions (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Iacoboni et al., 
2005) for increased chances of survival (for instance, for a timely flight response), as well as to 
coordinate our own actions with others (Gergely & Csibra, 2008; Miall, 2003). 
1.2.2 A system developed through experience 
In challenge to this approach, some authors have disputed the notion of such shared 
representations having evolved explicitly for social understanding.  Instead, they contend that this 
function has developed through means of Hebbian learning (Hebb, 1949), with mirror neurons 
coding for both action execution and observation as a consequence of visual action input largely 
co-occurring with motor output (Keysers & Perrett, 2004).  On a similar line, some authors suggest 
the shared circuits have developed by means of associative learning (Cook, Press, Dickinson, & 
Heyes, 2010; Heyes, 2001; Heyes, 2010), with the subtle difference that not only contiguity but 
also contingency is explicitly specified as necessary for mirror neuron formation. 
1.2.3 A self- or other- oriented system  
Other than the two theories differing with regards to how they suggest such a common-coding 
system (MNS / AON) could emerge, there is another key distinction between them: The first 
theory claims the system has an inherently social function, enabling us to effectively interact with 
others.  The latter theory posits that the social advantages of shared representation have in fact 
emerged as an epiphenomenon of processes evolved for the control and monitoring of one’s own 
behaviour (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). One argues 
that the principal function is social or other-oriented (e.g. Iacoboni et al., 2005; Oberman & 
Ramachandran, 2008; Schütz-Bosbach, Mancini, Aglioti, & Haggard, 2006), whilst the second 
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argues for a function that has a ‘self’ focus, potentially facilitating fine-grain visuomotor control 
(Brass & Heyes, 2005; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001).  
1.2.4 Internal models of action 
At the heart of this second hypothesis are forward (predictive) models of motor control. It is 
claimed that the motor system uses two forms of internal model (Miall, 2003; Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000): Inverse models project a relationship between intended goals and the motor 
commands necessary to meet those goals.  It transforms representations of location of object and 
limb location into a motor command to be able to reach for the object.  In contrast, forward 
models project a relationship between the motor command and the estimated (predicted) 
consequences of an action in terms of sensory feedback and environmental consequence (object 
is lifted).  First posited by Helmholtz (1867) and Sperry (1950), and developed over recent years by 
researchers in relation to action observation, the notion of forward models of motor control 
argues that our central nervous system (CNS) utilises a copy of the motor command acting on our 
muscles – an efference copy – to predict the consequences of our motor commands.  That is, the 
CNS predicts how our body will move as a response to a motor command, or how our bodies and 
environment will interact.  To do so, an internal forward model is developed that simulates both 
our motor behaviour and the environmental dynamics (such as tool dynamics), generating 
predictions of the relationship between our actions and their consequences.  These internal 
forward models are said not to be fixed, but are learned or trained through experience, with the 
internal forward model being updated based on prediction errors – the discrepancy between the 
expected outcome and the actual consequence experienced (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). 
1.2.5 Uses of motor prediction 
This prediction error is essential in visuomotor and sensorimotor control.  If a cup is not lifted 
from a table as expected, it may suggest the cup is heavier than expected.  In response we react 
by tightening our grip and engaging our muscles more (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001).  Motor 
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prediction can have several uses in sensorimotor control (Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert & 
Flanagan, 2001).  For instance, state estimation can be derived.  When making a movement we 
experience sensory signals as a consequence of our actions (reafferent signals).  These can be 
used in estimating our position and velocity with regards to the environment.  However, these 
reafferent signals experience delays as a consequence of neural conduction, receptor 
transduction and central processing, and can also be distorted by noise (Graf et al., 2007; Miall, 
2003; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001).  Utilising predictions based on efference copies of motor 
commands can overcome these issues related to processing sensory signals.  Motor prediction 
can also be used for sensory confirmation and cancellation, whereby sensory effects and changes 
resulting from our movements are attenuated to enhance more relevant sensory information.  In 
addition, this same mechanism can alert us as to whether an experienced movement was 
internally or externally generated, by retrieving information about whether the predicted and 
actual feedback are congruent or incongruent.   
This motor prediction system appears essentially to be one evolved for or developed for fine grain 
visuomotor and sensorimotor control of one’s own actions. Some authors have suggested that 
these forward (predictive) models may also be used in prediction of other’s actions (Blakemore & 
Frith, 2005; Grush, 2004; Prinz, 2006; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). However, any social advantages 
derived from the system may have occurred as a by-product of the system monitoring one’s own 
actions. 
1.2.6 The Mirror Neuron System in a predictive coding framework 
Kilner, Friston, & Frith (2007) have proposed an account of the workings of the MNS under the 
framework of forward / generative models, and in doing so suggest that this may contribute to 
intention understanding in others.   
In line with Hamilton & Grafton (2007), they propose that actions can be described at four levels: 
(1) the intention level, which refers to the long-term goal of an action; (2) the goal level that 
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describes short-term goals necessary to achieve the long-term intention; (3) the kinematic level 
that describes the shape of the hand and the movement of the arm in space and time; and (4) the 
muscle level refers to the pattern of muscle activity required to execute the action.  In the 
predictive coding account of the MNS, each level of the hierarchy of actions is proposed to 
employ a generative model to predict representations in the level below, e.g. to produce a 
sensory representation at the kinematic level of an action given the information at the goals or 
intentions level.  The prediction is conveyed to the lower level and compared to the 
representation/input received and a prediction error is produced, which in turn is conveyed back 
to the higher level and the representation of sensory causes adjusted, in turn modifying the 
prediction (Kilner et al., 2007).  
For action observation the essence of this approach is that, given a prior expectation about the 
goal of the person we are observing, we can predict their motor commands. Given their motor 
commands we can predict the kinematics, based on our own action system and experience. The 
comparison of the predicted kinematics with the observed kinematics generates a prediction 
error.  The inverse of this, the recognition model, allows the inference of the cause or goal of the 
action given the visual input.   
The prediction and error signals are said to be conveyed via reciprocal patterns of connectivity 
which have been shown between premotor areas and inferior parietal lobule (Iacoboni et al., 
2005; Rushworth, Behrens, & Johansen-Berg, 2006). Their predictive coding account of the MNS is 
based on minimizing prediction error through these reciprocal interactions.   The MNS as a 
predictive coding framework is depicted in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2. A Predictive Coding Account of The Mirror Neuron System. Adapted from Kilner et al. 
(2007). 
 
It seems therefore that there are arguments for the same motor prediction system or the 
hMNS/AON to be used for the monitoring of one’s own actions, but also for the monitoring of 
others’ actions.  Whichever function the system developed or evolved for, there is a large body of 
research suggesting we do anticipate and predict human as well as non-human dynamics in our 
environment, and that we possibly draw upon the motor system as a means to do so.  
1.3 Visual perception as a predictive process 
Predicting the dynamics of our environment is essential for us to respond with an appropriate 
movement within an appropriate time. For instance, in sport we see predictive estimations being 
performed regularly, as players make judgements about necessary movements and strength of 
motion to aim to return a serve in tennis, or prevent a goal in football.  Action perception thus 
involves the complex integration of visual information about exogenous dynamics (objects, tools, 
the environment), including the velocity of movement, direction of movement, the object’s 
material or weight to estimate impact consequences (you might not instigate a rapid duck for 
cover when a paper aeroplane flies towards you, as you would a flying golf ball), together with 
information about the dynamics of our endogenous system (our kinematic capabilities).  
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Similarly, the ability to anticipate, or predict, others people’s actions may be crucial to allow us to 
engage in collaborative and cooperative activities.  Coordinated activities with others, such as 
moving furniture together, rely to some extent on an expectation of how the other person is likely 
to pick up their end of the table, and their restricted movement or kinematics given the weight of 
the object.  Likewise, the ability to generate predictions about others’ actions is crucial to enable 
us to expedite our own response to them – for our actions to coincide, cooperate, or compete. 
As such, visual perception is argued to be a predictive activity (Graf et al., 2007; Prinz, 2006; 
Wilson & Knoblich, 2005), and there is much evidence to date to suggest that motion perception 
is indeed so.  Visual prediction has been demonstrated in behavioural and neuroimaging studies 
through various paradigms, as the following sections highlight. 
Behavioural data 
The occurrence of representational momentum is a task phenomenon that is postulated to 
demonstrate perceptual prediction activity.  Representational momentum is the phenomenon 
whereby video images depicting motion, or static images implying motion, are perceived as being 
further forward in their trajectory than is presented; that is, the trajectory of the movement is 
extrapolated forwards in time and/or space.  The paradigm generally employed involves 
presentation of images of an object or person in motion (induction phase), followed by a brief 
retention period, followed by a final (probe) image.  Participants are required to judge whether 
the probe image depicts the object/person at the same or different location as the final inducing 
image.   Observers are more likely to respond ‘same’ when the probe is further forward in the 
direction of movement.  Representational momentum has been demonstrated for static images 
inferring motion, such as a rocket launching, and a person jumping from a wall (Bertamini, 1993; 
Freyd, 1983; Reed & Vinson, 1996); for movements in different directions (Hubbard & Bharucha, 
1988); for images of non-biological motion (Freyd & Finke, 1984), for video images of full body 
biological motion in point light actors (PLA) (Jarraya, Amorim, & Bardy, 2005), and for motion in 
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complex scenes (Thornton & Hayes, 2004).  Researchers have suggested that the representational 
momentum phenomenon reflects the anticipated direction of movement, rather than the 
perceived actual movement (Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988), and as such reflects predictive 
processes in perception.  Indeed, this is supported by studies demonstrating that increasing the 
uncertainty about object behaviour can reduce and even eliminate the representational 
momentum effect (Kerzel, 2002). This in turn suggests that experience of an object’s behaviour 
and a level of certainty about the behaviour is necessary. 
This trajectory extrapolation effect has also been reported in priming studies.  For instance, 
Verfaillie & Daems (2002) presented participants with a priming phase in which they observed 
pairs of animated characters performing an action and were asked to judge if they were the same 
or different actions.  In the experimental phase, static images of postures were presented that 
depicted poses that participants (i) would have seen in the priming phase if an animation had 
continued longer, (ii) would have seen in the priming phase had the action sequence started 
earlier, or (iii) was not related to an action in the priming phase.  Participants had to determine 
whether the static test posture was a possible/impossible pose.  Facilitatory priming effects were 
only observable for test postures which had been primed with an action that would have resulted 
in the test pose had the animation continued longer.  Such trajectory extrapolation effects have 
been supported by other priming studies involving point-light actors (Verfaillie, 1993), rotating 
two and three-dimensional objects (Kourtzi & Shiffrar, 1997, 1999) and rotating human body 
movement, but not for actions violating normal human bodily movement (Kourtzi & Shiffrar, 
1999). 
On similar lines, the flash-lag effect (Nijhawan, 1994), whereby unpredictable effects, such as a 
brief flash, are generally perceived as trailing behind predictable or continuous events, and 
likewise, the Fröhlich effect (Fröhlich, 1923; Müsseler & Aschersleben, 1998), whereby the onset 
of rapid moving objects is perceived further forward in the object’s course, have both been 
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reported as evidence of the predictive quality of human visual motor perception (Nijhawan, 1994; 
Fröhlich, 1923; Müsseler & Aschersleben, 1998; Thornton & Hubbard, 2002). 
Eye movement data 
Studies examining eye-gaze and saccadic movement have also provided support for the predictive 
property of action perception.  In visually-guided action, proactive eye gaze is essential for 
coordination, planning and control of movement (Johansson, Westling, Bäckström, & Flanagan, 
2001; Land & Furneaux, 1997) (Land & Furneaux, 1997; Johansson, Westling, Bäckström, & 
Flanagan, 2001). It  has been hypothesised that if action perception of others involves direct 
matching of motor representations, the eye gaze produced when observing someone perform an 
action should equate to the pattern produced when executing an action oneself.   Flanagan & 
Johansson (2003) found that this was indeed the case; when observing another person perform a 
block stacking task, eye gaze was very similar to the eye gaze-hand coordination produced when 
performing the same task themselves, and importantly, it maintained a predictive rather than 
reactive pattern.  This was also found for both predictable and unpredictable actions (when the 
target block of choice was not known in advance) (Rotman, Troje, Johansson, & Flanagan, 2006).  
Predictive eye gaze movements have also been observed during the pursuit of targets that are 
transiently occluded, with eye movements demonstrating anticipatory saccades to the target 
reappearance position  (Bennett & Barnes, 2003, 2004; Madelain & Krauzlis, 2003; Orban de Xivry, 
Bennett, Lefèvre, & Barnes, 2006), and have also been observed in 12 month old infants for goal 
oriented actions (Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006).  The studies suggest that when 
observing someone perform an action, eye motor programmes are produced that are directed by 
motor representations for action execution, in that they are proactive and predictive, not 
reactive, which would suggest that, even when observing another, we use eye gaze in a manner 
appropriate for motor planning and control. 
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The occlusion paradigm 
The occlusion paradigm is another method that has been widely used of late to explore simulation 
and prediction of action. Generally, these studies involve the presentation of the beginning of an 
action sequence, which is then occluded from view by the presentation of a blank screen or 
occluding object, followed by a static test posture which depicts a position in the sequence that is 
earlier or later than (or in some studies coherent with) the true action posture had the action 
continued during the occlusion.  Participants are required to respond as to whether they believe 
the test posture is a depiction of an earlier or later action position in the sequence compared to 
what would be expected.  Findings from some such studies suggest that motion perception and 
simulation processes are highly accurate and run in real time with the actual action being 
observed (Graf et al., 2007; Parkinson, Springer, & Prinz, 2011).  Other studies, however, have 
demonstrated a lag error in simulation, suggesting simulation processes run with a constant time 
delay when observing action (Prinz & Rapinett, 2008; Sparenberg, Springer, & Prinz, 2012).  
Occlusion studies would thus imply either that anticipatory mechanisms of future action are very 
precise, or that we do not anticipate forthcoming action.  Either way, there is a lack of converging 
evidence from occlusion paradigms that action perception involves the extrapolation of the 
moving target forwards in its trajectory.  However, the varying findings may be due to issues with 
the stimuli used as shall be discussed in the subsequent section, and which this thesis in part 
intends to address. 
1.4 Timing of action simulation / action prediction. Does prediction of actions involve 
real-time simulation of action? 
Researchers utilising the occlusion paradigm have been interested in examining whether action 
perception involves pure trajectory extrapolation of visual/perceptual representations, or an 
internal simulation of the perceived motor movements through recruitment of motor 
representations developed from one’s motor experience.  Other researchers have used the 
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occlusion paradigm to examine the detail of the spatial and/or temporal aspects of human motion 
perception.  The majority of these studies have employed point-light actors (PLAs) whereby 
motion is depicted by moving dots on a high contrast background, which represent the position of 
the head and major joints of the body (Johansson, 1973).  Graf et al. (2007) used PLAs in an 
occlusion paradigm to implicitly examine timing of action simulation to avoid effects induced by 
task instruction.  Human PLAs conducting various whole-body actions were used as stimuli2. The 
test posture was rotated in depth/space and participants had to respond whether the posture 
was a continuation of the action in the same or different orientation (at any point in time). Error 
rates and reaction times (RTs) increased with increasing distance between occluder duration and 
rotation distance and performance was better overall when the test posture depicted a position 
that was temporally coherent with the occlusion duration.  From this finding, Graf et al. (2007) 
concluded that action simulation and prediction processes are remarkably accurate in terms of 
timing and suggested the results provide evidence for ‘real-time’ action simulation.   
Another implicit examination of timing of action simulation using an occlusion paradigm was 
employed by Parkinson, Springer, & Prinz (2011).  In their study, PLAs were observed briefly 
before being occluded and subsequently re-presented embedded in “TV snow” noise.  Test 
motion post-occlusion was also manipulated whereby it was temporally coherent or incoherent 
with the motion if it had continued during occlusion.  The dependent measure was the ability to 
detect PLA reappearance in various levels of noise.  When the re-appearance of the action was 
coherent with the occlusion period (i.e., the action was where it would have been if it had 
continued), detection was better than when it mismatched. This again supports the notion that 
simulation processes operate in real time, and in so being, facilitate perceptual processes by 
providing current state information (current expectations) about action percepts that are visually 
degraded or occluded. 
                                                          
2
 Nine actions were used: Lifting an object from the floor, pushing something away, knee-bends, waving 
both arms, standing up from a chair, embracing someone, putting on boots, bowling, throwing a ball 
overhead with both arms.  
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These two studies primarily wished to test the real-time simulation hypothesis. However, they 
were not concerned with the timing detail to determine exactly how accurate simulation 
mechanisms are.  Both Graf et al. (2007) and Parkinson et al., (2011) used a minimum temporal 
offset between occluder time and post-occlusion test posture of ±300ms.  These conditions would 
not have sufficient temporal resolution to determine the fine grain temporal detail of simulation, 
or to determine whether simulation mechanisms run with a small temporal gain (suggesting an 
anticipatory/forward prediction process in accordance with representational momentum studies), 
or indeed a lag, with regard to the real observed action.    
Sparenberg, Springer, & Prinz (2012) conducted three experiments to examine exactly this.  As in 
previous experiments, they used the occlusion paradigm first created by Graf et al. (2007) and 
PLAs to depict actions3.  However, they employed psychophysical measures to interrogate the 
temporal detail of action prediction/simulation mechanisms, and explicitly asked participants to 
judge the temporal coherence of the motion posture post-occlusion with the expected posture, 
given the occluder duration.  Participants were required to state whether the test posture 
depicted a point in motion that was too early or too late.  The important difference in this study 
was that they temporally manipulated the test posture post-occlusion to create thirteen temporal 
offset conditions, with just 33ms difference between them.   Such conditions provided much 
higher temporal resolution than the Graf et al. (2007) or Parkinson et al., (2011) studies, allowing 
them to directly examine the time course and accuracy of action simulation. 
Sparenberg and colleagues found a negative point of subjective equality (PSE) for both 
experiments 1 (300ms occluder) and 2 (500ms occluder) of -23ms and -26ms respectively, which 
differed significantly from zero.  From this, the authors could conclude that action simulation 
takes more time than the real action itself.  With no significant difference between the temporal 
errors for the two experiments with different occluder durations, the authors further concluded 
                                                          
3
 Five action sequences were used: lifting something from the floor, leapfrogging, pushing something away, 
waving with both hands, bowling. 
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that this was evidence for an initial time delay that remains constant (a stable intercept effect) 
during action simulation, possibly due to switching between perception and simulation processes. 
However, despite such a finding intuitively suggesting that action perception does not involve a 
predictive process, they did not rule this out.  Instead, the authors offered an explanation in terms 
of anticipation of progress of action occurring as people skip the unimportant elements of an 
action, and focus on main parts of an action (i.e. the goal).  The authors suggest that in their 
study, participants are required to simulate the full action in detail (including unimportant 
elements), which may have led to a temporal cost in action simulation. 
Although Sparenberg and colleagues provided a means by which to examine the temporal detail 
of action simulation and potential prediction mechanisms, their findings and conclusions appear 
somewhat contradictory. This said, their conclusions do not detract from the clear observation 
that action simulation took longer than the real observed actions, which is an opposite result from 
that found in a variety of studies examining action prediction.  That is, their findings do not 
correspond with studies suggesting perception is a predictive process, whereby we anticipate 
behaviour ahead of its occurrence (e.g. Freyd, 1983; Jarraya et al., 2005; Thornton & Hayes, 
2004).   
However, these somewhat confusing and contradictory results may be due to reasons pertaining 
to the choice of stimuli used.  Firstly, previous studies concentrated on whole-body complex 
actions, combining transitive and non-transitive actions without a context.  Given that many single 
cell and neuroimaging studies would indicate that the MNS/AON is particularly activated for goal-
directed/object-oriented actions(for monkey mirror neuron firing: Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & 
Rizzolatti, 1996; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Umiltà et al., 2001; for human AON activation: Rizzolatti et 
al., 1996; Johnson-Frey et al., 2003; Shmuelof and Zohary, 2005), it would be advantageous to 
examine the temporal accuracy of prediction related specifically to transitive actions. Sparenberg 
et al. (2012) and other studies may have been flawed by a lack of goal/intention in their stimuli, 
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which cannot in these cases be evoked to simulate the action (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; 
Jeannerod, 2001).  Secondly, previous studies have used action stimuli with varying degrees of 
familiarity to participants.  Activities such as throwing a basketball or leapfrogging, as used in 
these previous studies, may arguably be recently unfamiliar to participants.  The stimuli in the 
Sparenberg et al. (2012) and Graf et al. (2007) studies therefore do not differentiate between 
actions for which participants can and cannot easily draw upon their own motor repertoire to 
enable simulation/prediction mechanisms. Thirdly, researchers have observed that showing less 
information post-occlusion degrades performance in occlusion tasks (Parkinson, Springer, & Prinz, 
2012).  As each of the occlusion studies described present a simple static image post-occlusion on 
which to base a decision, it might be argued that performance accuracy is not as would be 
expected if action were allowed to continue until its completion. 
It is on the foundation of these first occlusion studies from Prinz’s lab that the experiments of 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis are based.  The present research in part aims to address these and 
other issues relating to the described occlusion studies in order to examine temporal features of 
action simulation and prediction. 
1.5 Neural substrates of action prediction/action simulation 
Several studies demonstrate at a neural level that action perception has predictive properties, 
and that the motor system may be involved in this predictive mechanism.  Evidence for the 
predictive properties of action perception comes from a particularly interesting single cell study in 
macaques that provided evidence that there is a subset of ‘mirror neurons’ that respond 
selectively to transitive actions even when the final part of the action is hidden from view (Umiltà 
et al., 2001).  Whilst observing an experimenter reach and grasp an object, these neurons within 
F5 continue to fire and increase their discharge once the experimenter’s hand disappears behind 
an occluder, reaching their peak discharge intensity at the point when the object would be 
grasped, even though this was not visible.  The study provided evidence at the single cell level 
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that predictive or anticipatory mechanisms were operating during observation of goal-directed 
actions. 
As the human homologue of area F5 in monkey, the human premotor cortex has been theorised 
to play a role in the simulation and prediction of observed actions.  As such, the role of the 
premotor cortex in prediction has been the subject of much research over recent years.  
Neuroimaging research in human participants has provided consistent support for the 
involvement of the premotor cortex in action prediction.  In an EEG study, Kilner, Vargas, Duval, 
Blakemore, & Sirigu (2004) also observed neuronal activity prior to the start of an action being 
observed.  They found that the readiness potential, an electrophysiological marker of motor 
preparation, was present also when observing someone else’s hand reach and grasp an object.  
Moreover, when the onset time of the action was predictable, the readiness potential amplitude 
increased prior to the observed action onset.  The authors postulate from this that the readiness 
potential is not simply a marker of motor preparation, but one of motor prediction, with the 
excitation of the motor system prior to observed movement potentially serving to facilitate our 
own timely response to others. 
Prediction or anticipation of forthcoming observed movement has also been demonstrated with 
fMRI.  Stadler et al., (2011) aimed to determine the role of the premotor cortex with regards to its 
potential predictive function compared to the representation of action in general (ie. holding a 
mental representation of an action in mind). They employed an occlusion paradigm with four 
conditions: a ‘prediction’ condition, in which participants indicated whether the action continued 
with coherent timing following the occlusion period;  a ‘freezing’ condition involved a static 
matching task, whereby participants held in mind the final image pre-occlusion and indicated 
whether the video post-occlusion continued from the same point in time. These two conditions 
were contrasted against two other conditions using the same stimuli: a ‘detection’ condition, in 
which participants indicated whether the action without occlusion was smooth or disrupted; and 
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a ‘counting’ condition, in which participants counted the number of occlusions per video clip 
disregarding the action.  The right pre-SMA was active for conditions relating to maintenance of 
an internal reference (both prediction and static matching, compared to detection and counting).  
Activation specific to the prediction condition (contrasted against the static matching condition) 
was found in the left dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) and left pre-SMA.  This prediction condition 
required a dynamic transformation of the stimuli over time - a simulation process - compared to 
the mental maintenance of an action representation, as in the ‘freezing’ condition.  The authors 
thus concluded that PMd and pre-SMA activation is specific to simulation and prediction 
processes. This was supported by a subsequent study (Stadler et al., 2012) involving repetitive 
TMS to the left PMd and to the vertex during observation of action that was transiently occluded.  
Applying TMS at the start of the occlusion period produced more prediction errors (increased 
error rates) than TMS over the vertex, with time-coherent trials being incorrectly judged as 
incoherent. 
Other studies have similarly found premotor cortex involvement in prediction processes when 
observing others’ actions, but implicate the more ventral PMv/IFG pars opercularis rather than 
the dorsal region.  Ramnani & Miall (2004) examined BOLD activation that was time-locked to the 
instructional cue in a visuomotor stimulus-response (finger movement) association task, thus 
examining anticipation of action. This was conducted for the participant’s own action execution 
preparation, as well as a third person’s (a real person known to the participant) action.  PMd 
activation was observed for the first person condition, but not for third person action anticipation.  
Instead, areas associated with attribution of mental states to others were activated, including the 
paracingulate cortex and superior temporal sulcus, as well as the PMv (identified as Broca’s area 
in the study).  Whilst the activation of motor areas for third person action prediction provides 
support for the simulation theory of action observation/prediction, authors suggest that the fact 
that separate sub-systems of the premotor cortex are activated for the different conditions 
suggests that simulation theory alone is insufficient to explain prediction of others’ actions; we 
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may also use mental imagery of others’ actions and the simulation of our own actions to aid the 
prediction process. In this study, however, no observed actions of a third person were visible. The 
participant was required to imagine a third person in another room responding to the cues.  
Therefore, the PMv activation may be more attributable to the additional mentalising required for 
the task, rather than action prediction for others per se.  This said, ventral premotor cortex/IFG 
pars opercularis activation has been associated with action prediction and simulation studies 
relating to the anticipation of handwriting movements in a PET study (Chaminade, Meary, 
Orliaguet, & Decety, 2001). 
The premotor cortex has consistently been associated with prediction tasks in general, even for 
abstract stimuli that cannot be mapped onto the human body.   For instance, ventrolateral 
premotor cortex activity has been observed for prediction of geometrical figure size (Schubotz & 
von Cramon, 2002) and geometrical figure event sequencing (Schubotz & von Cramon, 2004) in 
serial prediction tasks, for auditory rhythm prediction (Schubotz, von Cramon, & Lohmann, 2003) 
and pitch prediction (Schubotz & von Cramon, 2002), and has been associated with prediction of 
event dynamics in general (Schubotz, 2007).  Thus premotor areas would appear to be involved in 
predictive tasks in general, not solely action perception.  It is suggested that the type of event 
(biological/non-biological, hand/finger/limb, visual/auditory) is mapped somatotopically along the 
ventral-dorsal axis of the premotor cortex (Buccino et al., 2001; Schubotz & von Cramon, 2002, 
2004; Stadler et al., 2011), thus explaining differences in the literature with regards to dorsal and 
ventral premotor cortex activation for action prediction.  However, it is further argued that the 
prediction of any sequentially organised information is enough to elicit premotor cortex activity, 
with abstract information type being mapped along the PMC in a somatotopic manner, 
represented by codes of their ‘distal’ features (Schubotz & von Cramon, 2004; Schubotz, 2007; 
Hommel et al., 2002).  
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Despite the literature suggesting the involvement of distinct ventral or dorsal areas of the 
premotor cortex in action prediction, further studies have been able to converge the opposing 
findings.   As such, research provides consistent support for the involvement of the premotor 
cortex in action prediction, with the precise location along the premotor cortex likely relating to 
the body part involved in the action perceived.  The PMv/PMd may therefore have a specific 
predictive function within the context of the action observation network.  However, what is yet 
unclear is the role of the premotor cortex in anticipatory / predictive action perception of self-
generated as opposed to other-generated actions, or indeed whether the same subsection of the 
premotor cortex is recruited during the prediction of these two types of action. Given the debate 
surrounding the etiology of the putative action-observation network (whether it evolved for social 
purposes or for monitoring of one’s own actions), it would seem that a crucial line of investigation 
would be to examine shared representations and the role of the premotor cortex in relation to 
the prediction of self-generated and other-generated actions. 
1.6 Dissociating systems for observation of self versus other 
Very few studies have attempted to disassociate systems potentially serving a self-oriented 
function, as opposed to a social other-oriented function.  Several neuroimaging studies have, 
however, provided evidence for different neural correlates of self-related and other-related 
representations, which would suggest differing mechanisms underpinning them.  
1.6.1 Neural correlates of self and other 
Neuroimaging studies employing fMRI have examined judgements of action attribution; i.e., how 
we distinguish actions generated by ourselves and those of other people.   The ‘sense of agency’ - 
experiencing oneself as the cause of an action - is intricately related to self-ownership (Gallagher, 
2000), which is itself related to coherent postural representation of visual input with the internal 
body schema (Costantini & Haggard, 2007).  Studies have demonstrated the involvement of the 
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anterior insula in perceiving movement as self-generated (Farrer & Frith, 2002), imagining oneself 
perform an action compared to imagining someone else perform the action (Ruby & Decety, 
2001), and hearing one’s own voice compared to that of another (McGuire, Silbersweig, & Frith, 
1996).  Attributing another person to the cause of an action, however, involved greater activation 
in the right inferior parietal cortex (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Spence et al., 1997).  Similarly, greater 
activation in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) was reported when imagining someone else perform 
an action, compared to imagining oneself (Ruby & Decety, 2001), and when hearing the voice of 
another person compared to one’s own (McGuire et al., 1996).  Farrer and colleagues (2003) 
found that activity in both the IPL and insula was modulated by the degree of discrepancy 
between the movement executed by the participant and the visual feedback received on screen, 
with less discrepancy associated with more activation in the insula and reduced activity in the IPL, 
and more discrepancy having the opposite pattern of covariance.  The degree of involvement of 
these two areas would therefore appear to be associated with the extent to which a person 
attributes an action to themselves or another (Farrer et al., 2003). 
Several neuroimaging studies have also demonstrated that there are distinct neural 
representations for viewing action in different perspectives, which are arguably involved in 
distinguishing self from other (Chan, Peelen, & Downing, 2004; David et al., 2006; Ehrsson, 
Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Jarraya et al., 2005; Saxe, Jamal, & Powell, 2006).  The medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) has been widely associated with a sense of self (David et al., 2006; 
Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001).  Similarly, the first person perspective has been 
associated with increased activity in somatosensory areas, unlike the third person allocentric 
perspective (Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2001; Saxe et al., 2006). 
In summary, somatosensory areas, MPFC, insula and other limbic areas have robustly been 
reported to relate to sense of agency and self-representation.  In contrast, the inferior parietal 
cortex, and in particular the IPL, has frequently been associated with representation of ‘other’.  
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Several studies have therefore highlighted potential dissociable correlates, pathways and possible 
mechanisms underlying perception and interpretation of one’s own and others’ actions.  
1.6.2 The importance of perspective 
Several studies have demonstrated that human action stimuli in an egocentric perspective can 
create an affinity with the limb being observed or greater correspondence between the limb 
observed and one’s sense of self.  Botvinick and Cohen (1998) were the first to describe the 
‘rubber hand illusion’ (RHI), whereby synchronous stroking of a seen artificial rubber hand and the 
participant’s own occluded hand shifts the perceived position of their own hand toward that of 
the rubber hand.  Whilst the visual-tactile integration is powerful in eliciting the RHI, it 
necessitates the posture of the rubber hand to equate that of the participant’s; the perceptual 
drift only occurs when the rubber hand is in the egocentric perspective (Costantini & Haggard, 
2007; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Pavani, Spence, & Driver, 2000; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005).  The 
egocentric representation is crucial in matching the rubber hand to the participant’s internal body 
representation, or body schema, which creates a sense of body ownership with the false hand.  
The egocentric postural coherence of the false hand allows it to be assimilated with, rather than 
discriminated from the self (Costantini & Haggard, 2007). The rubber hand illusion and 
neuroimaging studies thus highlight the importance of perspective in associating action with self 
and dissociating action from other agents.  The manipulation of perspective may therefore be a 
useful tool to examine the function and the shared representations of perception and action. 
Despite the extensive neuroimaging data suggesting different neural representations for self- 
versus other- actions, many of the studies discussed in section 1.3 have examined action 
observation, action simulation and/or prediction utilising presentation of stimuli that can only be 
interpreted as others performing an action.  They use visual stimuli of actions performed with the 
actor facing towards the observer or sidelong in a wide shot, or simple limb movements in a cut-in 
shot again from a side angle.  Such presentation fails to disentangle differing mechanisms that 
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may underpin action observation and related cognitive processes for different perspectives, which 
have been associated with self or other to differing degrees (Oberman & Ramachandran, 2008; 
Chan et al., 2004; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Jarraya et al., 2005; Saxe et al., 2006).  If conclusions about 
the function of shared representations are to be drawn with regards to predictive mechanisms for 
self or for social purposes, it is essential to attempt to disentangle actions and facilitatory 
mechanisms relating to self and other.  Many of the studies discussed in section 1.3 are 
ambiguous with respect to these potentially differing processes. 
One method to attempt to disentangle processes related to self and others in action 
interpretation and prediction tasks is to utilise stimuli presented in the first person (egocentric) 
and third person (allocentric) perspectives.  This logic was postulated by Oberman and 
Ramachandran (2008), who suggest any shared representation would have emerged from 
associations built on visual feedback.  The assumption is that egocentric presented stimuli closely 
resemble the actual visual feedback of performing an action oneself, whereas allocentric stimuli 
capture the visual input of observing someone else. As mentioned previously, neuroimaging 
studies have demonstrated distinct neural representations for viewing actions in different 
perspectives, and are involved in distinguishing self versus other agents of the action (e.g. David 
et al., 2006; Ehrsson et al., 2004). If a mechanism has emerged for the monitoring of one’s own 
actions, the prediction of consequences of action would be most effectively achieved in the first 
person perspective.  If the mechanism has emerged for social reasons, action observation would 
be most efficient in the third-person perspective. 
1.6.3 The effect of perspective in cognitive tasks 
Visual stimuli presented in egocentric and allocentric perspectives have therefore been used in an 
attempt to disambiguate between self- and other-related processes.  Stimuli in an egocentric 
perspective are thus photographed or filmed from the perspective of an observer looking at their 
own body, whilst allocentric images are created from a body perspective that is inaccessible to 
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the observer and thus only attributable to looking at someone else’s body.  The sections that 
follow outline some of the behavioural, MEP, fMRI and EEG/MEG studies that have explicitly 
examined effects of perspective on cognitive tasks and neural activity. 
Behavioural data 
Conson, Aromino and Trojano (2010) examined whether handedness and visual perspective can 
modulate a person’s ability to discriminate between self and other.  Participants were explicitly 
asked to recognise hands presented in ego- and allocentric views as belonging to themselves or to 
another person.  Results demonstrated that participants were faster to recognise their own hand 
in the egocentric perspective, and faster to recognise others’ hands in the allocentric perspective. 
In addition, in the egocentric perspective, participants were significantly faster at recognising their 
self dominant hand compared to non-dominant hand.  There was no difference between 
recognising the right or left hand of others’ in the egocentric view.  In contrast, in the allocentric 
perspective, participants were significantly faster at recognising others’ hands that were non-
dominant to their own (in right handers, recognising other’s left hand; in left handers, recognising 
other’s right hand), with no difference between self left or right hand in this perspective. 
The findings suggest two things: One, that body specific information (perspective and 
handedness) is important in sense of ownership and self-other discrimination; and two, that peri-
dominant hand space is the preferred reference frame to distinguish other from self (Conson et 
al., 2010).  Leading on from this, we might also suggest, in experimental studies examining action 
observation mechanisms, that mirror-matched (specular) limb actions in the allocentric 
perspective would be preferable over the use of anatomy-matched actions, as the latter would 
have an additional processing disadvantage.  Further studies have demonstrated that specular 
correspondence also applies to action observation and action imagery (Alaerts, Heremans, 
Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2009; Conson, Mazzarella, & Trojano, 2009). 
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Examining perspective in isolation and its influence on representation of action, Anquetil and 
Jeannerod (2007) found no difference in action representation performance corresponding to 
first- and third-person perspective action observation.  Their behavioural study involved 
participants mentally imagining grasping actions either from a self-generated (egocentric) 
perspective or other-generated (allocentric) perspective, as if observing someone else facing 
them perform the same actions.  Utilising a mental chronometry method, they found that the 
time to complete actions was highly similar when imagined in the 1PP compared to 3PP.  
Furthermore, the time-to-complete-action difference between the easy-grasp (natural hand 
orientation) and hard-grasp (unnatural hand orientation) conditions was very similar between the 
two perspective conditions.  Authors concluded from the study that the results demonstrate 
shared representations for self- and other-generated actions.   
However, there is a flaw in the Anquetil and Jeannerod (2007) study.  For the allocentric 
perspective condition, participants were simultaneously presented with images whilst instructed 
to imagine the action.  The static image comprised the right hand of the ‘other’ being used to 
grasp an object, i.e. an anatomical limb match.   However, as discussed, several findings (Alaerts 
et al., 2009; Conson et al., 2010, 2009) would suggest that this type of limb match would be 
harder to simulate and therefore disadvantageous.  If a mirror-matched limb were used for 
imagining the allocentric condition, timing differences between conditions may be found, and in 
turn suggest different representations for ego- and allocentric actions.   
Findings and conclusions from the Anquetil and Jeannerod (2007) study have been further 
challenged by other studies.  Studies have highlighted the importance of perspective in 
integration of visuotactile stimuli in somatosensory tasks.  Hoover and Harris (2012) found that 
participants’ sensitivity to detect temporal asynchrony between proprioceptive and visual 
information was greatest when the visual feedback of finger movements were presented in an 
egocentric perspective compared to an allocentric perspective, regardless of whether they were 
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mirror-reversed or inverted (Hoover & Harris, 2012).  Furthermore, effects of distractor lights in 
discriminating location of vibrotactile stimulators on the participant’s hand were increased when 
the seen rubber hand ‘holding’ the distractors was aligned with the participant’s own hand (i.e. in 
an egocentric perspective) (Pavani et al., 2000), thus suggesting advantageous processing in 
sensory integration for first-person perspective visual displays.  
Bach, Fenton-Adams, Tipper (2014) similarly examined visuotactile integration.  Developing on a 
study by Morrison, Tipper, Fenton-Adams, & Bach (2013), they examined participants’ detection 
of tactile stimulation when observing reach-to-grasp and reach-retraction actions towards painful 
and non-painful objects, in the ego- and allocentric perspectives.  It was assumed that sensory 
expectation of pain would be achieved through prediction by integrating action information 
(whether the hand touched the object) with the internal model of the object (whether the object 
was painful).  The authors found an interesting three-way interaction, whereby, in the first person 
perspective (1PP), participants were quickest to detect tactile stimulation to their index finger 
when observing grasping actions of painful objects.  In contrast, in the third person perspective 
(3PP) only the main effects of object type and action were found, but no evidence that the two 
are combined to predict the sensory consequence of action.  The authors posit that the first-
person perspective has privileged access to mechanisms that predict sensory consequences of 
action and, in turn, conclude that the findings challenge theories of action-observation common 
coding systems evolving for the understanding of others’ actions. 
Whilst these studies have examined integration of visuotactile information as a means to examine 
prediction mechanisms relating to sensory consequences of action, other authors have used 
purely visual information to explore action consequences.  Kelly and Wheaton (2013), for 
instance, examined the effects of perspective and handedness of the participant as well as the 
actor observed on determining an action goal (screwing or unscrewing a screw from a panel).  In 
this sense, they examined ‘action prediction’ by exploring whether the ability for motor 
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resonance/simulation to occur is impacted on in a limb specific way.  Left- and right-handed 
participants were given training in the use of three types of screwdriver before completing an 
experimental task in which static images of an actor were presented in an egocentric or 
allocentric perspective, using their right or left hand.  Participants had to determine whether the 
direction of an arrow on the image indicated that the actor was screwing or unscrewing a screw 
with the tool.  Images in the egocentric perspective generated higher accuracy and faster 
latencies compared to allocentric images. There was no effect of handedness of participant or 
observed limb of actor performing the action.  The results are in line with previous research 
indicating that action outcomes are best facilitated in an internal (egocentric) perspective, 
irrespective of hand used, in line with previous studies (Bach et al, 2014; Conson et al., 2010; 
Hoover & Harris, 2012; Lindgren, 2012; Oosterhof et al., 2012).  
An advantage in cognitive task performance for stimuli presented in the 1PP compared to 3PP has 
also been observed in memory related tasks.  Participant’s recall accuracy and memory for tasks 
and task elements have been found to be significantly superior for simulations in the 1PP 
compared to 3PP (Lindgren, 2012).  Similarly, efficient episodic memory encoding and recollection 
has been found to be dependent on a first person perspective of the spatial relation between the 
body and the world (Bergouignan, Nyberg, & Ehrsson, 2014).  
If we are to follow the premise offered by Oberman and Ramachandran (2008), several of these 
studies suggest that common coding mechanisms for action execution and observation may have 
evolved not for social understanding purposes, but rather for the purpose of monitoring one’s 
own actions, and for fine grain visuomotor control.  However, despite these studies suggesting 
privileged cognitive performance for actions and events experienced in the first-person reference 
frame, evidence from studies recording MEPs has been mixed. 
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TMS-MEP data 
Schütz-Bosbach, Mancini, Aglioti, & Haggard (2006) measured action facilitation effects using TMS 
when watching an action attributed to another or attributed to oneself. They were able to 
manipulate the attribution of action of another’s hand to themselves or to another using the 
established rubber hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998).  This was done by the other’s hand 
being held in front of the participant’s body in a 1PP view, whilst their own hand was hidden from 
view.  The stroking of the other’s hand was congruent or incongruent with the stroking of the 
participant’s own hand.  The authors measured motor facilitation effects while observing random 
abductor actions of the experimenter’s index finger, by recording motor evoked potentials (MEPs) 
elicited from the participant’s right first-dorsal interosseus (FDI) muscle following TMS to primary 
motor cortex.  The authors found no main effect of the rubber hand illusion/ownership (ie. self-
synchronous/other-asynchronous stroking) or of the observed action (experimenter action/no 
action) on cortical excitability.  However, there was an interaction between the two, with 
observed action in the other-asynchronous condition facilitating MEPs of the observer.  The self-
synchronous condition did not facilitate MEPs compared to baseline (observation of static hand), 
rather it suppressed MEPs.   
The authors claim that the findings suggest that neural mechanisms map the actions of others to 
corresponding actions on one’s own body but, importantly, they argue that the mechanisms do 
not simply represent the ‘other’ as a derivative of, or equal to, the self. They argue that theories 
of shared representation require a common, agent-neutral, representation for one’s own actions 
and for the actions of others. However, Schütz-Bosbach and colleagues found an agent-specific 
representation in the primary motor cortex, and thus suggest the motor system differentiates 
between self and other, rather than equating them. Moreover, the authors conclude from the 
finding that the neural mechanisms underlying action observation are intrinsically social. 
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Nevertheless, it is key to note that in the Schütz-Bosbach et al. (2006) study, the condition in 
which action was attributed to an ‘other’ (asynchronous stroking) rather than self-attributed was 
seen from the egocentric perspective, that is, with the experimenter’s hand held in front of the 
observer’s body.  Whilst the authors claim this is a positive advantage to this study as visual input 
is kept constant across conditions, one might argue that observing another person’s arm in front 
of oneself at such an angle is highly irregular and unlikely.  The increased MEP amplitude reported 
for the ‘other’/asynchronous condition may potentially be due to a conflict between the visual 
and sensory feedback experienced.   
Despite evidence to suggest a shared representation system may have developed for the explicit 
purpose of social understanding, many other studies have found contradictory results to those 
found by Schütz-Bosbach and colleagues (2006).  Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman, & Pascual-Leone (2002) 
also explored whether hand orientation in an observed action affects the amount of cortico-spinal 
excitability by measuring MEPs.  Overall, MEP facilitation was greatest when participants 
observed actions in the egocentric perspective compared to the allocentric perspective.  The 
facilitation was specific to the muscle involved in the action being observed, i.e., MEP facilitation 
was selective to the FDI muscle of the participant when viewing index finger ab-/adduction 
movement, and selective to the APB muscle when viewing thumb ab-/adduction actions.  
Furthermore, the authors demonstrated that MEP facilitation depended on the orientation of the 
actions observed.  Both APB and FDI muscle facilitation were greatest during observation of 
movements in the egocentric (movement away from observer) compared to the allocentric 
(movement toward the observer) perspective.   
Facilitation of MEP size was greater during observation of natural (Away/Egocentric) hand 
orientations than unnatural (Toward/Allocentric) hand orientations (rotated not mirrored 
configuration). Under the framework of the mirror system or action observation system having 
emerged for social benefits (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010), it would be 
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predicted that observation of actions with a ‘toward orientation’ would result in larger MEPs.  
However, this was not the case in the Maeda et al., (2002) study, and is in accordance with later 
studies (Bach et al., 2014; Kelly & Wheaton, 2013; Oosterhof et al., 2012).  This said, the 
allocentric condition in the Maeda et al. (2002) study utilised stimuli of finger actions in a rotated 
(anatomical match) configuration.  This ‘other’ condition could therefore induce a disadvantaged 
simulation process for this condition (e.g. Conson et al., 2010, 2009).  Ideally, a study would 
compare the egocentric perspective to allocentric perspectives in both the rotated (anatomical 
match) and flipped (mirror/specular match) configurations.  
This is exactly what the study conducted by Alaerts et al. (2009) explored.  They investigated the 
effects of posture, perspective and body side on MEP amplitudes induced during action 
observation. Participants observed simple wrist extension movements with the left and right 
hands in both ego- and allocentric perspectives, and with posture congruent (palm down) or 
incongruent (palm up) with the observer.  In accordance with the Maeda et al. (2002) findings, 
overall facilitation of MEP amplitude size was greatest in the egocentric compared to allocentric 
perspective.  However, this was only the case for right hand movements.  For left hand 
movements, the allocentric condition elicited the greatest motor facilitation of the extensor 
muscle.  The findings thus provide MEP-TMS support for a mirror-match preference over an 
anatomical-match when observing actions in a third person perspective, as well as support for 
imitation studies demonstrating a specular preference when imitating (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, 
& Gattis, 2000).  However, the study did not compare MEP amplitude difference magnitudes from 
baseline across these two conditions to determine whether one perspective (egocentric or 
allocentric mirror-match) preferentially facilitates motor excitability.  In this regard, the findings 
are ambiguous with respect to whether a shared representation system has a self or other 
oriented function.  
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Single cell data 
Despite several years of convincing data from single cell recordings in macaques demonstrating 
the existence of mirror neurons, very few studies have examined whether these mirror neurons 
continue to have mirror neuron properties when actions are observed from different 
perspectives.  Caggiano et al., (2011) investigated the role of perspective on firing rates of motor 
neurons in F5 of the macaque whilst they observed actions from 0, 90°, or 180° perspectives. With 
specific reference to perspective, the researchers found that different neurons showed different 
tuning profiles across the different perspectives.  Slightly more neurons responded specifically to 
actions observed from a first-person (0°) perspective (n = 27) than a third-person (90° and 180°) 
perspective (n =15 and n = 18, respectively).  Their results demonstrated there are dissociable 
neural populations for actions observed from first- and third-person perspectives, with a potential 
bias for stronger coding of actions from a first-person perspective. The study thus tentatively 
suggests that mirror neurons have a bias for coding egocentric actions, and provides single cell 
evidence that neural regions involved in action observation may have an egocentric (self-
monitoring) function, rather than a social function.  
fMRI data 
When considering fMRI studies, Oosterhof et al., (2012) have highlighted that the majority of 
studies that have attempted to examine shared representations for both executed and observed 
action failed to find evidence for cross-modal action coding (i.e., similar coding across the visual 
and motor domains) in ventral pre-motor cortex (PMv).  Furthermore, importantly, the only study 
(Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009) that reported full cross-modal coding in PMv 
employed stimuli in the first-person perspective only, where actions were seen as if performed by 
the participant. The Kilner et al. (2009) study therefore did not test a fundamental aspect of the 
MNS/AON - the ability to generalise one’s own motor information to actions of others observed 
from the third-person perspective.  
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Oosterhof and colleagues (2012) attempted to fill this gap in the literature.  Using multivoxel 
pattern analysis (MVPA), where a classifier trained on action can recognize specific actions that 
are observed, and vice versa, the authors found action-specific cross-modal visual–motor 
representations in ventral premotor cortex (PMv) for the first-person but not for the third-person 
perspective. In contrast, more posterior areas in the parietal and occipitotemporal cortex did 
show cross-modal coding irrespective of perspective. The findings point to a stronger role for 
these latter regions, relative to PMv, in supporting the understanding of othersʼ actions.  These 
properties are consistent with the results of Caggiano et al., (2011) with regards to observed 
actions being coded differently for first- versus third-person perspectives, with the former 
potentially being coded more strongly in PMv (and it’s macaque homologue F5). 
EEG and MEG data 
In EEG and MEG studies, very few studies indeed have explored action observation with regard to 
perspective of the observer.  In fact, only two studies have been found to date that do this.  
Frenkel-Toledo, Bentin, Perry, Liebermann, & Soroker (2013) examined EEG oscillation 
suppression during manual action execution as well as action observation from egocentric (facing 
away, seeing the actor from behind) and allocentric (facing towards the participant) perspectives, 
with suppression determined relative to a non-biological movement (viewing a rolling ball). 
With regards to effect of perspective in the observed action conditions, authors reported that 
suppression tended to be greatest in the allocentric rather than egocentric condition.  However, it 
is important to highlight that their egocentric condition was not the typical view that would be 
seen if the observer were making the action.  Instead, a third person perspective is used again, 
with the actor’s back to the observer.  This is an important distinction. Reduced suppression of 
EEG power in this condition compared to the allocentric (actor facing the observing) may be due 
to an interpretation of the visual input of the egocentric condition as being less socially relevant 
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for the observer compared to the allocentric condition.  Similar results have been found in MEG 
studies (Kilner et al., 2006). 
Kilner et al. (2006) had previously similarly investigated the effect of perspective on alpha 
suppression, utilising MEG.  They solely examined action observation, and did so in a manner 
similar to Frenkel-Toledo et al. (2013) in that participants watched videos of actors that were 
either facing towards the observer (allocentric) or facing way with their back to the observer 
(egocentric).  Actors made simple arm movements, raising their left/right arm to touch/not touch 
their ear.  Alpha suppression in the full (7-12Hz) range was investigated, compared with averaged 
amplitude of alpha power across conditions as baseline.  Authors reported significant alpha 
modulation at parietal sensors driven by the hand observed moving (left/right) when the actor 
was facing towards the observer, whilst no suppression was observed in the facing away 
condition. The authors suggest that these differing patterns may reflect a process modulated by 
social relevance of the person observed. A person with their back to us has greatly reduced social 
salience.  Kilner and colleagues speculate that the attenuation of alpha oscillations may be 
modulated by view selective visual input from the STS. They suggest that signals about actions 
from other people are filtered, allowing only actions of the most socially relevant persons to pass 
into the 'mirror system' (Kilner et al., 2006). 
The perspective or orientation of an observed action has been associated with self- and other-
related action, with 1PP actions generally being more easily mapped onto one’s own self 
representations and related to self-generated action as opposed to other-generated action.  The 
effect of perspective during action observation on behaviour in cognitive tasks and on neural 
activity appears to be a salient one, with evidence to suggest that 1PP observed actions have a 
processing advantage. This advantage is supported by single cell recordings demonstrating that 
more neurons in area F5 code for 1PP actions than 3PP, and fMRI showing that the human 
homologue of this area, PMv, demonstrates crossmodal visuo-motor coding only for 1PP actions.  
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Together with the M/EEG studies demonstrating how neural activity is modulated by social 
salience, which can relate to perspective, it is clear that perspective is an important feature when 
examining action observation.  Given the role of the premotor cortex in relation to action 
prediction, future lines of research worth pursuing would be to examine the effect of perspective 
on prediction accuracy for observed actions to determine whether a 1PP advantage exists for 
timing of prediction accuracy, as the single cell and fMRI studies to date would imply.   
1.7 Present work 
The present thesis aims to examine prediction accuracy for actions observed in different frames of 
reference.  More specifically, the thesis examines simulation dynamics and spatiotemporal 
prediction of observed transitive actions. Developing on previous work conducted by Prinz’s lab 
(e.g. Sparenberg et al., 2012), the studies presented employ actions in the first- and third-person 
perspectives, corresponding to self and other actions. In determining which frame of reference is 
advantageous for least prediction error, the thesis has the ultimate aim of determining whether 
the prediction system, and its underlying mechanisms, may essentially be a self-serving system or 
have a fundamentally social-oriented function.   
Each of the studies presented utilise dynamic action stimuli recorded in the first-person 
(egocentric) and third person (allocentric) perspectives, i.e. actions involving limb movements 
away from the observer and towards the observer respectively.  Unlike the Frenkel-Toledo (2013) 
and Kilner (2003) studies, the egocentric perspective  or first-person perspective (1PP) conditions 
depict images of actions from an angle that most accurately correspond to what would be seen if 
the observer had made the action. Whereas, in the allocentric, or third-person perspective (3PP), 
the actions can only be interpreted as someone else having performed the action. 
 
 
Chapter 1 | 40 
 
 
 
  
A summary of the aims of the empirical chapters that follow are outlined below. 
Chapter 2: The first empirical chapter of the thesis is a proof of concept chapter to examine the 
usefulness of an occlusion paradigm and the psychophysics method to examine the 
spatiotemporal dynamics of action prediction with the type of stimuli intended to be used 
throughout the rest of the thesis; that is, using simple hand-on-tool transitive action sequences, 
presented in first person (1PP) and third-person perspective (3PP) frames of reference.  Two 
behavioural studies are described, the second replicating the first, that shed light on the dynamics 
of simulation and prediction accuracy for such actions in the two perspectives.     
Chapter 3: This chapter describes three studies that employ the same methods outlined in the 
previous chapter to examine the effects of priming the actions to be observed with real world 
experience. That is, three distinct groups of participants receive real world visual experience of 
the actions in the 3PP, or motor and visual experience in the 1PP, or motor priming alone without 
visual input.  We discuss the effects of these different experiences on prediction of action 
sequences in the two frames of reference. 
Chapter 4: This chapter describes an EEG study that examines event related potentials (ERPs) that 
have been associated with expectancy violation to examine neural markers of prediction error.  
The study employs a similar paradigm to that employed in the prior two chapters, with 
participants receiving motor priming with visual input prior to engaging in the experiment, and 
examines these potential neural markers of prediction error at the re-onset of the action post-
occlusion.  Mean amplitudes of ERPs are examined for actions in the two perspectives for the 
biological (transitive) action sequences, as well as for non-biological actions (a rolling ball), 
employed as a control for lower versus upper visual field effects.   
Chapter 5.  This chapter again employs a behavioural paradigm to examine action prediction in 
first-and third-person perspectives.  However, the two studies presented in this chapter utilise an 
alternative method to that employed in earlier chapters.  Here, a coincidence anticipation task is 
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used that requires the participant to provide a motor response to coincide with the expected 
moment in time of an action state.  Two studies are presented; one without any motor priming of 
the actions, and the second with motor priming of the actions without visual input, thus allowing 
a comparison of results with those elicited from earlier experiments using the temporal 
judgement psychophysics method. The results are discussed in relation to different mechanisms 
that converging methods of enquiry may draw upon.     
Chapter 6.  This final empirical chapter in essence is a pilot experiment, providing an initial 
exploratory study of individual differences in action prediction performance of the coincidence 
anticipation task.  The chapter extends on Chapter 5 in that it examines the results of the two 
previous experiments in relation to other cognitive and neurophysiological measures from the 
same participants of time perception, motor control as well as autistic like traits. Using a multiple 
linear mixed regression model, the chapter determines whether individual differences can be 
accounted for by the motor experience received or by any of these additional factors. 
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CHAPTER 2: Spatiotemporal prediction of observed action with a 
temporal judgement task 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Anticipation of events in our environment is essential for us to respond with an appropriate 
movement within an adequate time period. For instance, stepping into an elevator or stepping 
onto a moving escalator require prediction of the upcoming dynamics of the doors or the stairs to 
estimate the most appropriate time to step forward. In sport, we see this predictive estimation 
being performed regularly, as players make judgements about the motions necessary to return a 
serve in tennis, or prevent a goal in football. Likewise, the ability to generate predictions about 
other people’s actions is crucial to enable us to expedite our own response to them – for our 
actions to coincide, cooperate, or compete. 
However, generating a reactive response in a dynamically changing environment poses many 
problems. It takes more than 100ms for our movements to be updated as a result of 
somatosensory feedback (Flanders & Cordo, 1989) and approximately 150-200ms based on visual 
feedback (Miall, Weir, Wolpert, & Stein, 1993; Saunders & Knill, 2003). Yet we are able to 
generate responsive movements with great temporal and spatial precision. An explanation for 
this ability is that our nervous system anticipates the future state of our environment or of other 
people, thus enabling us to prepare a motor response in a timely manner. It is postulated that we 
are able to do so based on internal forward (predictive) models developed through our visual and 
motor experiences, which are updated based on prediction errors, i.e. the discrepancy between 
the expected outcome and the actual consequence experienced (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). Such 
predictive models allow the nervous system to compensate for the delays in sensory feedback 
due to neural conduction, receptor transduction, central processing, and noise distortion(Graf et 
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al., 2007; Miall, 2003; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001), and thus facilitate fine grained visuo-motor 
control. Such models draw on memory of experience, with accurate estimation (least prediction 
error) occurring when the motion is predictable and familiar. 
As such, visual perception is arguably a predictive activity (Graf et al., 2007; Prinz, 2006; Wilson & 
Knoblich, 2005) and research to date suggests that motion perception is indeed so. For instance, 
Representational momentum, the phenomenon whereby static images depicting or implying 
motion are perceived as being further forward in their trajectory than is presented, has been 
demonstrated in a range of conditions from static images inferring motion (Bertamini, 1993; 
Freyd, 1983; Reed & Vinson, 1996) to video images of full body biological motion in point light 
actors (Jarraya et al., 2005). Researchers have suggested that the representational momentum 
phenomenon reflects the anticipated direction of movement, rather than the perceived actual 
movement (Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988), and as such reflects predictive processes in perception.  
Similarly, in other trajectory extrapolation studies, priming effects have been observable when 
test postures are primed with an action that would have resulted in the test pose had the priming 
action sequence continued further. Such trajectory extrapolation effects have been reported in 
priming studies involving animated characters (Verfaillie & Daems, 2002), point-light actors 
(Verfaillie, 1993) and rotating human body movement, but not for actions violating normal human 
bodily movement (Zoe Kourtzi & Shiffrar, 1999). 
Furthermore, oculomotor studies demonstrate that when observing someone perform an action, 
eye motor programmes are produced that are directed by motor representations for action 
execution, they being predictive, not reactive, which would suggest we use eye gaze in a manner 
appropriate for motor planning and control (Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). 
Such a prediction system is said to be underpinned by activity within the action-observation 
network (AON), a network of brain regions that become active not only when we perform an 
action ourselves but also when we observe an action being performed by another (Rizzolatti & 
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Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). It is suggested that these shared neural 
representations employ our own motor system when simply observing an action, allowing us to 
internally emulate or simulate that action (Vittorio Gallese, 2005; Grush, 2004; Jeannerod, 2001). 
Several authors claim that this shared representation system evolved in primates as a means to 
facilitate social interaction (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) – the 
‘adaptation hypothesis’ - allowing us to embody others’ expressions and actions, and aiding 
prediction of other people by drawing on our own motor repertoire (Blakemore & Frith, 2005; 
Vittorio Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Iacoboni et al., 2005).  
A somewhat different perspective postulates that the AON functions not as a consequence of 
evolution for perception and prediction of others. Instead, it suggests execution-observation 
common coding has resulted through Hebbian or associative learning, as a consequence of visual 
input largely co-occurring with motor output (Cook et al., 2010; Heyes, 2001; Heyes, 2010) – the 
‘associative hypothesis’. Advocates of this theory suggest that the system’s principal function is 
not social, in that it does not have the specific purpose of facilitating action interpretation in 
others.  Rather, the system may have a self-related purpose, to facilitate visuo-motor control.  
The etiology and function of the AON are thus debated. Despite this, few studies have attempted 
to disassociate systems potentially serving a self-oriented predictive function, as opposed to a 
social, other-oriented function. That is, many studies that have examined action observation 
and/or prediction have used stimuli that can only be interpreted as others performing an action. 
Such presentation fails to disentangle differing mechanisms that may underpin action observation 
and prediction for actions from different perspectives, which have been associated with self or 
other (Chan et al., 2004; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Jarraya et al., 2005; Oberman & Ramachandran, 
2008; Saxe et al., 2006).  If conclusions about the function of shared representations are to be 
drawn with regards to predictive mechanisms for self or for social purposes, it is essential to 
attempt to disentangle actions and facilitatory mechanisms relating to self and other.  
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One method to attempt to differentiate self and other related processes is to utilise stimuli 
presented in the first person perspective (1PP, egocentric) and third person perspective (3PP, 
allocentric), as postulated by Oberman and Ramachandran (2008). If a mechanism has emerged 
for the monitoring of one’s own actions, predicting the consequences of an action would be most 
effectively achieved (that is, have the least prediction error) in the 1PP. In sharp contrast, if the 
mechanism has emerged for the social reason of understanding someone else’s actions, action 
prediction would be most effective in the 3PP (Bach et al., 2014; Oberman & Ramachandran, 
2008). 
Whilst previous work has largely examined the prediction of consequences of observed actions 
(e.g. Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008; Urgesi, Savonitto, Fabbro, & Aglioti, 2012), few 
studies have explored the temporal dimension of action prediction. Examining temporal aspects 
of action observation allows us to determine whether the motion perception system is temporally 
predictive, potentially enabling us to respond to our environment in a timely manner. The current 
study examines the ability to determine future action states, and specifically the temporal acuity 
of prediction, via a spatio-temporal judgement task. The technique is adapted from an action 
occlusion paradigm (Parkinson et al., 2011, 2012; Prinz & Rapinett, 2008; Sparenberg et al., 2012), 
which has previously been used to explore temporal prediction of actions using pointlight images. 
However, some of these studies have combined transitive object-directed and intransitive non-
object related, and familiar and unfamiliar actions, and have found inconsistent results, not 
always in accordance with the notion that perception is predictive (cf. Sparenberg et al., 2012). 
However, given that many single cell and neuroimaging studies would indicate that the MNS/AON 
is particularly activated for goal-directed/object-oriented actions (for monkey mirror neuron 
firing: Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996; 
Umiltà et al., 2001; for human AON activation: Iacoboni et al., 2005; Johnson-Frey et al., 2003; 
Shmuelof & Zohary, 2006) it would be beneficial to examine the temporal accuracy of prediction 
related specifically to transitive actions. Here high quality video images of simple everyday object-
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related actions are presented, such as picking up a wine glass, to examine temporal prediction of 
action. In particular, the study examines temporal prediction of actions presented in the 1PP and 
3PP. In accordance with the proposal that the AON emerged as a consequence of visual input co-
occurring with motor output, but which has enabled us to extrapolate predictive processes to 
observation of others, it is hypothesised that predictive acuity will be at its best during the 
observation of 1PP actions. Such a result might suggest that the AON is a system that principally 
feeds into motor control processes, as opposed to a system evolved for the interpretation of 
others' actions or social interaction. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, potential differences in a spatio-temporal judgement task are examined 
when observing actions in first-person and third-person perspectives. Experiment 2 forms a 
replication of the first experiment with a different sample to validate the paradigm and the stimuli 
used. 
 
2.2 EXPERIMENT 1 
2.2.1 METHOD 
2.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-one participants (14 male) were recruited through the University of York, Department of 
Psychology participant pool. Prior to testing it was decided to exclude participants if their point of 
subjective equality (PSE) value (determined from the fitted psychometric function) was beyond 
the stimulus range presented in the experiment (between -200 and 200ms) indicating their 
sensitivity (or detection threshold) was too low for the present study to determine it accurately. 
This criterion rejected seven participants; data from the remaining twenty-four participants (nine 
male) were analysed. Included participants were between 19 and 38 years of age (M=26.5, 
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SD=4.8) and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received a small payment or course 
credit in compensation for their time. Procedures were approved by the Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee at The University of York. 
2.2.1.2 Materials 
Stimuli were recorded using a Panasonic full HD 1920x1080p (50p) Camcorder, mounted on a 
tripod. Action sequences were recorded from a bird’s eye perspective, looking down onto a table 
covered with a black cloth. Each action sequence recorded comprised a transitive action involving 
an actor’s forearm and hand reaching towards an object on a table, grasping it, lifting it and 
removing it from the table in the direction of the actor. Action sequences were recorded with five 
different objects: a mug, a wine glass, a hammer, a pair of scissors and a jug of water. Each action 
was performed by a male and by a female actor using their right hand, producing ten template 
sequences in the first person perspective; that is, the hand appearing from the inferior edge of 
the screen.  
Recordings were edited using Sony Vegas Pro v10, which was used to trim the recordings so that 
each action sequence began with 300ms prior to the action beginning (i.e. prior to the hand 
appearing and moving towards the object) and 300ms post-completion of the action. Actions 
were rendered at 60Hz. Full action sequences (without occlusion) had a duration of 2383ms 
minimum and 3567ms maximum (M =2754.9ms).  
From these template sequences in the 1PP, 3PP action sequences were created by flipping the 
image about the horizontal axis (see Figure 1). 3PP actions were therefore a mirror-match, rather 
than an anatomical-match, of the 1PP actions. This manipulation was based on studies 
demonstrating that we imitate mirror-matched actions better than anatomically matched actions 
(Chiavarino, Apperly, & Humphreys, 2007) and that whilst perspective and handedness are 
important in sense of ownership, peri-dominant-hand space is the preferred reference frame to 
distinguish other from self (Conson, Aromino, & Trojano, 2010; Conson, Alaerts, Heremans, 
Chapter 2 | 48 
 
 
 
  
Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2009; Mazzarella, & Trojano, 2009). Therefore, in experimental studies 
examining action observation mechanisms, mirror-matched limb actions in the allocentric 
perspective (3PP) would be preferable over the use of anatomically-matched actions, which 
would have an additional processing disadvantage4. 
Presentation of visual stimuli and response recording was programmed using Python v2.7 
(www.python.org) and Pygame modules (www.pygame.org). Visual stimuli were presented on a 
1280x1024 monitor, with 1024x576 image dimensions on a black surround, at a viewing distance 
of 64cm, subtending a visual angle of 28x15 degrees, at a 60Hz screen refresh rate. 
An occlusion image was created using a grey-scale average of a frame from a video prior to the 
start of the action (eg. a cup on the table top without the hand in shot was averaged to grey-
scale). 
 
Figure 2.1.Static images taken from example video stimuli in the first-person perspective (1PP) and 
third-person perspective (3PP) conditions. 3PP action sequences were created from the 1PP video 
sequences by flipping the images about the horizontal axis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Bach, Fenton-Adams, & Tipper (2014) investigated observation of anatomical- and mirror-matched action 
observation and found no evidence for differences between these 3PP conditions. 
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2.2.1.3 Design and Procedure 
Experimental trials began with 1000ms of an action sequence video. The action video was then 
replaced by the grey-scale occlusion image, presented for a fixed duration of 500ms. The occluder 
was then followed by the continuation of the action video until the end of the sequence. The 
point from which the action sequence continued post-occlusion was manipulated in 13 time 
steps, with the time between the last frame pre-occlusion and the first frame post-occlusion 
ranging from 300ms to 700ms in steps of 33ms (2 frames). This produced 13 offset periods 
between -200 and 200ms. Thus, an offset period of zero corresponded to a coherent trial, 
whereby the post-occlusion - pre-occlusion frame difference temporally corresponded exactly to 
the duration of the occlusion (500ms). 
Participants were instructed to imagine the continuation of the action during the occlusion 
period. Once the action continued after occlusion, participants were requested to respond with a 
key press to indicate whether the point from which the action continued was temporally earlier or 
later than the actual action would be expected to be given the occlusion period and their 
expectation. Participants were asked to respond whilst the action was still continuing and before 
completion of the sequence when the screen went to black. Task responses were given with the 
right hand. A self-paced inter-trial interval was employed, requiring the participant to press the 
spacebar to progress to the next trial. Figure 2 depicts an experimental trial. 
An ‘earlier’ trial refers to a negative temporal offset (<0); that is, the time between the last frame 
pre-occlusion and the first frame post-occlusion is less than the occlusion period (<500ms). A 
‘later’ trial refers to a positive temporal offset (>0); the time between the last frame pre-occlusion 
and the first frame post-occlusion is greater than the occlusion period (<500ms).  
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Figure 2.2. Schema of a trial in Experiments 1 and 2.  Each trial began with 1000ms of the start of 
an action sequence, followed by an occlusion screen for a fixed duration of 500ms.  The 
continuation of the action then followed until its completion, with the re-start being incoherent-
early, incoherent-late, or coherent with the length of the occluder.  Participants had to respond 
during the continuation of the action as to whether they thought the action re-started from a point 
that was too early or too late. 
 
The experiment began with a familiarisation phase, and then a practice phase, before proceeding 
to the main experimental phase. In the familiarisation phase, participants viewed each template 
video (i.e. without occlusion) twice (once in each perspective), and were asked to simply observe. 
Twenty practice trials (10 in each perspective) were then presented, allowing participants to 
adjust their judgement and response speed. Trials presented in this practice phase were the 
temporal offset extremes (offsets of -200ms and 200ms) for each object in each perspective 
(gender of the hand was randomised). ‘Correct/Incorrect’ feedback was provided to participants 
at the end of each practice trial. 
The main experimental phase consisted of 390 trials in each of the 1PP and 3PP conditions (780 
trials in total) (5 actions x 13 offset periods x 6 repetitions), divided into ten equal blocks. The 1PP 
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and 3PP conditions were presented in alternate blocks which were counterbalanced between 
participants. Trials that were not responded to within the given response time were repeated 
once at the end of the block. Each block began with 10 familiarisation trials in the perspective 
(1PP/3PP) corresponding to that block. Each block ended with a ‘Break’ screen allowing 
participants to rest their eyes and to proceed to the next block when ready to do so.  
The temporal offset was varied using the method-of-constant-stimuli.  In this method, stimuli 
levels (in this case, the temporal offsets) are not related from one trial to the next, but are 
presented randomly. This prevents participants from being able to predict the level of the next 
stimulus, and as such reduces habituation and expectation. 
Trials were presented in a pseudo-random order, ensuring that the same object or temporal 
offset was never presented three times consecutively. From the proportion of ‘late’ responses per 
stimulus offset condition, logistic psychometric functions were fitted to each individual’s data to 
estimate their point of subjective equality (PSE) and spread of their data. 
2.2.2. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Due to a technical error, the temporal shifting of the action post-occlusion resulted in shifts of 
one frame difference from those intended. The resulting temporal shifts relative to the occlusion 
duration were as follows: -216, -183, -149, -116, -83, -49, -16, 16, 49, 83, 116, 149, 183 ms. This 
unintended manipulation however does not preclude the assessment of the temporal acuity of 
action prediction, as the same sample resolution is obtained used for the fitting of psychometric 
functions to individuals' data. The manipulation was rectified for all subsequent experiments.  
Data were collapsed across object and actor gender and analysed in terms of temporal offset (test 
motion) and perspective.  Temporal offsets were determined relative to the occluder duration. 
Firstly, participants’ proportion of ‘late’ responses across the 13 temporal offset conditions were 
analysed in a one-way ANOVA. Data for both the 1PP and 3PP conditions showed a statistically 
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significant effect of temporal offset (F (12,276) = 73.78, p<.001,2p   =.76 for the 1PP; F(12,276) = 
64.12, p<.001, 2p  =.74 for the 3PP). Importantly, the linear trend was significant for both 1PP and 
3PP conditions (F(1,23)=228.62, p<.001, 2p  =.91; F(1,23)=162.30, p<.001, 
2
p  =.88 respectively). 
This indicates that participants could perform the task, as data show a significant linear increase in 
the proportion of late responses with increasing temporal offset. 
For each individual participant’s data, a logistic function was fitted to the proportion of ‘late’ 
responses for each temporal offset condition by minimising the mean squared error of the fit. The 
number of free parameters was determined per individual by nested modelled F-tests as some 
participants had a high lapse rate. This lapse rate refers to an error rate for stimuli conditions that 
are close to the extremes, with the error made likely due to a brief lapse in attention or other 
event, such as sneezing, that leads the participant to miss the presentation of the stimulus. 
This determined the main parameters of interest: the point of subjective equality (PSE) as well as 
the spread of the data. See Figure 2.3 for an example of an individual fitted psychometric 
function.  
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Figure 2.3. Example logistic function fitted to an individual participant's proportion of 'late' 
responses per temporal offset condition.  The solid line depicts the function for first person 
perspective actions (1PP) and the dashed line for third person perspective actions (3PP). 
 
The PSE determines the temporal offset that would elicit an ‘early’ / ‘late’ response probability of 
.5, and is a determinant of the individual's subjective experience of a ‘real-time’, or temporally 
coherent, outcome. A negative PSE value thus indicates that a condition in which less video had 
been removed than the occluder time was perceived as being coherent with the occluder, and 
would in turn indicate that mental simulation was progressing slower than the real action itself. A 
positive PSE indicates that a ‘later’ condition was perceived as being coherent with the occluder, 
and that the mental simulation was progressing faster than the real action. 
An average PSE was determined across participants for each perspective. For the 1PP condition, 
an average PSE of 22.40ms (SE=8.19) was observed, which was marginally significantly different 
from zero (t(23) = 1.84; p = .079). For the 3PP condition, an average PSE of 24.79ms (SE=8.19) was 
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observed, which was also marginally significantly from zero (t(23) = 1.93; p = .066). That is, there 
were trends in the data for simulations to run faster than reality.  A repeated measures t-test 
demonstrated that there was no significant difference between the PSEs for the two perspective 
conditions (t(23) = -0.2067; p = .838) . Figure 4 depicts the mean PSEs for the two perspective 
conditions and their standard errors adjusted for the repeated measures design according to 
O’Brien & Cousineau (2014). 
 
Figure 2.4. Bar graph depicting the mean point of subjective equality (PSE) for each perspective in 
Experiment 1. Light blue bars show the mean PSE for first person perspective (IPP) actions, dark 
blue bars show the mean PSE for third person perspective (3PP) actions. Error bars depict ±1 
standard error. 
 
An average spread of the data was determined across participants for each perspective. The 
spread of the data is an additional measure that can be used to determine the performance on a 
particular psychophysics task. The spread is a determinant of an individual's ability, or sensitivity, 
to detect a change, or in this case detect a temporal shift in the action sequence. The spread has 
an inverse relation to the slope (gradient) of the psychometric function. As such, a small spread 
indicates good performance in detecting a spatio-temporal shift and a large spread indicates 
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poorer sensitivity. For the 1PP condition, an average spread of 219.18 (SE=15.32) was observed. 
For the 3PP condition, an average spread of 245.85 (SE=15.32) was observed. A repeated 
measures t-test demonstrated that there was no significant difference in the spread of the two 
perspective conditions (t(23) = -1.23; p = .231). Figure 5 depicts the mean spread for the two 
perspective conditions and their standard errors adjusted for repeated measures according to 
Cousineau and O'Brien (2014). 
 
Figure 2.5. Bar graph depicting the mean spread of data for each perspective in Experiment 1. Light 
blue bars show the mean PSE for first person perspective (IPP) actions, dark blue bars show the 
mean PSE for third person perspective (3PP) actions. Error bars depict ±1 standard error. 
 
Before discussing the results of Experiment 1 in detail, given that this is the first experiment to use 
such stimuli in an occlusion task to probe prediction, a second experiment was conducted to 
determine whether the same results could be replicated with a different participant group, as well 
as to remove the technical flaw identified in Experiment 1. The details of this replication are 
provided in Experiment 2. 
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2.3 EXPERIMENT 2  
2.3.1 METHOD 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two participants (13 male) were recruited through the University of York, Department of 
Psychology participant pool. Participants were excluded if their point of subjective equality (PSE) 
value was beyond the stimulus range presented in the experiment (between -200 and 200ms) 
indicating their sensitivity was too low for the present study to determine it accurately. This 
criterion rejected 8 participants; data from the remaining twenty-four participants (nine male) 
were analysed. Included participants were between 18 and 28 years of age (M=20.5, SD=2.2) and 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received a small payment or course credit in 
compensation for their time. Procedures were approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee at The University of York. 
2.3.1.2 Materials, Design and Procedure 
The same materials and stimuli were used for this second experiment as in Experiment 1. This 
experiment also followed the same design and procedure as in Experiment 1 (section 2.2.1.3), 
with the only change being the adjustment of the temporal offset to adjust for the technical issue 
of Experiment 1. That is, the temporal offset conditions were as intended with 13 temporal 
offsets in steps of ~33ms (2 frames) up to a maximal offset of +/- 200ms. Temporal shifts relative 
to the occlusion duration were therefore as follows: -200, -167, -133, -100, -67, -33, 0, 33, 67, 100, 
133, 167, 200ms. 
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2.3.2 RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Data were collapsed across object and actor gender and analysed in terms of temporal offset (test 
motion) and perspective. Temporal offsets were determined relative to the occluder duration.  
Firstly, participants’ proportion of ‘late’ responses across the 13 temporal offset conditions were 
analysed in a one-way ANOVA. Data for both the 1PP and 3PP conditions showed a statistically 
significant effect of temporal offset (F (12,276) = 66.67, p<.001,2p  =.74 for the 1PP; F(12,276) = 
85.83, p<.001, 2p  =.79 for the 3PP). Importantly, the linear trend was significant for both 1PP and 
3PP conditions (F(1,23)=225.33, p<.001, 2p  =.91; F(1,23)=316.81, p<.001, 
2
p  =.93 respectively). 
This indicates that participants could perform the task, as data show a significant linear increase in 
the proportion of late responses with increasing temporal offset. 
As in Experiment 1, for each individual participant’s data, a logistic function was fitted to the 
proportion of ‘late’ responses for each temporal offset condition by minimising the mean squared 
error of the fit. The number of free parameters was determined per individual by nested 
modelled F-tests as some participants had a high lapse rate. This determined the two main 
parameters of interest: the point of subjective equality (PSE) and the spread of the data. 
An average PSE was determined across participants for each perspective. For the 1PP condition, 
an average PSE of 19.29ms (SE=7.14) was observed, which was not significantly different from 
zero (t(23) = 1.29; p = .208). For the 3PP condition, an average PSE of 37.29ms (SE=7.14) was 
observed, which differed significantly from zero (t(23) = 2.56; p = .018). A repeated measures t-
test demonstrated that there was no significant difference between the PSEs for the two 
perspective conditions (t(23) = -1.78; p = .088). Figure 6 shows the mean PSEs for each 
perspective. 
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Figure 2.6. Bar graph depicting the mean point of subjective equality (PSE) for each perspective in 
Experiment 2. Light blue bars show mean PSEs for first person perspective (IPP) actions, dark blue 
bars show the mean PSE for third person perspective (3PP) actions. Error bars depict ±1 standard 
error. 
 
The average spread of the data was determined across participants for each perspective. For the 
1PP condition, an average spread of 206.35 (SE=11.57) was observed. For the 3PP condition, an 
average spread of 202.27 (SE=11.57) was observed. A repeated measures t-test demonstrated 
that there was no significant difference in the spread of the two perspective conditions (t(23) = 
0.25; p = .806).  Figure 7 shows the mean spread of the data for each perspective. 
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Figure 2.7. Bar graph depicting the mean spread of data for each perspective in Experiment 2.  
Light blue bars show mean spread for first person perspective (IPP) actions, dark blue bars show 
the mean spread for third person perspective (3PP) actions. Error bars depict ±1 standard error. 
2.3.2.1 Leave-One-Object-Out (LOOO) Analysis  
In order to verify that there was not one particular stimulus object potentially influencing the data 
over the others, an additional analysis was conducted whereby psychometric functions were 
fitted to each individual participants' proportion of ‘late’ responses, iteratively removing data 
corresponding to each of the five stimulus object type in turn. From data aggregated over 
Experiments 1 and 2, the average PSE and spread across participants were determined for each of 
these five analyses.  Variability in the stimuli was desirable in order for results to be generalisable 
to other brief transitive actions, and not specific to a particular type of grasp. The objects used 
therefore elicited reach and grasp kinematics with varying degrees of complexity, requiring power 
grasp or precision grip movements. These differences in the fine kinematics of the reach and 
grasp actions naturally resulted in differences in the PSE elicited by each object. The results of the 
ANOVA examining the PSE across object type and perspective, combining data from both 
Experiments 1 and 2 are presented in Appendix A.  
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2.3.3 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the Leave-One-Object-Out analysis was to justify the use of these particular five 
objects/actions in the further study of the temporal prediction of action.  Variance in kinematics 
and complexity of kinematics was required in order for results to be generalisable to other 
transitive action types, and we see that this variance can have an effect on prediction error.   The 
variance in the kinematics of action required to grasp and lift each object elicited differing PSEs 
and data spread across action type.  The reduction in prediction error with the removal of the jug 
or the scissors suggests that these actions may produce more uncertainty and therefore more 
anticipation (prediction error) potentially due to the more complex fine motor control required in 
the case of the scissors, or due to a heavier weight in the case of the jug, which would not be 
easily estimable.  The variance in the individual object actions was sufficient to have a potential 
effect on the PSE across perspective conditions, however, the lack of an object x perspective 
interaction indicates that the prediction error is similar for both first person and third person 
perspectives and consistent across transitive action type.  This LOOO analysis therefore provides 
confirmatory evidence of the 1PP-3PP action prediction consistency across transitive actions, and 
validates the use of these objects in the further study of temporal action prediction in subsequent 
chapters.  
Before interpreting the data further it is worth discussing the PSE value that would constitute 
optimal performance; that is, whether a PSE close to zero or a significantly positive PSE is optimal 
for engagement with the environment and/or motor control. It is important that we are able to 
anticipate an action outcome and that our internal simulation of that action continue such that 
predictions of future states can guide action. However, it is critical for visuomotor performance 
that this prediction be as accurate as possible, whereby the forward model and reality match. 
Representational momentum studies demonstrate that there is an automatic simulation process 
of future states. However, such tasks require participants to recall from memory the last stimulus 
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seen and in doing so participants make errors in reporting stimuli in loci they would have moved 
to. In sharp contrast, the current paradigm presents stimuli that have continued along their action 
trajectory and the task is to identify their accurate action state. In this situation, performance 
closer to zero is closer to reality (that is, there is less prediction error between the simulated 
action and the real action dynamics). Hence, subsequent motor processes directed towards the 
stimulus would be more accurate. We therefore posit that a PSE closer to zero is indicative of 
optimal performance.  
Given the above premise, there are two aspects of the data to be discussed. First, action 
simulation processes appear to be somewhat more rapid than the actual observed action 
dynamics.  This is an interesting contrast to previous similar studies that have shown that action 
simulation processes run significantly more slowly than the actual action (e.g., Prinz & Rapinett, 
2008; Sparenberg et al., 2012). At this stage it is uncertain why this contrast has emerged, but it is 
worth noting a number of interesting methodological differences that might mediate the 
difference in results. Firstly, previous studies have focussed on whole-body complex actions, 
combining transitive and intransitive actions. Given that many single cell and neuroimaging 
studies would indicate that the MNS/AON is particularly activated for goal-directed/object-
oriented actions (e.g. Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996) it may be the case that lack of 
goal/intention in intransitive conditions influences the simulation processes on which temporal 
judgements are made (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Jeannerod, 2001).  Secondly, previous studies 
have used action stimuli with varying degrees of familiarity to participants. Activities such as 
throwing a basketball or leapfrogging, as used in these previous studies, may arguably be recently 
unfamiliar to participants. The stimuli in the Sparenberg et al. (2012) study therefore do not 
differentiate between actions for which participants can and cannot easily draw upon their own 
motor repertoire to enable simulation/prediction mechanisms. Thirdly, the use of point light 
actions (Graf et al., 2007; Parkinson et al., 2011, 2012; Sparenberg et al., 2012) may also influence 
the nature of timing judgements. Finally, researchers have observed that showing less 
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information post-occlusion degrades performance in occlusion tasks (Parkinson et al., 2012).  As 
each of the occlusion studies described present a simple static image post-occlusion on which to 
base a decision, it might be argued that performance accuracy is not as would be expected if 
actions were allowed to continue until their completion, as in these present studies. 
As noted, the stimuli contrast on all these dimensions. They are all highly familiar and simple 
transitive reach-to-grasp actions, which are presented in high quality full colour videos, and the 
display for judgement is a continuation of the action rather than a static image. Which of these 
stimulus properties mediates the change in temporal judgement decisions is not clear at this time. 
Certainly, however, the stimulus properties that shift temporal simulations from slower to faster 
than the actual observed action dynamics are certainly worthy of further study. 
The central focus of these first studies was to examine contrasts between 1PP and 3PP views of 
action. In accordance with the logic proposed by Oberman & Ramachandran (2008), an account 
arguing that simulation of observed actions evolved as a process to facilitate the understanding of 
other people might predict better spatio-temporal judgements when viewing 3PP actions. In 
contrast, an account arguing that simulation processes emerged to predict one’s own action 
states might predict more accurate performance when viewing 1PP actions. The results of these 
first studies are equivocal. The spread of the data, used as a measure of how well participants can 
perform the task was equal across action perspective, demonstrating participants performed the 
spatio-temporal judgement task with equal ability across the action perspectives. Examining the 
PSE, based on these first studies, at most it would appear that the prediction system is not 
viewpoint dependent, and that there is an anticipation bias whereby we simulate actions faster 
than real world dynamics and thus overestimate the action state in spatio-temporal terms.  
Although there is a trend for the 1PP viewing condition to be somewhat more accurate than 3PP, 
this is not significant in this study. The lack of consistent contrast between 1PP and 3PP has 
certainly been observed in other situations, for example, in behavioural studies (Bach et al., 2014) 
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and fMRI studies, where common neural population codes for producing and observing action are 
observed in parietal cortex in both 1PP and 3PP views (e.g. Oosterhof, Tipper, & Downing, 2012). 
However, in both of these studies other situations did detect contrasts between 1PP and 3PP. For 
example, when more complex aspects of action had to be integrated, Bach et al., (2014) observed 
faster responses when observing 1PP than 3PP actions, and in fMRI ventral premotor cortex 
encoded joint production and perception of actions only in the 1PP (Oosterhof et al, 2012). 
Therefore, in the experiments that follow in Chapter 3, other experimental situations are 
examined that might reveal contrasts in temporal prediction between 1PP and 3PP observed 
actions, as well as those which might improve prediction performance. In the following chapter, 
the first experiment aims to facilitate the processing of 3PP actions via a visual priming 
manipulation. The following two experiments determine whether prediction can be facilitated via 
two motor priming manipulations. 
 
Chapter 3 | 64 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 3: Visual and Motor Priming Effects on Action Prediction 
 
3.1 EXPERIMENT 3: Visual priming of actions in third-person perspective 
 
3.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many of the occlusion studies discussed in Chapter 2 found that prediction performance was 
significantly impaired when the whole body actions were inverted (Graf et al., 2007; Parkinson et 
al., 2011; Sparenberg et al., 2012). Under the assumption that humans have no visual experience 
of inverted movements and cannot draw upon their motor repertoire to simulate such actions 
(Loula, Prasad, Harber, & Shiffrar, 2005), the authors of these studies concluded that simulation of 
biological motion requires more than trajectory extrapolation alone.  Researchers have postulated 
that such simulation likely requires first-hand experience, either visual or motoric, of the actions.  
Several studies have examined how visual experience may be sufficient to influence how we 
perceive or predict actions. A body of research has demonstrated how individuals can acquire 
motor skills or modify behaviour based on outcomes through observational learning (Buchanan & 
Wright, 2011; Carroll & Bandura, 1982; Chamley, 2003). Furthermore, perceptual experience alone 
has been found to influence how we perceive other’s actions.  For instance, Cross, Stadler, 
Parkinson, Schütz-Bosbach, & Prinz, (2011) found that temporal prediction of actions improved 
consistently after observational training of gymnastic moves.  In neuroimaging, Higuchi, Holle, 
Roberts, Eickhoff, & Vogt, (2012) demonstrated that activation intensities in prefrontal areas of the 
AON during observational practice of guitar chord playing predicted the behavioural effects on 
chord playing.  These studies suggest the emergence of motor resonance processes through 
observational experience alone. 
Chapter 3 | 65 
 
 
 
  
Other studies, however, have determined the importance of motor experience in the simulation of 
action, demonstrating that action simulation mechanisms are enhanced by the capability of 
performing an observed action (e.g. Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008; Calvo-Merino, Glaser, 
Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Urgesi, Savonitto, Fabbro, & Aglioti, 2012).  These studies 
are expanded on in Section 3.2 of this chapter. This said, there remains little research examining 
the extent to which motor experience compared to visual experience impacts action observation, 
given that it is difficult to tease apart experience in these two forms (visual input generally 
accompanies one’s own motor output).  Only a limited number of studies have examined the two 
in comparison (Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Urgesi et al., 2012)   
Experiments 3 to 5 in this chapter intend to bring together research from the areas of action 
prediction, and motor and visual experience effects on action perception, with the aim to assess 
how visual and motor experience may each contribute to action prediction mechanisms.  The 
research additionally intends to assess whether experience in either modality improves prediction 
performance preferentially or selectively for actions that map most closely onto self-generated 
actions (first person perspective) or other-generated (third person perspective) actions.   
In the first of the experiments that follow, we determine whether real-world visual priming can 
facilitate prediction of 3PP actions. 
3.1.2 METHOD 
3.1.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-three participants (nine male) were recruited through the University of York, Department of 
Psychology participant pool.  As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants were excluded if their point 
of subjective equality (PSE) value was beyond the stimulus range presented in the experiment.  
Nine participants were excluded on this basis and subsequent analyses were conducted on the 
remaining 24 participants (eight male). All were aged between 18 and 33 years of age (M=22.3, 
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SD=3.7) and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received a small payment or course 
credit in compensation for their time.  Procedures were approved by the Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee at The University of York. 
3.1.2.2 Materials & Procedure 
The same stimuli and paradigm were used as in Experiments 1 and 2.  In Experiment 3, after the 
familiarisation phase and before the practice phase of the main computer based task, participants 
observed the experimenter perform the transitive actions on the same objects from across the 
table using their left hand (thus replicating the image of the action flipped about the horizontal 
axis as in the 3PP condition).  Each transitive action was performed 4 times on each object. The 
same main experimental computer task as in Experiments 1 and 2 was then performed by 
participants. 
3.1.3 RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, all participants produced monotonically increasing proportions of ‘late’ 
responses with increasing temporal offset for both the 1PP (F(1,23)= 232.09, p<.001, 2p =.91) 
conditions and 3PP (F(1,23)= 234.76, p<.001,  2p =.91) conditions, indicating that they could 
perform the task well. 
From the logistic functions fitted to each individual participant’s data, an average PSE was 
determined across participants for each perspective.  For the 1PP condition, an average PSE of 
23.55ms (SE=6.20) was observed, which was not significantly different than zero (t(23) = 1.76; p = 
.091).  For the 3PP condition, an average PSE of 29.43ms (SE=6.20) was observed, which differed 
significantly from zero (t (23) = 2.24; p = .035).  However, a repeated measures t-test 
demonstrated that there was no significant difference between the PSEs for the two perspective 
conditions (t(23) = -.67; p = .509) (see Figure 3.1).  A combined analysis of Experiments 2 (without 
visual priming) and 3 (with visual priming) also failed to detect any differences between the 
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baseline Experiment 2 and the visual 3PP action priming condition of Experiment 3 on the PSE for 
1PP actions (t(23) = -.24; p = .81) or 3PP actions (t(23) = .39; p = .70). 
For the 1PP condition, an average spread of 217.79 (SE=12.80) was observed. For the 3PP 
condition, an average spread of 211.14 (SE=12.80) was observed. A repeated measures t-test 
demonstrated that there was no significant difference in the spread of the two perspective 
conditions (t(23) = .37; p = .717). 
 
Figure 3.1. Bar graph depicting the mean point of subjective equality (PSE) for each perspective in 
Experiment 3.  Light blue bars show the mean PSE for first person perspective (IPP) actions, dark 
blue bars show the mean PSE for third person perspective (3PP) actions. Error bars depict ±1 
standard error. 
The results of this experiment are therefore very clear.  Although participants received real world 
visual experience of another person reaching out and grasping the objects in the same manner as 
subsequent 3PP visual displays, there was no effect on spatio-temporal judgements.  As noted, it 
was ensured that the viewed priming actions were a close match to the 3PP actions in the 
computer task, and hence it was predicted 3PP performance would improve.  The results are 
Chapter 3 | 68 
 
 
 
  
unable to provide support for an account claiming the simulation process is primarily involved in 
the prediction of another person’s actions.   
However, a counter argument may be that our priming events were limited, certainly much 
reduced compared with prior studies (e.g., Cross et al., 2011).  Nevertheless, in these latter 
studies, participants were learning much more complex and unfamiliar actions such as gymnastic 
movements. For typical participants there would be no prior motor representations of these 
complex and difficult actions. In contrast, we would argue that the very simple everyday reach-to-
grasp actions in our study would benefit from a few exposures, if visual exposure is effective in 
temporal judgement tasks.  The following two experiments manipulate motor experience with a 
similar level of four exposures to each stimulus.  As will be seen, with this similar level of 
exposure, contrasts between 1PP and 3PP now emerge.  Hence the studies to be reported suggest 
large amounts of exposure are not necessary when everyday actions are simple and very familiar, 
and furthermore, motor representations are more influential than prior visual exposure on 
temporal judgements of viewed actions. 
 
3.2 EXPERIMENT 4: Visual and motor priming of actions in first-person perspective 
3.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of prior motor experience in the simulation of action has previously been 
demonstrated. For example, Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, (2005) 
conducted fMRI in expert ballet dancers, expert capoeira dancers and inexpert controls whilst 
they watched ballet or capoeira dance sequences.  Greater activation was observed in areas of the 
AON when participants watched dance in their expertise.  In a later study, Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, 
Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, (2006) utilised the fact that male and female ballet dancers have 
different motoric dance experiences but have equal levels of visual familiarity of ballet moves.  
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The male and female ballet dancers observed gender-specific ballet moves whilst being scanned in 
fMRI.  They found increased activity in the AON when participants observed action within their 
motor repertoire compared to the actions they frequently observed but of which they had no 
physical experience.  The authors concluded that the AON responds with motor experience over 
and above visual experience and that this system integrates observed actions with movements in 
one’s own motor repertoire (see also, Cross, Hamilton, & Grafton, 2006; Knoblich & Flach, 2001 
for similar observations). Hence these studies demonstrate that action simulation mechanisms are 
enhanced by the capability of performing an observed action, and that we integrate information 
from motor experience with current visual input, which can facilitate predictive mechanisms to 
determine action outcomes. 
Therefore, in the current study we provided motor experience prior to the spatio-temporal 
judgement task.  That is, participants reached to grasp and pick up each of the 5 objects in the 
study 4 times.  We predicted two possible outcomes.  First, that there might be a general 
improvement in temporal judgement accuracy for all forms of viewed action after motor priming.  
That is, both 1PP and 3PP spatio-temporal judgements are more accurate.  However, second, 
because the motor priming is by necessity an egocentric 1PP activity, temporal judgements of 1PP 
actions may differ from those of 3PP actions. 
3.2.2 METHOD 
3.2.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-two participants (12 male) were recruited through the University of York, Department of 
Psychology participant pool. As in Experiment 1 and 2, participants were excluded if their point of 
subjective equality (PSE) value was beyond the stimulus range presented in the experiment.  Eight 
participants were excluded on this basis and subsequent analyses were conducted on the 
remaining 24 participants (11 male). All were aged between 18 and 31 years of age (M=22.5, 
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SD=3.4) and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received a small payment or course 
credit in compensation for their time.  Procedures were approved by the Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee at The University of York. 
3.2.2.2 Materials & Procedure 
The same stimuli and paradigm were used as in Experiments 1 and 2.  In Experiment 3, however, 
after the familiarisation phase and before the practice phase, participants performed the 
transitive actions themselves, with eyes open.  Participants were asked to observe the 
experimenter place the object on a table covered with a black cloth, on a marker set at 34cm from 
the participant’s edge of the table. Participants were asked to begin each action with their hands 
off the table, and then reach towards, grasp and remove each object from the table as if they 
were about to use the object and in a manner that replicated as precisely as possible the action 
just observed (eg. grasp the wine glass by placing the fingers on the stem of the glass to lift the 
object), such that participants received motor experience that was specific to the actions they 
would judge.  On completion of each action (when the object was removed from the table 
completely towards the participant), the experimenter took the object from the participant and 
placed it back on the marker ready for the next action.  Each action was performed with the 
participant’s right hand, four times on each of the five objects. The same main experimental 
computer task as in Experiment 1 was then performed by participants. 
3.2.3 RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
As in the previous experiments, all participants produced monotonically increasing proportions of 
‘late’ responses with increasing stimulus interval offsets for both the 1PP (F(1,23)=274.17, p<.001, 
2p =.92), and 3PP conditions (F(1,23)= 198.34, p<.001,
2
p =.90), demonstrating that participants 
could perform the task well. 
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From the logistic functions fitted to each individual participant’s data, an average PSE was 
determined across participants for each perspective.  For the 1PP condition, an average PSE of -
3.26ms (SE=6.88) was observed, which did not differ significantly from zero (t(23) = -.27; p = .79).  
For the 3PP condition, an average PSE of 26.84ms (SE=6.88) was observed, which was marginally 
greater than zero, but did not reach significance (t(23) = 1.81; p = .083).  A repeated measures t-
test demonstrated that there was a significant difference between the PSEs for the two 
perspective conditions (t(23) = -3.09; p = .005, d = .63). See Figure 3.2. 
For the 1PP condition, an average spread of 215.88 (SE=13.40) was observed. For the 3PP 
condition, an average spread of 247.86 (SE=13.40) was observed. A repeated measures t-test 
demonstrated that there was no significant difference in the spread of the two perspective 
conditions (t(23) = -1.69; p = .105).  
  
Figure 3.2. Bar graph depicting the mean point of subjective equality for each perspective in 
Experiment 4.  Light blue bars show the mean PSE for first person perspective (IPP) actions, dark 
blue bars show the mean PSE for third person perspective (3PP) actions. Error bars depict ±1 
standard error. * = .005. 
** 
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This is the first of this series of studies to detect a significant contrast between 1PP and 3PP 
viewed action when judging temporal aspects of action.  It appears that prior motor experience is 
important for facilitating performance when viewing 1PP actions.  This contrasts with the findings 
of Experiment 3 where prior visual experience of 3PP actions had no significant effect on 
performance.  The results of Experiments 3 and 4 are in line with previous observations 
concerning the role of vision and motor experience on action simulation processes.  For example, 
Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, (2008) and Urgesi, Savonitto, Fabbro, & Aglioti, (2012) examined 
action anticipation in basketball and volleyball players respectively and compared this with 
supporters who had similar visual experience.  Only those with prior motor representations could 
accurately judge the future states of throws and serves based on viewed players’ body kinematics.  
Furthermore, participants given physical practice training improved their abilities to predict 
actions by reading body kinematics.  Those assigned to observational training alone improved only 
in understanding the ball trajectory (Urgesi et al., 2012). Our findings are aligned with this prior 
work showing motor experience is also required to temporally predict bodily actions.  However, 
our results go further by demonstrating that motor experience can selectively facilitate temporal 
judgements of actions viewed from a first person perspective. 
 
3.3 EXPERIMENT 5: Motor priming without visual input in first-person perspective 
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A further issue concerns whether the effects produced in Experiment 4 are purely due to action 
priming.  Note that when practising the reach and grasp actions participants were able to observe 
their actions, as would be expected in such a naturalistic situation.  Therefore, it is unclear 
whether the difference between 1PP and 3PP detected in Experiment 4 is due to motor priming or 
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whether it is caused by a combination of motor priming and concomitant visual input from the 
1PP. 
Experiment 5 therefore adopts an approach similar to that of Casile and Giese, (2005).  They 
assessed the visual recognition of gait before and after non-visual motor training, in which 
participants were blindfolded whilst learning a novel upper-body coordinated movement.  The 
study showed a selective improvement in recognition of subsequently observed actions that were 
physically trained compared to novel actions, despite participants having no visual input during 
the training phase. The Casile and Giese (2005) study therefore demonstrated that motor 
experience, without visual experience, has a direct influence on action recognition.  We now 
examine whether pure motor experience, when participants are unable to observe their own 
action, also has a facilitation effect when making temporal judgements and whether this is 
selective for 1PP actions. 
3.3.2 METHOD 
3.3.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-six participants (16 male) were recruited through the University of York, Department of 
Psychology participant pool.  As in all other experiments, participants were excluded if their point 
of subjective equality (PSE) value was beyond the stimulus range presented in the experiment.  
Twelve participants were excluded on this basis and subsequent analyses were conducted on the 
remaining 24 participants (12 male). All were aged between 18 and 29 years of age (M=22.9, 
SD=3.5) and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received a small payment or course 
credit in compensation for their time.  Procedures were approved by the Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee at The University of York. 
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3.3.2.2 Materials & Procedure 
The same stimuli and paradigm were used as in Experiments 1 and 2 in Chapter 2 and Experiments 
3 and 4 in the current chapter.  In Experiment 5, after the familiarisation phase and before the 
practice phase, participants performed the transitive actions themselves.  Participants were 
instructed to reach and grasp each object as in Experiment 3, such that they received motor 
experience specific to the actions to be judged, but with eyes closed. On completion of each 
action (when the object was removed from the table completely towards the participant), they 
were instructed to open their eyes once the object had been placed in its usual location by the 
experimenter.  Participants were then able to look at the object until they were ready to grasp it, 
at which point they closed their eyes and completed the reach-to-grasp action.  These self-paced 
actions were performed with the participant’s right hand, four times on each of the five objects. 
The same main experimental computer task, with temporal offsets as in Experiment 2 was then 
performed by participants. 
3.3.3 RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
As in all previous experiments, all included participants produced monotonically increasing 
proportions of ‘late’ responses for increasing temporal offsets; i.e. the linear trend was significant 
for 1PP actions (F(1,23)= 68.65, p<.001,2p =.75), and 3PP actions (F(1,23)= 61.73, p<.001,
2
p 
=.73), indicating they could perform the task well in both perspective conditions.   
From the logistic functions fitted to each individual participant’s data, an average PSE was 
determined across participants for each perspective.  For the 1PP condition, an average PSE of -
14.01ms (SE=8.85) was observed, which did not differ significantly from zero (t(23) = -.86; p = 
.397).  For the 3PP condition, an average PSE of 18.46ms (SE=8.85) was observed, which also did 
not differ significantly from zero (t(23) = 1.55; p = .134).  Importantly, a repeated measures t-test 
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demonstrated that there was a significant difference between the PSEs for the two perspective 
conditions (t(23) = -2.59; p = .016, d= .53). See Figure 3.3. 
In terms of the spread of the data in Experiment 5, for the 1PP condition, an average spread of 
239.30 (SE=18.85) was observed. For the 3PP condition, an average spread of 216.62 (SE=18.85) 
was observed. A repeated measures t-test demonstrated that there was no significant difference 
in the spread of the two perspective conditions (t(23) = .85; p = .403).  
 
Figure 3.3. Bar graph depicting the mean point of subjective equality (PSE) for each perspective in 
Experiment 5. Light blue bars show the mean PSE for first person perspective (IPP) actions, dark 
blue bars show the mean PSE for third person perspective (3PP) actions. Error bars depict ±1 
standard error. * < .05. 
Experiment 5 examined the effect of motor priming when there was no concurrent visual input.  It 
has essentially confirmed the findings of Experiment 4. Indeed, a 2 (perspective) x 2 (experiment) 
ANOVA contrasting Experiments 4 and 5 showed a highly significant main effect of viewpoint 
(F(1,46) = 15.57, p <.001, 2
p =.25), but no main effect of experiment (F(1,46) =.28, p= .60), nor an 
interaction (F(1,46) = .02, p=.88).  Thus, when participants have some motor experience of the 
actions to be subsequently judged there is a significant contrast between 1PP and 3PP viewed 
* 
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actions.  That is, 3PP actions are simulated at a faster rate than 1PP actions and the latter tend to 
be somewhat more accurate. 
3.4. CONTRASTING RESULTS ACROSS EXPERIMENTS 
3.4.1. The point of subjective equality 
 
Figure 3.4. Bar graph depicting the mean point of subjective equality (PSE) for each perspective in 
each experiment. Light blue bars show mean PSEs for first-person perspective (1PP) actions, dark 
blue bars show mean PSEs for third-person perspective (3PP) actions. Error bars depict ±1 standard 
error. * < .05. ** = .005. 
Figure 3.4 summarises the overall data pattern in terms of point of subjective experience (PSE) in 
the spatio-temporal judgement tasks across Experiments 2 to 5.  We have noted, in line with 
previous research, the critical importance of motor experience in the simulation of actions.  To 
further extract the pattern of performance across experiments we performed a combined 
analysis.  This examined the effects of perspective (1PP vs 3PP) and the effects of motor priming 
(no motor priming vs motor priming).  The latter involved the combination of Experiments 2 and 3 
in the no motor priming condition and Experiments 4 and 5 in the motor priming condition.  This 2 
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(perspective) x 2 (yes/no motor priming) ANOVA demonstrated no significant effect of motor 
priming.  However, of central importance, there was a significant effect of perspective (F(1,94) = 
17.61, p = .001, 2
p =.16).  That is, in all studies the spatio-temporal prediction performance in the 
1PP condition tended to be more accurate than the 3PP condition, with the latter 3PP revealing 
simulation processes tending to be faster than the observed actions. However, this main effect of 
perspective was modulated by a marginally significant interaction between perspective and 
yes/no motor priming (F(1,94) = 3.53, p= .06, 2
p =.04. Planned comparisons revealed that the 3PP 
judgements were not significantly influenced by whether participants experienced motor priming 
prior to the task (t(94) = .79, p=.43).  However, in sharp contrast, there was a significant change in 
the accuracy of the 1PP temporal judgements, with significantly slower motor simulations after 
motor priming (t(94)=2.13, p=.034, d= .44).  Figure 3.5 depicts these differences in the temporal 
prediction of action in 1PP and 3PP with and without motor priming. 
 
Figure 3.5. Bar graph depicting the mean point of subjective equality (PSE) for each perspective 
with and without motor priming.  Light blue bars show mean PSEs for first-person perspective (1PP) 
actions, dark blue bars show mean PSEs for third-person perspective (3PP) actions. Error bars 
depict ±1 standard error. * < .05. 
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3.4.2. The slope of the psychometric function 
In Experiments 1 and 2 in Chapter 2, the slope of the psychometric function averaged over 
participants did not significantly differ between first-person and third-person action perspectives. 
The same was demonstrated in Experiments 3 to 5.  This was the case despite the motor priming 
with visual input (Experiment 4) or without visual input (Experiment 5), which did have the effect 
of differentiating the PSE between perspectives. As the slope of the psychometric function is 
generally used as a measure of sensitivity, it would indicate that participants’ sensitivity did not 
change over experiments; that is, participants’ sensitivity did not improve following motor 
priming. This would at first appear contradictory to the results demonstrated by the point of 
subjective equality. However, these apparently contradictory results simply indicate that despite a 
lack of change in sensitivity to the stimuli, participants do experience a change in perception.  
Specifically, the PSE is a measure of accuracy, related to the measure of central tendency, and 
provides a measure of constant error (in this case prediction error). On the other hand, the spread 
or slope of the psychometric function provides a measure of precision, more related to the 
standard deviation of the data and the variable error. The two are independent of one another. As 
such, this series of experiments has shown that participants are high in accuracy following motor 
priming, but participants’ judgements are low in precision over the 5 experiments. Variable error 
does not vary appreciably with motor experience or changes in perception. Figure 3.6 summarises 
the overall data pattern in terms of slope of the psychometric functions in the spatio-temporal 
judgement tasks across Experiments 2 to 5. 
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Figure 3.6. Bar graph depicting the mean spread of the psychometric functions for each 
perspective in Experiments 2 to 5. Light blue bars show the mean PSE for first person perspective 
(IPP) actions, dark blue bars show the mean PSE for third person perspective (3PP) actions. Error 
bars depict ±1 standard error. 
3.4.3 Leave-One-Object-Out Analysis 
To examine the individual effects of visual priming, visual and motor, and motor priming only on 
action prediction for each of the five objects used in each experiment, a leave-one-object-out 
(LOOO) analysis was performed on the data, as described in section 2.3.2.1 of Chapter 2. This 
aimed to determine whether the same pattern of results arises for each object type across 
experiments.  The statistical analyses of the LOOO analyses are provided in Appendix B, and 
demonstrate that the same pattern in contrast in PSE between 1PP and 3PP observed action 
sequences was similar across transitive action type. 
3.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn concerning the function and mechanisms of 
the action simulation processes, although our conclusions concerning the aetiology of the action 
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observation network remain limited. The adaptation theory of the AON suggests that we recruit 
motor regions to create motor simulations of observed actions as a means to anticipate and 
interpret the actions of other people.  That is, the account suggests the AON is a mechanism 
underlying action prediction that has evolved to facilitate social interaction (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 
1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).   By this account we reasoned that when viewing 3PP actions 
that more closely match what would be perceived when observing another person, action timing 
judgements might be more accurate than when viewing 1PP actions.  In all experiments we have 
found no evidence for this pattern.  Indeed, even when 3PP actions were visually primed with real 
world reach and grasp actions that equated to the actions subsequently observed, 3PP actions 
gained no advantage (Experiment 3).  In contrast, 1PP action timing judgments tended to be more 
accurate. 
Although 3PP action prediction remained less accurate we do not rule out a role of the AON in the 
prediction of other people’s actions.  Indeed the forward prediction error observed for 3PP 
actions, indicating the simulation is further along the motion path, would enable compensation 
for any unpredictability in the actions of other people.  In essence, as when intercepting a moving 
object over which we have no control, the motor system has to predict future states to place 
effectors appropriately for the objects arrival; then similarly, as we never have control over the 
final properties of another person’s actions, forward prediction error would enable adjustments to 
be made.  Thus, for an unfamiliar agent or action it would be more advantageous to slightly over 
anticipate, and we note the forward errors are small (< 40ms) enabling efficient interpersonal 
interactions. 
However, it is worth noting that the observation that simulation processes for 3PP actions 
appeared to be somewhat faster than the actual observed action contrasted with previous similar 
studies (Sparenberg et al., 2012).  That is, in the Sparenberg et al. (2012) study, motor simulation 
appeared to be slower than the actual actions.  They additionally manipulated the occlusion 
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duration and found the same negative bias (slower simulation than real action) for the different 
occluder durations, suggesting a stable time error. As a means to reconcile their findings with 
previous studies that suggest perception is predictive, the authors suggested this error may be 
due to a switching cost from a perception to a simulation mechanism. However, we suggest that it 
is worth considering the role of stimulus type, whether point light images, transitive vs 
intransitive, whole body vs single hand grasps, familiar vs unfamiliar, and whether the stimulus to 
be judged is static or a continuation of the action.  As we have revealed with contrasts in 
viewpoint (1PP vs 3PP), further study of stimulus type may provide new insights into when and 
why action simulation processes are faster or slower than reality, and in turn when perception is 
necessarily predictive. 
In contrast to the 3PP data, 1PP action prediction tended to be more accurate (closer to zero) in all 
conditions.  Following the logic of Oberman & Ramachandran, (2008) and that the 1PP more 
closely matches the visual input when performing an action oneself, the results support the notion 
that action observation systems emerged to guide one’s own actions.  At the least, the results 
would suggest that the system is less attuned to serving a social function as it is to providing an 
accurate state estimation for 1PP actions.  
Of note, and in support of the idea that the system emerged for self action prediction, is that the 
contrast between 1PP and 3PP was most evident after motor priming, where participants received 
brief experience of grasping and lifting the objects in a manner similar to what would 
subsequently be observed (Experiments 4 & 5).  It is striking that only minimal motor priming (4 
reaches to each object) was sufficient to improve timing judgements.  Our findings are in line with 
the literature clearly showing that it is prior motor experience/skill that influences motor 
simulation processes (e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 2005) and that action prediction based on body 
kinematics is improved following motor practice (Urgesi et al., 2012).  In particular, motor priming 
without any visual input (Experiment 5) is able to facilitate 1PP action judgements, and this result 
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supports that of Casile & Giese (2005).  The lack of contrast between Experiment 4, in which there 
was both visual and motor priming, and Experiment 5 in which there was only motor priming, 
might suggest that our effects were purely motor and vision played little role.  However, we are 
cautious concerning this conclusion, as the condition examining purely visual observation of 1PP 
action without motor output was not possible in our current design.  Thus it may yet be 
demonstrated that visual and physical experience may provide complementary and mutually 
reinforcing benefits to action prediction. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In sum, this series of experiments has demonstrated more than one property of the AON.  The 
experiments examined the ability to make spatio-temporal judgements about future states of 
observed action.  The ability to develop internal forward models of action and run an action 
simulation process is important to enable accurate visuomotor processes.  It appears we have an 
anticipatory bias when observing actions of which we have little or no first-hand experience, but 
which reduces as we gain physical experience of these actions. Moreover, prediction differences 
can be observed between viewing action that closely matches our visual experience when 
performing an action (1PP) and that experienced when observing another person (3PP).  The data 
confirm that motor priming has a selective effect on spatio-temporal prediction of 1PP rather than 
3PP actions. This effect of motor priming, firstly, supports the theory that internal forward models 
of action and simulation processes draw upon one’s own motor representations, and secondly,  
supports the notion that the major role of such action simulation and prediction processes, and 
their underlying mechanisms (the AON), is to facilitate one’s own actions.  This said, such action 
simulations can be extended to enable similar computations when observing another person’s 
actions, although they retain greater prediction error which may arguably have the social benefit 
of dealing with uncertainty and unpredictability of others. 
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CHAPTER 4: Neural Signals of Prediction Error for First- and Third-
Person Observed Actions 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
There has been an extensive amount of research examining the human neural network that 
underpins the observation of action, largely driven by evidence that the same network underpins 
action execution.  This network is also thought to underpin action prediction mechanisms, which 
have been investigated more recently.  Despite sustained interest in action observation and 
prediction processes and mechanisms, there remain several unexplored questions.  One such 
question relates to the influence of visual perspective on neural activity during action prediction 
processing.  Whilst behavioural studies indicate clear differences in performance for actions 
observed in different perspectives, to date little research has examined the effects of viewpoint 
during observation and prediction on neural activity.  
In the previous chapter, we determined that only following motor experience (but not visual 
experience alone), spatiotemporal prediction of observed actions improves for transitive actions 
observed in a first-person perspective, but that this effect is not generalised to third-person 
perspective actions.  The present study aims to determine whether such differences can be 
observed neurally, by examining evoked potentials in EEG using a similar paradigm as outlined in 
the previous two chapters.   
4.1.1 Effects of visual perspective in behavioural studies 
The effect of visual perspective during action observation on cognitive processes appears to be a 
salient one. Studies have demonstrated that actions presented in the first person perspective 
appear to have a processing advantage in visuotactile integration (Bach et al., 2014; Hoover & 
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Harris, 2012; Pavani et al., 2000); in action direction determination (Kelly & Wheaton, 2013); and 
participants’ recall of task elements is superior when experienced in an egocentric perspective 
(Bergouignan et al., 2014; Lindgren, 2012).   
The evidence suggests that 1PP observed actions have a processing advantage. This advantage is 
supported by single cell recordings demonstrating that within the macaque mirror neuron system 
more neurons in area F5 code for IPP than 3PP actions (Caggiano et al., 2011), which may 
tentatively be interpreted as mirror neurons having a bias for coding egocentric actions. FMRI has 
further demonstrated that the human homologue of this area, PMv, demonstrates crossmodal 
visuo-motor coding only for 1PP actions (Oosterhof et al., 2012).   
4.1.2 Action Prediction and Visual Perspective 
Studies have demonstrated that motor priming, or physical experience of actions, provides an 
advantage when predicting the consequences of observed actions (Aglioti et al., 2008; Cross et al., 
2009; Urgesi et al., 2012), when recognising observed actions (Casile & Giese, 2006), as well as 
when predicting the spatiotemporal dynamics of observed actions, as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter.  Developing on previous action prediction literature that demonstrated that we 
more accurately predict actions in the spatiotemporal domain when those actions fall within our 
own motor experience (Sparenberg et al., 2012), the studies presented over the previous two 
chapters provided the novel manipulation of presenting actions from different perspectives.  
These perspectives either mapped onto the visual input received when performing an action 
oneself, or were actions that could only be interpreted as another individual performing the 
action.  The series of studies determined that only following motor experience, spatiotemporal 
prediction of observed actions improves for transitive actions observed in a first-person 
perspective, but that this effect is not generalised to third-person perspective actions.  Such a 
result could suggest that action prediction mechanisms may not have evolved for the prediction 
and in turn interpretation of others’ actions, as mirror neuron theory would posit (Rizzolatti & 
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Craighero, 2004), but have a much more self-relevant purpose, potentially in terms of motor 
control and kinematic adjustment.  This said, a spatiotemporal anticipation bias was observed for 
third-person perspective actions, which persisted even following motor experience of the actions 
to be observed. We offered the interpretation that this may be a consequence of the system 
compensating for the added uncertainty of interacting with unfamiliar others or actions. 
Our results may thus support the notion that prediction mechanisms for motor control may also 
serve the higher level cognitive function of social prediction, as has previously been postulated 
(Press, Heyes, & Kilner, 2011; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001).  However, whilst the predictive coding 
account of the AON (Kilner et al., 2007) (please see section 1.2.6 of Chapter 1) is based on 
minimizing prediction error, we suggest that if this same system is employed to predict and 
interact with others, then the forward or generative model may need to take into account the 
additional uncertainty of observing unfamiliar others, an uncertainty allowance, that is summed 
to our prediction based on our motor experience.  This may have the ultimate consequence of the 
prediction error signal being reduced when observing others (which may lead to the anticipation 
bias we have observed in our previous behavioural studies).  This current study aims to test just 
this, by examining the event related potentials (ERPs) associated in previous literature with 
expectancy violation following spatiotemporal incoherency compared to coherency in 1PP and 
3PP observed actions.  
4.1.3 EEG - Event Related Potential components in prediction 
4.1.3.1 The observer Error Related Negativity - oERN 
In terms of ERP components of interest associated with action monitoring and prediction 
violation, there are two potential candidates to examine: the observer Error Related Negativity 
(oERN) and the P300.  Within the action monitoring literature, previous research has 
demonstrated a negative going deflection in EEG data at frontocentral sites following one’s own 
erroneous motor response, termed an error-related negativity (ERN), shown to peak 
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approximately 100-200 ms following one’s own erroneous responses (Falkenstein et al., 1990; 
Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Emanuel, 1993).  More recently, a similar ERP component has 
been identified for observed action that is modulated by an observed actor’s response 
appropriateness.  This observer Error Related Negativity (oERN) has been identified for observed 
erroneous responses in Go/No-Go tasks as well as Flanker tasks and has been shown to peak 
somewhat later than the ERN for one’s own errors (Koban, Pourtois, Vocat, & Vuilleumier, 2010; 
Bates, Patel, & Liddle, 2005; Miltner, Brauer, Hecht, Trippe, & Coles, 2004; van Schie, Mars, Coles, 
& Bekkering, 2004). Experimental design of these studies meant that it remained unknown 
whether the oERN reflected observed erroneous compared to accurate responses, or an observed 
violation of expected response.  More recent work by Kobza & Bellebaum (2013), using a study 
design allowing prediction error of both correct and incorrect observed actor responses, 
demonstrated the oERN component reflects an action prediction error.   
Source localisation analyses in previous studies of the oERN have found that the component’s 
topography and sources resemble that of the ERN, with medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) determined as the sources of the ERN (Dehaene, Posner & Tucker, 
2004; Bellebaum & Daum, 2008; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Gentsch, Ullsperger, & Ullsperger, 
2009; Holroyd et al., 2004; Miltner et al., 2004) and oERN components (Koban et al., 2012; Koban 
et al., 2010; Kobza & Bellebaum, 2013). The MPFC and ACC’s disinhibition to response error has 
been related to involvement in action monitoring to allow modification of performance, 
particularly in goal-directed actions (Holroyd & Coles, 2002).  Kobza and Bellebaum’s (2013) work 
would suggest that the MPFC/ACC’s involvement in performance monitoring depends less on 
accuracy of actions, but on predictions and their violations.  
Whilst previous studies have used typical Go/No-Go and Flanker paradigms, in this present study, 
we aim to examine whether the same oERN component can be identified in relation to predicted 
action violation when the observed action is unpredicted (incoherent) in terms of spatiotemporal 
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dynamics of action.  As in previous studies described in Chapters 2 and 3, participants observe 
transitive actions performed on tools after having actively performed those same actions prior to 
observation.  Participants view the actions from 1PP and 3PP viewpoints.  During the dynamic 
video sequences, the action is occluded from view for a period, after which the action continues 
again in a manner coherent with the occlusion duration, or from a point in time that is earlier than 
would be expected, or later than would be expected, given the occlusion duration and their 
expectation based on their own motor experience of the action. 
We would hypothesise that the oERN would be evident for conditions in which the dynamics of 
the action continue from a point that is earlier or later than expected compared to when the 
action continues coherently after the occlusion period.  In addition, we would predict that the 
oERN would be greater for first-person perspective actions compared to third-person perspective 
actions, if 1PP actions are more salient for the prediction system, and if the system predominantly 
subserves one’s own action monitoring for kinematic adjustment. 
4.1.3.2 The P300 
The second ERP component of interest is the P300.  This component is defined as a positive 
deflection of the event related potential that begins approximately 300 ms following stimulus 
onset or response onset. The component has been largely investigated with oddball paradigms, 
which involve detection of infrequent ‘target’ stimuli in a succession of frequent ‘non-target’ or 
standard stimuli.  The P300 component is reliably elicited when a target stimulus as opposed to a 
non-target, is detected, irrespective of stimulus modality. The amplitude of the P300 is larger for 
unexpected than for expected outcomes (Linden, 2005), and typically increases in magnitude 
from the frontal (Fz) to parietal (Pz) electrode sites (Johnson, 1993).  The P300 is believed to be a 
neural index of the mechanisms involved in updating internal representations of the environment 
to make an appropriate response (Polich, 2007).  
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Although innumerable studies have examined the P300 with the oddball paradigm, and 
associated it with detection of infrequent target stimuli, or unusual stimuli (Escera, Alho, 
Schröger, & Winkler, 2000), several authors have linked the P300 to the wider phenomenon of 
deviance detection, whereby the stimulus experienced deviates from a specific predicted 
outcome (Knolle, Schröger, & Kotz, 2013) .  In our present study, we provide motor priming of the 
actions-to-be-observed, which may generate specific predictions about the spatiotemporal 
dynamics of the action. In such a case, any observed perturbations in these dynamics should be 
salient and elicit a prediction error.  Here we examine whether such a prediction error can be 
observed as a P300 ERP component following spatiotemporal incoherence following the occlusion 
of the action. 
In terms of perspective, there are two possibilities with regards to the P300. As in the Knolle et al. 
(2013) study, it is possible that the 1PP observed actions will generate greater P300 ERPs 
compared to 3PP observed actions if the 1PP can be thought of as more salient than the 3PP 
actions.  However, as Knolle and colleagues also suggest (Knolle et al., 2013), the P300 ERPs may 
reflect the difficulty of computing prediction error.  In this case we would expect predictions to be 
more specific for 1PP actions, whereas some prediction uncertainty would remain for actions 
observed in a third person perspective, requiring greater processing effort.  Therefore if the 
processing of prediction errors is more efficient in detecting visual error in the 1PP, it will produce 
a reduced signal in this perspective compared to the 3PP that requires greater processing power. 
In such a case, a greater P300 response to spatiotemporally incoherent visual stimuli would be 
observed for the 3PP observed actions. 
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4.2 METHODS 
4.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-four participants (nine male) were recruited through the University of York, Department 
of Psychology participant pool.  Participants were aged between 18 and 39 years (M=22.17, 
SD=5.24) and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received a small payment or course 
credit in compensation for their time. Procedures were approved by the Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee at The University of York. 
4.2.2 Materials  
For the biological actions, the same stimuli were used as outlined in Experiments 1 to 5 (please 
see Chapter 2, section 2.2.1.2).  Here we note differences from previous stimulus presentation, 
the main one being the inclusion of a new non-biological (rolling ball) condition to control for low-
level visual properties of the scene, such as upper and lower visual field presentation, but without 
human action properties. Each 1PP non-biological action sequence recorded comprised a small 
ball (2cm diameter) rolling towards an object at the centre of a table from a starting point at the 
inferior edge of the table, hitting the object, bouncing off the object and rolling back in the 
opposite direction. This rolling ball action was designed to match as much as possible the human 
reach-to-grasp actions.  As for the biological action, sequences were recorded with five different 
objects: a mug, a wine glass, a hammer, a pair of scissors and a jug of water.  From these non-
biological template sequences in the 1PP, 3PP non-biological sequences were created by flipping 
the image about the horizontal axis. 
Stimuli were recorded using a Panasonic full HD 1920x1080p (50p) Camcorder, mounted on a 
tripod. Action sequences were recorded from a bird’s eye perspective, looking down onto a table 
covered with a black cloth.  Recordings were edited using Sony Vegas Pro v10, which was used to 
trim the recordings so that each action sequence began with 300ms prior to the action beginning 
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(i.e. prior to the ball or hand appearing and moving towards the object) and 300ms post-
completion of the events. The software was also used to adjust the playback rate so that the 
length of each ball action sequence equated to the average length of the biological action with 
the same object over the male and female actor sequences.  Actions were rendered at 60Hz.  
4.2.3 Procedure 
The experiment began with a familiarisation phase, followed by motor priming, and then a 
practice phase, before proceeding to the main experimental phase. In the familiarisation phase, 
participants viewed each template video (i.e. without occlusion) twice (once in each perspective), 
and were asked to simply observe. Practice trials were then presented, allowing participants to 
adjust their judgement. Trials presented in this practice phase were the temporally incoherent 
(Early / Late) conditions for each object in each perspective (gender of the hand was randomised 
for the biological actions), for each action type. ‘Correct/Incorrect’ verbal feedback was provided 
to participants at the end of each practice trial. 
In the current experiment, after the familiarisation phase and before the practice phase, 
participants performed the transitive actions themselves, with eyes open.  This procedure 
followed that employed in Experiment 4 of Chapter 3 (please see section 3.2.2.2 for details).  Each 
action was performed four times on each of the five objects.  
Experimental trials began with a fixation cross for 1000 ms.  Following this, 1000 ms of the 
beginning of an action sequence was displayed. The action video was then replaced by the grey-
scale occlusion image, presented for a fixed duration of 500ms.  The occluder was then followed 
by the continuation of the action video until the end of the sequence.  The point from which the 
action sequence continued post-occlusion was manipulated, so that the sequence continued 
either coherently with the occlusion duration, whereby 500ms were removed from the video 
sequence (the Correct condition); or with a temporal offset of ±300ms. The Early condition had 
300ms less than the occlusion period removed from the video, whereas the Late condition 
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showed the continuation of the video with 300ms more than the occlusion period removed from 
the video, such that the continuation of the action appeared to jump backwards (Early) or 
forwards (Late) compared to where the action would continue from if it were coherent with the 
occlusion duration.   
Note that this is a significant reduction in the range of errors trials, where in previous studies 
there were 13 temporal offset conditions ranging from -200 to 200ms.  This simplified design was 
felt to be more suited to the ERP method in order to reduce the duration of the experiment.  This 
change probably results in less behavioural sensitivity to the error detection task, as noted in the 
Results section. 
Participants were instructed to imagine the continuation of the action during the occlusion period.  
Once the action continued after occlusion, participants were requested to give a verbal response 
to indicate whether the point from which the action continued was temporally earlier or later 
than the actual action would be expected to be, given the occlusion period and the participant’s 
expectation.  Participants were asked to provide their response on seeing a question mark 
presented for 2 seconds at the end of the action sequence.   
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Figure 4.1. Schema of a trial in Experiment 6. Each trial began with a fixation cross for 1000 ms, 
which was immediately followed by 1000ms of the start of an action sequence.  An occlusion 
screen was then displayed for a fixed duration of 500ms.  The continuation of the action then 
followed until its completion, with the re-start being incoherent-early, incoherent-late, or coherent 
with the length of the occluder.  At the end of the action sequence a question mark was presented 
for 2000 ms, during which time participants provided a verbal response as to whether they thought 
the action re-started from a point that was too early or too late. 
 
The biological actions consisted of 300 trials in total; 150 trials in each of the 1PP and 3PP 
conditions, and 50 trials in each of the Early, Coherent and Late conditions per perspective.  The 
300 trials were divided into ten equal blocks (30 trials in each block). At the end of each biological 
action block, a non-biological (ball) action block was presented.  Non-biological actions consisted 
of 150 trials in total; 75 in each of the 1PP and 3PP conditions, 25 in each of the Early, Coherent 
and Late conditions. These were also divided into ten equal blocks (15 trials in each block). A Non-
Bio action block immediately succeeded a Bio Action block, and the 1PP and 3PP conditions were 
presented in alternate blocks (i.e. Bio 1PP, Non-bio 1PP, Bio 3PP, Non-bio 3PP etc.), which were 
counterbalanced between participants. Each Bio/Non-bio block began with 10 familiarisation 
trials in the perspective (1PP/3PP) corresponding to that block, which involved presenting the 
action sequence from beginning to end without an occlusion.  At the end of the Non-Biological 
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action block, a ‘Break’ screen was displayed, allowing participants to rest their eyes and to 
proceed to the next block when ready to do so. 
4.2.4 EEG Recording 
EEG data were recorded continuously from 64 Ag-AgCl electrodes, according to the International 
10-20 system, using a Waveguard cap (ANTNeuro, The Netherlands) with active shielding and 
ANT-Neuro amplifier.  In addition, data were also recorded from the left and right mastoids.  The 
ground was located at site AFz.  Electrode site impedances were kept below 10 KΩ. Data were 
sampled at a rate of 1000Hz and the data online referenced to the common average. To control 
for eye movements, bipolar vertical and horizontal electro-oculograms (VEOG/HEOGs) recorded 
blinks and saccades. Data were acquired using ASA (AntNeuro, The Netherlands) software. 
4.2.4.1 Triggers 
Event markers were coded within the experimental paradigm script in Python v.2.7 
(www.python.org) and sent to the system amplifier. These event markers were located at three 
specific time points of interest: 1) the start of the action sequence, 2) the start of the occlusion 
period, and 3) the end of the occlusion period/start of the re-onset of the action post-occlusion.  
4.2.5 ERP Preprocessing and Analysis 
Preprocessing and analysis of the EEG data were conducted offline using Brain Vision Analyzer 
(BVA) software version 2.0 (Brain Products, Munich, Germany). The continuous data were high-
pass filtered using an IIR filter (phase shift-free Butterworth filter) with a 0.1 Hz cut-off and low-
pass filtered using a 30Hz cut-off with 24dB/Octave.   Noisy or flat channels were identified 
visually and removed, or interpolated by spherical splines (Perrin, Pernier, Bertrand, & Echallier, 
1989) if necessary.  This topographic interpolation allows defective channels to be replaced by 
obtaining virtual EEG channel values based on real values, interpolating scalp potentials. 
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4.2.5.1 Epoch formation 
Filtered data were then epoched into the conditions of interest using a time window of 800ms.  
For the ERP analysis, which focusses on the period post-occlusion to detect prediction error, data 
were epoched into a time window of -200ms to 600ms relative to the end of the occlusion 
period/re-onset of the post-occlusion action (the third trigger).  Data were epoched according to 
Perspective (1PP/3PP), Offset (Early, Correct, Late), and Action Type (Biological Action/Non-
Biological (Ball) action). 
4.2.5.2 Artifact Rejection 
Artifact rejection was performed in two steps.  Firstly, muscle artifacts and significant eye 
movements were identified using semi-automatic artefact rejection, with a ± 75 µV/ms voltage 
step threshold, visually inspected and epochs containing artifacts rejected. Secondly, an ocular 
correction was performed using the Gratton and Coles (Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 1983) method 
without raw average subtraction to reduce or eliminate the effects of eye movements on the EEG.  
For the biological action trials (300 in total, 50 per condition), the number of artifact-free trials 
analysed per participant ranged from 146 to 300 (M = 254.5, SD = 48.34).  The number of trials 
included in the analysis did not differ across the 6 biological action conditions (F(5,115) = 1.61, p = 
.16).  For the non-biological action trials (150 in total, 25 in each condition), the number of 
artifact-free trials analysed per participant ranged from 67 to 150 (M = 126.17, SD =23.72). The 
number of trials included in the analysis did not differ across the 6 non-biological (ball) action 
conditions (F(5,115) = 1.17, p = .33). 
Averaged waveforms per condition were generated for each individual, to produce evoked 
potentials time-locked to the re-onset of action post-occlusion. Mean amplitudes in microvolts 
(µV) were calculated for the time-windows relating to the two ERP components of interest.  Mean 
amplitude was defined as the difference between the mean baseline voltage in the time-window -
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200 to 0 ms pre-stimulus onset and the mean amplitude in the time window 100-200ms post-
occlusion (to assess the oERN), and the mean amplitude in time window 350-450 ms post-
occlusion (to assess the P300).  
Grand-averaged waveforms were generated across participants for each condition for visual 
inspection and to produce grand averaged evoked response plots.  
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4.3 RESULTS 
4.3.1 Behavioural Data 
Statistical analyses revealing Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant were Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected.  Participants produced monotonically increasing proportions of ‘late’ responses 
with increasing temporal offset for all action types and perspectives: 1PP Non-bio F(1.5,34.57)= 
339.94, p<.001, 2p =.94); 1PP Bio F(2,46) = 268.31, p < .001, 
2
p = .92; 3PP Non-Bio F(1.2,27.56)= 
394.03, p< .001, = 2p =.95; 3PP Bio F(1.4, 33.18) = 358.49, p< .001,
2
p  = .94.  As in Chapters 2 and 
3, logistic functions were fitted to each individual participant’s proportion of ‘late’ responses for 
each of the Time Offset conditions, and an average point of subjective equality (PSE) was 
determined across participants for each perspective in each action type. 
A 2 (perspective) x 2 (action type) repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated no significant effect 
of action perspective on prediction error (F(1,23) = 0.07, p = .80), indicating that the prediction 
error was similar for 1PP actions (M = 64.67, SE = 5.80) and 3PP actions (M = 67.47, SE = 5.28) . 
However, there was a significant main effect of action type on prediction error, F(1,23) = 5.46, p = 
.03, 2p = .19, with non-biological (ball) actions eliciting least prediction error (M = 57.58, SE = 
5.27) compared to the biological actions (M = 74.56, SE = 5.54).  There was no significant 
interaction effect between the viewing perspective and the action type on prediction error 
(F(1,23) = .19, p = .67). This indicates that the effect of action type was not modulated by the 
viewing perspective, or that the pattern of results in terms of perspective was similar for both the 
biological and the non-biological actions.  Figure 4.2 depicts the mean prediction error for the two 
action types in the two perspectives. 
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Figure 4.2. Mean point of subjective equality for each Action Type and each Perspective in the EEG 
study.  Light blue bars depict 1PP action, dark blue bars show 3PP actions. * p < .05. 
 
4.3.2 Electrophysiological Results  
The amplitude of the oERN and P300 components were defined according to prior literature to 
determine unbiased a priori electrode sites for inspection, and following visual inspection of the 
grand-averaged waveforms to determine the time windows of interest.  Previous ERP studies 
have shown that the oERN/ERN component is best recorded at frontocentral electrode positions 
(Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2001, Koban et al., 2010). The P300 component has been reported as best recorded at more 
parietal midline sites Cz, CPz and Pz (Johnson, 1993: Polich, 2003). 
Mean amplitudes (in microvolts) per individual per condition were calculated, defined as the 
mean voltage relative to baseline between 100 and 200 ms at electrodes Fz, FCz, and Cz for the 
oERN. For the P300, the mean voltage relative to baseline from 350 to 450 ms after re-onset of 
action post-occlusions was calculated at electrodes Cz, CPz and Pz.  
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4.3.2.1. EEG  - Observer Error Related Negativity (oERN) 
4.3.2.1.1. oERN - Non-Biological Action (Ball actions) 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the mean amplitude of the ERPs time locked to 
the re-onset of the action post-occlusion, averaged over electrodes Fz, FCz and Cz, within a time 
window of 100-200ms.  Perspective (1PP, 3PP) and Time Offset (Early, Correct, Late) were set as 
main factors.  The ANOVA importantly demonstrated that there was a non-significant main effect 
of perspective (F(1,23) = 1.23, p = .279).  There was, however, a main effect of Time Offset 
(F(2,46) = 3.35, p = .044, 2p = .13), with Early conditions eliciting a greater negative amplitude (M 
= -1.79, SE = .14) compared to Coherent conditions (M = -1.44, SE = .11) and a significantly greater 
amplitude than Late conditions (M = -1.32, SE = .10).  The Perspective x Time Offset interaction 
was non-significant (F(2,46) = .23, p = .80).  Figure 4.3 shows the mean amplitude averaged over 
electrodes Fz, FCz and Cz for the Perspective and Time Offset conditions. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 
depict the averaged waveform at electrode Fz, where the largest mean amplitude was recorded 
between 100-200ms following continuation of the action post-occlusion for the Perspective and 
Time Offset conditions.  
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Figure 4.3. Mean amplitude (µV) for non-biological data averaged over electrodes Fz, FCz and Cz in 
the time-window 100-200 ms following re-onset of action post-occlusion for the two perspectives 
and three time-offset conditions. Error bars depict ±1 SE of the mean. * p<.05. 
 
  
        
Figure 4.4 Grand averaged waveforms for non-biological action at electrode Fz for 1PP actions (A) 
and 3PP actions (B).  Solid lines depict the Coherent condition, dashed lines the Early condition, and 
dotted lines the Late condition.  Blue shaded area shows the time-window of interest for the oERN 
component. 
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Figure 4.5. Grand averaged waveforms for non-biological action at electrode Fz for Early (A), 
Coherent (B) and Late (C) conditions. Solid lines represent 1PP actions, dashed lines 3PP actions. 
Blue shaded area shows the time-window of interest for the oERN component. 
 
4.3.2.1.2. oERN – Biological Actions 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the mean amplitude of the ERPs time locked to 
the re-onset of the action post-occlusion, averaged over electrodes Fz, FCz and Cz, within a time 
window of 100-200ms.  Perspective (1PP, 3PP) and Time Offset (Early, Correct, Late) were set as 
main factors.  Importantly, there was a significant main effect of Perspective (F(1,23)=4.60,p=.043, 
=.17), with 1PP action eliciting a greater negative deflection overall (M = -1.45, SE = .24) compared 
to 3PP actions (M = -1.18, SE = .30).  There was also a main effect of Time Offset (F(2,46)= 4.16, 
p=.022, 2p = .15), with Coherent conditions generating a greater negative deflection (M = -1.55, 
SE =.31) compared to both Early (M = -1.12, SE = .26) and Late conditions (M = -1.27, SE = .27).  
The Perspective x Time Offset interaction was non-significant (F(2,46) = 2.99, p = .06).  Figure 4.6 
shows the mean amplitude averaged over electrodes Fz, FCz and Cz for the Perspective and Time 
Offset conditions. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 depict the averaged waveform at electrode Fz, where the 
largest mean amplitude was recorded between 100-200ms following continuation of the action 
post-occlusion, for the Perspective and Time Offset conditions. 
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Figure 4.6. Mean amplitudes (µV) for biological data averaged over electrodes Fz, FCz and Cz in the 
time window 100-200 ms following re-onset of action post-occlusion for the two perspectives and 
three time-offset conditions.  Error bars depict ±1 SE of the mean. * p<.05. 
 
     
         
Figure 4.7. Grand averaged waveforms for biological action at electrode Fz for 1PP actions (A) and 
3PP actions (B).  Solid lines depict the Coherent condition, dashed lines the Early condition, and 
dotted lines the Late condition.  Blue shaded area shows the time-window of interest for the oERN 
component. 
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Figure 4.8. Grand averaged waveforms for biological action at electrode Fz for Early (A), Coherent 
(B) and Late (C) conditions. Solid lines represent 1PP actions, dashed lines 3PP actions. Blue shaded 
area shows the time-window of interest for the oERN component. 
4.3.2.2. EEG - P300  
4.3.2.2.1. P300 - Non-Biological (Ball) action 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the mean amplitude of the ERPs time locked to 
the re-onset of the action post-occlusion, averaged over electrodes Cz, CPz and Pz, within a time 
window of 350-450ms.  Perspective (1PP vs 3PP) and Time Offset (Early, Correct, Late) were set as 
main factors.  Importantly, there was a non-significant effect of Perspective (1PP M = 1.37, SE = 
.12; 3PP M = 1.39, SE = .12; F(1,23) = .008, p = .928). A significant main effect of Time Offset was 
observed (F(2,46) = 10.309, p < .001, 2p = .31), with both Early (M = 1.43, SE =.17 ) and Late 
conditions (M = 1.91, SE = .16) generating significantly greater mean amplitudes compared to the 
Coherent condition (M = .81, SE = .13) (Early – Coherent p=.01; Late – Coherent p < .001).  The 
Perspective x Time Offset interaction was non-significant (F(2,46) = 1.85, p = .17). Figure 4.9 
shows the mean amplitude averaged over electrodes Cz, CPz and Pz for the Perspective and Time 
Offset conditions. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 depict the averaged waveform at electrode Pz, where the 
largest mean amplitude was recorded between 350-450ms following continuation of the action 
post-occlusion, for the Perspective and Time Offset conditions. 
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Figure 4.9. Mean amplitudes (µV) for non-biological data averaged over electrodes Cz, CPz and Pz 
in the time window 350-450 ms following re-onset of action post-occlusion for the two 
perspectives and three time-offset conditions.  Error bars depict ±1 SE of the mean. * p =.01. ** p = 
.001. 
 
     
      
Figure 4.10. Grand averaged waveforms for non-biological action at electrode Pz for 1PP actions (A) 
and 3PP actions (B).  Solid lines depict the Coherent condition, dashed lines the Early condition, and 
dotted lines the Late condition.  Blue shaded area shows the time-window of interest for the P300 
component. 
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Figure 4.11. Grand averaged waveforms for non-biological action at electrode Pz for Early (A), 
Coherent (B) and Late (C) conditions. Solid lines represent 1PP actions, dashed lines 3PP actions. 
Blue shaded area shows the time-window of interest for the P300 component. 
4.3.2.2.2. P300 – Biological Action 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the mean amplitude of the ERPs time locked to 
the re-onset of the action post-occlusion, averaged over electrodes Cz, CPz and Pz, within a time 
window of 350-450ms.  Perspective (1PP vs 3PP) and Time Offset (Early, Correct, Late) were set as 
main factors.  The ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of Perspective (F(1,23) = 9.41, 
p=.005, 2p = .29), with 3PP actions generating a greater P300 mean amplitude (M = 1.73, SE = 
.09) than 1PP actions (M = 1.22, SE= .09). A significant main effect of Time Offset (F(2,46) =18.89, 
p<.001, 2p = .45) was also observed. Contrasts revealed significantly greater P300 mean 
amplitudes for the Early (M = 1.64, SE = .13) compared to the Coherent condition (M = .84, SE = 
.09), and for the Late (M = 1.94, SE = .13) compared to Coherent condition (both ps < .001), and 
no significant difference between the Early and Late conditions.  A significant Perspective x Time 
Offset interaction was also observed (F(2,46) = 5.64, p = .006, 2p = .20).  Figure 4.12 shows the 
mean amplitude averaged over electrodes Cz, CPz and Pz for the Perspective and Time Offset 
conditions. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 depict the averaged waveform at electrode Pz, where the 
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largest mean amplitude was recorded between 350-450ms following continuation of the action 
post-occlusion, for the Perspective and Time Offset conditions. 
 
Figure 4.12. Mean amplitudes (µV) for biological data averaged over electrodes Cz, CPz and Pz in 
the time window 350-450 ms following re-onset of action post-occlusion for the two perspectives 
and three time-offset conditions.  Error bars depict ±1 SE of the mean. ** p < .001. 
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Figure 4.13. Grand averaged waveforms for biological action at electrode Pz for 1PP actions (A) and 
3PP actions (B).  Solid lines depict the Coherent condition, dashed lines the Early condition, and 
dotted lines the Late condition.  Blue shaded area shows the time-window of interest for the P300 
component. 
 
         
   
Figure 4.14. Grand averaged waveforms for biological action at electrode Pz for Early (A), Coherent 
(B) and Late (C) conditions. Solid lines represent 1PP actions, dashed lines 3PP actions. Blue shaded 
area shows the time-window of interest for the P300 component. 
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4.4. DISCUSSION 
4.4.1. Behavioural Data 
The results from the behavioural data of the biological actions were unexpected as they do not 
replicate the findings from the previous behavioural study that examined action prediction 
following motor priming with eyes open (Experiment 4, Chapter 3).  There are two principal 
differences in results compared to Experiment 4: The motor priming (with concomitant visual 
input) in Experiment 4 demonstrated a significant difference in action prediction between the two 
frames of reference, with prediction being much closer to accuracy for 1PP actions, compared to 
prediction of 3PP actions, whereas in this present study we find no difference in prediction 
accuracy for 1PP and 3PP biological action following the same type of motor priming with eyes 
open. Furthermore, action prediction accuracy is much worse for both 1PP and 3PP actions in this 
current study (Experiment 6) compared to Experiment 4 (~70ms difference for 1PP, and ~50ms for 
3PP actions).  There are a couple of differences between Experiment 4 and this present 
experiment which may contribute to these observed differences in results:   
Firstly, in the current study, only three temporal offset conditions were used, with intervals of 
300ms (-300ms, 0ms, +300ms).  In sharp contrast, previous experiments involved 13 temporal 
offsets with intervals of just 33ms (intervals of almost ten times smaller) in order to sample finely 
over the psychometric function.  Two temporal offsets (three temporal conditions in all) were 
used in this current experiment in order to keep the experiment duration to a minimum whilst 
also interrogating prediction of non-biological action.  However, a reduced resolution along the 
psychometric curve would mean we can be less precise about the extent of the prediction error in 
this experiment.  Thus, the elevated prediction error observed in this study compared to 
Experiment 4 may not be due to poorer performance on the part of this group of participants, but 
more related to the reduced sensitivity of the experimental design to examine the behavioural 
data. 
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Secondly, this present study included additional conditions of non-biological ball actions in both 
perspectives. The non-biological actions observed alternately between transitive action blocks 
may have facilitated prediction mechanisms for biological action in the 3PP, or hindered 
prediction mechanisms for 1PP actions, and thus contribute to the lack of difference in prediction 
performance for these biological actions.  That is, including new conditions in a within-
participants design can produce interactions between conditions, changing previous observations 
(see influential companion effects, Poulton, 1982). 
4.4.2. Electrophysiological Results 
4.4.2.1 Non-biological (ball) data  
With regards to the non-biological (ball rolling) actions, we observe that in contrast to the 
biological actions, there were no differences between perspective conditions in mean amplitude 
of components at either the 100-200 ms or 350-450 ms time windows.  This is likely due to such 
an action not being mapped onto one’s own body movement schema.  When processing the 
observation of non-biological action, the viewpoint may be less relevant, as the action is always 
being generated by an external entity; the action, whether it start from the inferior or the 
superior edge of the table, will be processed in much the same manner.  The kinematics of such 
action cannot be emulated through the same processes as observing human biological action as 
we have no motor experience of moving in the manner of a rolling ball. As such, any deviation 
from the expected spatiotemporal dynamics of the action may be processed equally for actions 
originating from upper and lower regions of the screen. 
If we are unable to draw upon our own motor experience for simulation of non-biological action, 
this could raise the question as to why we see in the behavioural data increased prediction 
accuracy for the non-biological compared to biological actions.  However, it is important to note 
that the kinematics of non-biological action are much simpler than biological action.  The 
trajectory of non-biological action is generally linear and speed remains constant, whereas 
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biological action is more varied, with the kinematics of the action changing and slowing as a hand 
approaches closer to a target object, and the grasp varying with the target object shape, weight 
and complexity of fine-grain motor adjustments required to lift the object.   
Importantly, the non-biological action results support an interpretation of the biological action in 
terms of the visual mapping of self- (1PP) and other-generated (3PP) action, rather than any 
differences observed being as a consequence of upper and lower visual field processing.    
4.4.2.2 Biological data 
4.4.2.2.1 Observer Error Related Negativity (oERN) 
The results from the oERN ERP analysis indicate that a greater negative deflection was observed 
for 1PP actions compared to 3PP actions at re-onset of the action post-occlusion, as might have 
been predicted. However, surprisingly, the oERN analysis demonstrated that, unlike the predicted 
effect of the Early and Late conditions generating larger negative deflections than the Correct 
condition, whereby the action follows the occlusion in a spatiotemporally coherent manner, 
instead we observe a greater negative deflection for the Coherent trials compared to the Early 
and Late conditions.  The non-significant perspective x time offset interaction indicated that this 
pattern was maintained for both the 1PP and 3PP actions.  This was an unpredicted result as the 
oERN literature would suggest that a deviance from an expected outcome would elicit a greater 
negative-going deflection compared to an expected outcome (Koban et al., 2010, Koban et al., 
2012; Kobza et al., 2013).  We observe in this instance a reversal of such findings, whereby the 
coherent condition trials generate a larger error signal than the incoherent conditions.  
To interpret this finding we have to consider the paradigm used and the participants’ task.  
Following the same paradigm as in the previous behavioural studies, using psychophysics, 
participants were required to provide an ‘Early’/’Late’ response to every trial, including trials that 
were spatiotemporally coherent.  The greater amplitude observed for coherent trials compared to 
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incoherent trials may therefore indicate a response conflict between that which participants 
observe to be correct/as expected, and simultaneously being required to provide an inconsistent 
response with their observation (which would equate to an erroneous response). The visual input 
for the coherent trials is incompatible with the task requirement. The greater negative deflection 
may therefore be more associated with a response conflict.  Although the response has not yet 
been provided at this point in time, participants may unconsciously already have experienced a 
response conflict in preparation for providing their vocal response.  The latency of the observed 
component also resembles the latency of the ERN, shown to peak between 100-200 ms (Gehring 
et al., 1993), more than the oERN which generally has a slightly delayed latency. We would like to 
posit that the greater negative deflection for Coherent compared to Incoherent conditions may 
thus indicate a response conflict associated with the preparation of an inconsistent/erroneous 
response compared to what is observed and what the participant wishes to respond.  
Examining the main effect of perspective in light of the above, the results are as would be 
predicted if 1PP actions are more salient than 3PP actions, and furthermore are in line with 
previous studies that have demonstrated greater deflections for self-generated deviants as 
opposed to externally-generated deviants (Knolle et al., 2013) and greater N100 suppression 
effect for self- compared to externally-generated/unpredictable sounds (Knolle, Schröger, Baess, 
& Kotz, 2012).  
Although the 1PP actions visually presented to participants are not self-generated, the visual 
input of 1PP action maps closely onto what would be perceived when performing an action - it 
has higher visuospatial congruence between a viewer’s own action and the observed sequence. 
As such, we would postulate that the neural signals of prediction and expectancy violation are not 
only observable with the typical Flanker or Go/No-Go tasks, but are also evident in this novel 
paradigm.  That is, EEG has identified some of the neural systems that mediate the processes of 
spatiotemporal prediction of observed action.  More importantly, the data show that the error 
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signal is more prominent when viewing 1PP than 3PP actions, supporting our notion that these 
mechanisms are important for action monitoring for self-related actions (in order to make 
necessary adjustments in time and space), more than for the monitoring of others’ actions.  
4.4.2.2.2. P300 
The results of the P300 ERP analysis on the biological action data revealed a greater positive 
deflection for Early and Late time offset conditions compared to the Coherent condition. That is to 
say, when the action post occlusion continued from a point that was spatiotemporally 
inconsistent with the real action dynamics, a greater P300 ERP response was recorded compared 
to when the action continued from a spatiotemporally coherent point in time.   This result was as 
predicted.  A large body of research examining effects on the P300 have used established 
paradigms, such as the Flanker task or a Go/No-Go task, and have interpreted the P300 in terms 
of the ERP being a neural signature of deviance detection, elicited by rare or unusual stimuli 
(Escera et al., 2000). More recently, studies have demonstrated that the P300 may be responsive 
to prediction error (Knolle et al., 2012).  These studies are, however, limited in their interpretation 
by the paradigm that they employ.  By using a paradigm not used previously to examine the P300, 
we again find that the P300 would appear to be responsive to prediction error. Previous literature 
associates the P300 to memory processes, enabling the access to representations held in short 
term memory to make comparisons between the deviant stimulus observed and the standard 
stimulus.  We may interpret our present results in the same way, as participants make 
comparisons between the visual stimulus observed and their internal representation of action 
dynamics, with this representation potentially being drawn from the recent motor experience of 
the very actions being observed.    
In terms of the central issue of perspective, we find that the greater P300 amplitude is elicited for 
third-person perspective observed actions compared to first-person perspective actions. Two 
opposing accounts of what mechanisms the P300 reflected were discussed previously.  The first 
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account assumed that if the neural system underpinning action prediction is more attuned to 
processing 1PP actions, as behavioural studies in previous chapters indicate, then greater P300 
amplitude would be observed for temporally incoherent conditions in the 1PP compared to the 
3PP.  A greater prediction error signal would be observed as the 1PP actions would be more 
salient.  This hypothesis was made following the logic of previous literature (e.g. Baess, Jacobsen, 
& Schröger, 2008; Knolle et al., 2013).   However, the second account proposed that the P300 
amplitude can reflect the difficulty of a computation.  It is largely assumed that the amount of 
effort, and in turn neural resources, allocated to a task is determined by the difficulty or task load 
(Gopher & Navon, 1980; Kahneman, 1973).  As task difficulty determines the extent of resource 
allocation it leads to higher physiological costs.  In fMRI research, the hemodynamic response 
measured (the blood oxygenated level dependent (BOLD) response) reflects energy use by 
neurons and therefore a reduced BOLD signal may reflect increased processing efficiency 
(Huettel, Song, McCarthy, 2009).  In line with this, we would predict that the processing of fine-
grained temporal properties of an action would be harder for 3PP than 1PP, and hence P300 
would be greater for the former than the latter.  This is the result that has been observed in the 
current study.  The results may suggest that the task related to 3PP actions makes greater 
demands on the processing system. 
This result and interpretation does contrast with the earlier oERN response observed at 100-200 
ms where we observe a greater negative deflection for first compared to third-person perspective 
actions.  We would suggest that the neuronal processing within these different time-windows 
varies in terms of the level of conscious processing of the stimuli.  That is, early ERP components 
are considered exogenous components, varying with the physical properties of stimuli and reflect 
automatic processing; whereas later ERP components (such as the P300) are endogenous 
components, reflecting more conscious higher level cognitive processing of the stimuli (Brandeis 
& Lehmann, 1986; Portella et al., 2014).  As such the perspective of the observed action may be 
processed in discreet ways within the two time-windows of interest in the current study.  In this 
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study, the earlier component may reflect pre-awareness detection of a conflict, whereas the P300 
may relate to the processing and comparison of the observed stimuli with internal 
representations of expected action dynamics, which may account for the greater oERN amplitude 
for 1PP compared to 3PP actions, but a greater P300 amplitude for 3PP compared to 1PP actions, 
as more processing resources are required for 3PP in the case of the later P300 time-window. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In this EEG study, evoked potentials were examined following the re-onset of action dynamics 
post occlusion that were temporally coherent or incoherent with the occlusion period.  Biological 
transitive actions and non-biological (ball rolling) actions were presented in the first-person and 
third-person perspectives.  The results of the non-biological data, employed as a control 
condition, allow the biological action data to be interpreted in terms of visual mapping of self- vs 
other-generated actions, rather than differences being due to lower vs upper visual field 
processing.  The study demonstrated greater amplitudes in the 100-200ms time window post-
occlusion for 1PP compared to 3PP actions when there was a conflict between that observed and 
the response requirement.  This may suggest that 1PP actions, or self-generated actions, are more 
salient for the action monitoring system.  Further support for this suggestion is provided by the 
later ERP component, the P300, the amplitude of which was greater for incoherent conditions 
compared to the temporally coherent condition. Although in this instance the P300 amplitude 
was reduced for 1PP compared to 3PP actions, there is evidence to suggest that this may reflect a 
processing advantage in the higher cognitive process of comparing visual inputs to an internal 
representation.  The observed results may support the notion that the mechanisms underlying 
action monitoring and prediction are more attuned to self-related actions than for the prediction 
of others.     
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CHAPTER 5: Spatiotemporal prediction of actions with a 
coincidence anticipation task 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the behavioural studies set out in Chapters 2 and 3, spatiotemporal prediction of action was 
interrogated with psychophysics methods. In the current chapter we again wish to interrogate 
spatiotemporal prediction processes, but via the use of an alternative paradigm.  The chapter 
aims to determine whether the results of the previous behavioural studies are replicated under 
different task requirements of the participants, using response time as the principal measure.  
More specifically, the chapter aims to i) examine spatiotemporal prediction of actions presented 
in first- and third-person perspectives with the use of a coincidence anticipation (response time) 
task; ii) examine the effect of motor priming on action prediction in relation to response time. 
Previous studies discussed in this thesis so far have examined action prediction with a 
spatiotemporal judgement task. This involved participants making a perceptual judgement of 
whether an observed action state was spatiotemporally too early or too late in its transition 
following occlusion compared to an expectation. Such a task may be considered an abstract 
manner of interrogating prediction mechanisms in that in order to make a judgement, a 
comparison must be made between the perceived action and the participant’s internal action 
schema.  Additionally, the action post-occlusion is spatiotemporally manipulated to be coherent 
or incoherent with the length of the occlusion.  Such action dynamics, in the incoherent 
conditions, are highly unlikely to occur in the real world, and participants’ task of making 
abstracted judgements would not be required in a real-life context.  It may be argued, therefore, 
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that the results of the previous studies may be a consequence of the experimental lab 
manipulation, which in turn lack real world ecological validity (Neisser, 1976).       
In fact, if we consider the actions which would necessitate the use of anticipation or prediction 
mechanisms in a real world context, interceptive actions such as those performed in sporting 
activities, and coincidence timing as we see in cooperative interactions, are some of the tasks that 
would draw on these mechanisms, each of which involves a simultaneous corresponding motor 
act during perceptual processing of dynamic information.  If dorsal perceptual systems are, as has 
been argued (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Goodale & Haffenden, 1998), primarily for action 
purposes, then ideally to interrogate action prediction we would use a paradigm that allows 
participants to act in response to the action being observed, as would be the case in a natural 
context.  In support of this, studies have demonstrated that the timing precision observed in 
sporting experts’ interceptive abilities is apparent only through perception and movement control 
linkages (Farrow & Abernethy, 2003).  
An alternative method therefore would be to aim to more directly tap into the mechanisms and 
motor codes employed to perform an action when observing it.  An alternative paradigm to the 
judgement task of previous chapters may thus entail the participant performing a similar lift 
action to the lift movement observed when the object is lifted from the table. Thus, with a change 
in task, participants task performance more readily draws upon the movement kinematics (to 
some degree) required to perform the action being observed. 
The large majority of studies examining temporal aspects of action prediction to date have used 
similar paradigms to those used in our previous studies; that is, using a judgement task with 
participants determining whether the action was a coherent continuation of the action sequence 
or not post-occlusion, or whether the action was too late/too early in two-alternative forced 
choice tasks (Graf et al., 2007; Parkinson et al., 2011; Prinz & Rapinett, 2008; Sparenberg et al., 
2012).  Among the action prediction literature, a limited number of studies utilise response time 
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or a motor act as a measure of prediction accuracy (Bootsma, 1989; Cross, Stadler, Parkinson, 
Schütz-Bosbach, & Prinz, 2011b). 
Despite few studies using reaction time to examine action prediction, there may be good reason 
to examine spatiotemporal prediction with different task requirements, particularly with regards 
to lab only based manipulations.  In essence, a perceptual judgement task removes the 
perception and action coupling that is inherent within natural anticipation performance in situ. 
Starkes et al., (1995) aimed to determine the effects of expertise on action prediction in a more 
natural context as opposed to a lab-based testing environment.  They examined prediction of the 
landing location of volleyball serves, with players’ vision of different time points of the serve being 
occluded with liquid crystal occluding glasses (Milgram, 1987)5.  This natural setting study 
replicated lab-based experiments that had used film sequences (Wright et al., 1990).  Both studies 
demonstrated that experts had superior spatial prediction ability than novices.  However, in the 
Starkes et al. (1995) study, participants made their predictions from a static position, providing a 
verbal response, and thus despite the natural setting, the study did not require the more 
ecologically valid response of providing the motor act required to return the serve. A later study, 
with squash players (Abernethy, Gill, Parks, & Packer, 2001), aimed to do just this, maintaining the 
perception-action coupling as much as possible.  Abernethy (2001) requested players to continue 
playing their shot despite visual occlusion.  This natural setting study also replicated the lab-based 
experiments demonstrating that superior expertise produced superior prediction abilities.  
Yet, these studies did not directly compare prediction between coupled and uncoupled 
perception-action responses.  Thus, in a subsequent study, Farrow and Abernethy (2003) 
demonstrated that different perceptual processes may be engaged during anticipation tasks that 
depend on factors including the expertise of the observer and, importantly for the purposes of 
this chapter, the degree of perception-action coupling inherent in the task requirements.  The 
                                                          
5
 Crystal occluding glasses allow vision to be occluded for transient periods of time, with onset/offset of 
occlusion controlled by the experimenter with remote activation. 
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authors directly interrogated the effects of making judgements (providing a verbal response) in 
contrast to providing a motor response. Similar to the Starkes et al (1995) and Abernethy (2001) 
studies, participants wore crystal occluding glasses in a natural setting of a tennis game.  
Participants were expert or novice tennis players, who had vision occluded during different stages 
of the opponent’s tennis serve (pre-contact vs post-contact occlusion).  Additionally, there were 
two response conditions; an uncoupled perception-action response whereby participants had to 
remain static and provide a verbal response as to whether the service return needed a forehand 
or backhand swing (which indicated the direction they would move), and a coupled perception-
action response that required participants to move as if to return the service.  The study 
demonstrated a significant interaction between the response mode (coupled/uncoupled 
perception-action response) and the skill level of participants.  Expertise effects on prediction 
accuracy were clear under the coupled condition, but not the uncoupled condition.  
The Farrow and Abernethy (2003) study would suggest that following motor priming, prediction 
accuracy would be better in a task requiring a motor act in response to an observed action, 
compared to a more abstracted judgement response on the coherency of the action continuation. 
Although we do not compare the two types of study directly, we aimed to determine whether the 
results of the perceptual judgement task of Chapters 2 and 3 would be replicated with a different 
task demand, specifically a coincidence anticipation task.  This task requires participants to 
provide a motor response that involves releasing a finger from a response key at the time point 
when an object is considered to be lifted from a table, although this exact moment is occluded 
from view.  This type of task in effect allows a coupled perception-observation response from 
which to obtain the main measure of spatiotemporal prediction. 
In our previous studies, we found that following motor experience of the action to be observed, 
action prediction improved only for first person perspective actions.  However, the Farrow and 
Abernethy (2003) study might suggest that this may be a result of the task requirement, and that 
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if a task employed a perception-action coupled response, then perhaps prediction accuracy would 
improve also for third-person perspective actions.  This is based on the fact that coupled 
perception-action tasks draw upon the same mechanisms (i.e. simultaneous perception processes 
and motor control responses) that are necessary in action prediction tasks in a natural context, 
which in general require a motor response to be made as a consequence of an action on the part 
of another individual, as we see in interceptive actions or coinciding actions when cooperating 
with others.  Thus, in accordance with our previous studies, it was hypothesised that 
spatiotemporal action prediction would improve following direct motor experience of the 
transitive actions to be observed compared to prediction without such experience.  However, in 
this study, in line with the conclusions following the Farrow and Abernethy study (2003), it was 
hypothesised that such motor experience may also improve prediction of actions in the third-
person perspective as well as the first-person perspective.  
In addition, in the current study, we also introduce a variable action duration pre-occlusion, 
providing participants with a jittered length of time during which the action sequence is visible 
before the onset of occlusion.  A previous study by Parkinson et al. (2012) explored the effect of 
different durations of action visually available before occlusion onset and found that the more 
information, the more accurate participants’ prediction performance. However, in contrast to the 
Parkinson and colleagues (2012) study, which used a psychophysics paradigm much like that 
employed in the studies presented in the previous chapters, the current study has implications for 
the length of time available to simulate the action during the occlusion period before the object is 
lifted from the table.  In the current study, a longer period of action sequence visually available 
pre-occlusion equates to less time during the occlusion before participants are required to 
provide a response (coinciding with the lift time of the object from the table).  As such, we might 
suggest that, with the use of the current coincidence anticipation task design, the shorter period 
participants have pre-occlusion to watch the unfolding action provides more time during 
occlusion to engage a switch from perceptual to simulation processes (as Sparenberg and 
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colleagues (2012) argue) and prepare a response.  We might thus hypothesise that in the current 
study, prediction performance would be more accurate in general for the shorter pre-occlusion 
action duration trials.  On a more exploratory line, the chapter in turn will examine how the 
effects of perspective and motor priming interact with the time to simulate occluded action. 
 
5.2 EXPERIMENT 7 – Without Motor Priming 
5.2.1 METHODS   
5.2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-four participants (7 male) were recruited through the University of York, Department of 
Psychology participant pool. Participants were aged between 19 and 28 years (M=20.63, SD=1.71) 
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received a small payment or course credit in 
compensation for their time. Procedures were approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee at The University of York. 
5.2.1.2 Materials 
Materials and stimuli were comprised of the same video sequences used for the behavioural 
experiments described in Chapters 2 and 3 (Experiments 1 to 5; please see Section 2.2.1.2 of 
Chapter 2). As a brief reminder, ten video sequences in the first person perspective were created 
of transitive actions involving an actor’s hand reaching towards an object on a table, grasping it, 
lifting it and removing it from the table in the direction of the actor. As before, transitive actions 
were performed on five objects: a mug, a wine glass, a hammer, a pair of scissors and a jug of 
water by two actors of different genders. Third person perspective sequences were created by 
flipping the images about the horizontal axis. 
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Presentation of visual stimuli and response recording was programmed using Python v2.7 
(www.python.org) and Pygame modules (www.pygame.org). Visual stimuli were presented on a 
1280x1024 monitor, with 1024x576 image dimensions on a black surround, at a viewing distance 
of 64cm, subtending a visual angle of 28x15 degrees, at a 60Hz screen refresh rate. 
5.2.1.3 Design and Procedure 
The practice and main experimental task, to be described below, was to lift the finger from a key 
at the point in time when it was judged an object was lifted from the table.  However, a 
familiarisation phase and a lift demo phase of the experiment were undertaken before the main 
experimental trials began.  In the familiarisation phase, participants viewed each template video 
twice (once in each perspective; 20 video sequences in total), and were asked to simply observe. 
Twenty lift demo trials were then presented (5 objects x 2 actor genders x 2 perspectives) to 
ensure that participants were fully aware of what was meant by the objects’ ‘lift time point’. The 
lift demo trials involved the presentation of the template sequences again, during which the 
image was paused at the point in time that the object was lifted from the table.  The image 
paused for a duration of two seconds before continuing until completion. Table 5.1. shows the 
real lift times (in milliseconds) for the five objects for the two actor genders.  
Table 5.1. Real lift time points (in milliseconds) for each object and each actor gender, determined 
from the start of the action sequence. 
 
Lift time point in milliseconds 
 
Actor 
gender 
 
Object 
  
 
 
Cup Glass Hammer Scissors Jug Mean 
Male 1467 1317 1083 1467 1650 1396.8 
Female 1483 1517 1250 1383 2083 1543.2 
 
Mean 1475 1417 1166.5 1425 1866.5 1470 
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In the following practice and main experimental phases, trials began with a fixation cross 
presented until participants started the experimental trial sequence by pressing and releasing the 
space bar. Participants were instructed to use their left hand to press the space bar. This 
presented a smaller fixation cross, which remained on screen until the participant pressed and 
held down the ‘enter’ key with their right index finger. Pressing and holding the enter key initiated 
the start of a transitive action sequence, which unfolded for a jittered duration of 700ms or 
1000m. The action video was then replaced by the grey-scale occlusion image. Participants were 
instructed to imagine the continuation of the action during the occlusion, and to provide a 
response by raising their finger from the enter key at the moment in time they believed the object 
to be lifted from the table (though this was not visible). This occlusion image remained on the 
screen until the participant made a key release response or until the end of the length of the full 
action sequence.  
If a participant failed to respond during the length of an action sequence, and before the screen 
went to a fixation cross, the trial was repeated once at the end of the block.  A self-paced inter-
trial interval was employed, requiring the participant to press the spacebar on seeing the fixation 
cross to progress to the next trial.  Figure 5.1 depicts an experimental trial. 
In the practice phase, twenty practice trials were presented (5 objects x 2 actor genders x 2 
perspectives) to allow participants to adjust their judgement and response speed. In the practice 
phase, on participants’ raising their finger from the response key, the occlusion screen was 
replaced by the continuation of the action sequence from the time point the participant’s finger 
was lifted, in a manner as if the action had continued normally behind the occlusion; i.e. the time 
between the start of the action sequence and the time point from which it re-started post-
occlusion equated to the time elapsed between the participant pressing and releasing the 
response key.   Participants thus received visual feedback, with the image jumping forwards or 
backwards from where they would expect it to be if they were too early or too late with their 
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response, respectively. On completion of the action sequence, participants also received written 
feedback, indicating that they were either ‘too early’ or ‘too late’ with their response, or ‘correct’.  
Participants had to be within 17ms of accuracy to receive ‘correct’ feedback.   
The main experimental phase consisted of 100 trials in each of the 1PP and 3PP conditions, 
divided into ten equal blocks (200 trials in total; 5 actions x 2 actor genders x 2 repetitions in each 
block). The 1PP and 3PP conditions were presented in alternate blocks, counterbalanced across 
participants. Each block began with 10 familiarisation trials in the perspective (1PP/3PP) 
corresponding to that block.  Each block ended with a ‘Break’ screen allowing participants to rest 
their eyes and to proceed to the next block when ready to do so.  In the experimental phase, 
participants did not receive visual or written feedback on their response time. Instead, when 
participants released their finger from the response key, a black screen with a fixation cross was 
presented. Participants had to press the spacebar with their left hand to progress to the next trial. 
 
Figure 5.1. Schema of a trial in Experiments 7 and 8. Each trial began with a fixation cross 
presented until the participant pressed and held down the ‘enter’ key. This started an action 
sequence that was presented for a jittered duration of either 700 ms or 1000 ms.  An occlusion 
screen was then presented. Participants had to respond during the occlusion of the action by 
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raising their finger from the response key at the point in time they thought the object was lifted 
from the table. ITI= Inter-trial interval. 
 
5.2.2 RESULTS 
For each participant, a response time (RT) in milliseconds was determined from participants’ 
release of the response key in relation to the onset of the action sequence.  From the RT, a 
prediction error (in milliseconds) was calculated by subtracting the time point at which the object 
was actually lifted from the table from participants’ RT. Negative values would thus indicate RTs 
of shorter latency than the real lift time point, and positive values indicate RTs of longer latency 
than the real lift time point.  For the purposes of this main analysis, average RTs and prediction 
errors were calculated over participants, collapsing across actor gender and object, and analysed 
in terms of perspective, experiment and pre-occlusion action length. 
It is well know that there is generally a lag between providing a response and the operating 
system receiving the input from the response device.  This device latency varies with both the 
model of the response device, in this case a DELL USB keyboard, and the operating system. 
Response device latency tests conducted by Psychology Software Tools, Inc. (www.pstnet.com) 
have demonstrated that for the keyboard and operating system used in this study, response 
device latency is on average 13.98 ms (SD = .74).  As such, for this study, participants’ RTs were 
adjusted accordingly by 14 ms. 
In addition, it is worth noting that Parkinson et al. (2012) demonstrated that the amount of 
information provided prior to occlusion can also affect accuracy of action prediction in occlusion 
tasks.  Bearing this in mind, and that in this particular experiment we jittered the duration of pre-
occlusion action available to observers, the analysis additionally includes the pre-occlusion action 
duration to examine whether this influenced spatiotemporal prediction accuracy in this 
coincidence anticipation task. 
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A repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on the data from Experiment 7, with both 
perspective (1PP vs 3PP) and pre-occlusion jitter length (700 vs 1000 ms) as within-participants 
variables.  The ANOVA revealed a non-significant main effect of perspective (1PP M = 60.95 ms 
(SE = 6.80); 3PP M = 62.43 ms (SE = 6.80); F(1,23) = .02, p = .90).  However, a significant main 
effect of jitter was revealed (F(1,23) = 27.29, p <.001, 2p = .54), with 1000 ms of action pre-
occlusion (less time between occlusion onset and object lift point) (M = 103.95; SE = 8.79) eliciting 
more prediction error than 700 ms of action pre-occlusion (more time between occlusion onset 
and object lift point) (M = 19.43; SE = 8.79).  There was a marginally significant perspective x jitter 
interaction (F(1,23) = 3.79, p = .06).  
In Experiment 7, the results depict positive prediction errors for the two perspective conditions. 
The positive errors indicate that participants’ responses were on average of longer latency than 
the actual point of lift of the objects from the table. Such delayed responses suggest that 
participants were simulating the actions at a rate that was slower than the real dynamics of the 
unfolding action. To visually depict the findings of the experiments in terms of action simulation, a 
figure reversing the sign of prediction error values in presented in Figure 5.2a. This figure more 
clearly represents the findings in terms of speed of action simulation in relation to the action 
dynamics. Figure 5.2a shows the prediction errors observed for the two perspective conditions for 
both jitter durations in Experiment 7 (without motor priming).  
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Figure 5.2. Bar charts depicting data from (a) Experiment 7 (without motor priming) and (b) 
Experiment 8 (with motor priming). Plots show mean prediction error (in milliseconds) for action 
observed in each perspective, with sign values reversed to depict internal simulation of action 
relative to the real action dynamics. Negative values depict slower simulation than the real action 
dynamics. Light blue bars show prediction error following 700 ms of action sequence pre-occlusion, 
dark blue bars show prediction error following 1000ms of action sequence pre-occlusion. Error 
bars depict ±1 standard error of the mean. 
 
 
5.3 EXPERIMENT 8 – With Motor Priming 
5.3.1 METHOD 
5.3.1.1 Participants  
Twenty-four participants (9 male) were recruited through the University of York, Department of 
Psychology participant pool. Participants were aged between 18 and 26 years (M=20.25, SD=2.45) 
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received a small payment or course credit in 
compensation for their time. Procedures were approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee at The University of York. 
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5.3.1.2 Materials, Design and Procedure 
The same stimuli and paradigm were used as in Experiment 7 (Sections 5.2.1.2. and 5.2.1.3).  In 
Experiment 8, however, after the familiarisation phase and before the lift demo and practice 
phases, participants performed the transitive actions themselves, with eyes closed, as outlined in 
Experiment 5 (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.2).  As a reminder, participants were asked to observe the 
experimenter place the object on a table covered with a black cloth, on a marker set at 34cm from 
the participant’s edge of the table. Participants were asked to reach towards, grasp and remove 
each object from the table as if they were about to use the object.  Each action was performed 
with the participant’s right hand, four times on each of the five objects. For greater detail, please 
see Section 3.3.2.2.  The same main experimental computer task as in Experiment 7 was then 
performed by participants. 
5.3.2 RESULTS 
A repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on the data from Experiment 8, with both 
perspective (1PP vs 3PP) and pre-occlusion jitter length (700 vs 1000 ms) as within-participants 
variables.  The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of perspective (1PP M = 11.79 (SE = 7.05), 
3PP M = -14.77 (SE = 7.05); F(1,23) = 5.97, p = .02, 2p = .21).  A significant main effect of jitter was 
also revealed (F(1,23) = 20.29, p <.001, 2p = .47) (1000 ms of action pre-occlusion M = 36.13, SE = 
9.44; 700 ms of action pre-occlusion M = -39.10 (SE = 9.44)). There was a also a significant 
perspective x jitter interaction (F(1,23) = 28.06, p = <.001, 2p= .55).  Figure 5.2b shows the 
prediction errors observed for the two perspective conditions and two jitter durations following 
the motor practice received in Experiment 8.  As previously, prediction error values in the figure 
have their sign reversed to more adequately depict the speed of internal simulation of the action 
compared to the real action dynamics, with negative values showing slower simulation compared 
to the real action. 
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5.4. GENERAL RESULTS 
The main aim of these two experiments was to i) determine action prediction accuracy for the 
two perspectives of action with this task, and ii) determine whether there is an effect of motor 
experience on action prediction accuracy in this task.  In order to examine both these aspects, 
driven mainly to examine the difference in results between Experiments 7 and 8, the data from 
the two experiments were entered into a single analysis.   
A mixed ANOVA was conducted with pre-occlusion (jitter) duration (700ms vs 1000ms) and 
perspective (1PP vs 3PP) as within-participant factors, and experiment (no motor priming vs 
motor priming) as the between-participant factor.  The 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a non-significant 
main effect of perspective (M 1PP = 36.37 (SE = 4.59), M 3PP = 23.83 (SE = 4.59); F(1,46) = 2.48, p 
= .122) and a non-significant main effect of experiment (M Exp 7 = 61.69 (SE = 38.94), M Exp 8 = -
1.49 (SE = 38.94); F(1,46) = 1.32, p = .257).  However, as observed in previous studies, a marginally 
significant perspective x experiment interaction was revealed (F(1, 46) = 3.1, p = .085, 2p = .06).  
A main effect of pre-occlusion action duration was revealed (F(1,46) = 47.19, p <.001, 2p = .51), 
with the pre-occlusion action length of 700ms eliciting least prediction error (M = -9.84, SE =6.71 ) 
compared to the 1000ms action duration prior to occlusion (M = 70.04, SE = 6.71 ). There was a 
non-significant jitter x experiment interaction, though a significant jitter x perspective interaction 
was revealed (F(1,46) = 25.06, p < .001, 2p = .35).  A significant three-way interaction of jitter x 
perspective x motor priming was also demonstrated (F(1,46) = 4.52, p = .039, 2p = .09). Figure 
5.2.a and 5.2.b show the mean prediction error in milliseconds for Experiments 7 and 8 
respectively, for the two perspective conditions and the two jittered pre-occlusion action 
durations.  
Planned comparisons revealed that the 1PP action prediction was not significantly influenced by 
whether participants experienced motor priming prior to the task (700 ms pre-occlusion: t(23) = 
.91, p=.37; 1000 ms pre-occlusions: t(23) = .94, p=.36). Also, 3PP action prediction was not 
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influenced by motor priming when there was more time between occlusion onset and lift-point 
(700 ms pre occlusion) (t(23) = 1.05, p = .31), and that only 3PP action prediction improved when 
there was limited time between occlusion onset and lift-point (1000 ms pre-occlusion) following 
motor priming (t(23) = 2.15, p = .043). 
5.4 DISCUSSION 
This chapter aimed to examine action prediction through the use of an alternative paradigm to 
that used so far in the thesis.  Whilst other chapters have used psychophysics and a two-
alternative forced choice spatiotemporal judgement task, this chapter employs a coincidence 
detection task, requiring participants to provide a motor response that coincides with the point in 
time an object is lifted from a table whilst occluded from view.  The principle measure of 
prediction accuracy or prediction error is therefore no longer the point of subjective equality 
(PSE), but the response time of participants.  We principally aimed to determine whether the 
results from Experiments 2 and 5, of Chapters 2 and 3 respectively, would be replicated with this 
alternative paradigm, and again i) examine spatiotemporal prediction of actions presented from 
two different frames of reference, and ii) examine how motor experience of the actions influences 
action prediction in the two perspectives. 
The first thing to note from Experiment 7 is that participants’ prediction error values for both the 
1PP and 3PP actions were positive.  This indicates that participants released their finger from the 
response key, to indicate the lift point of an object, somewhat after the actual lift time-point of 
the action.  This was particularly the case when participants had less time between occlusion 
onset and time-of-lift to simulate the action (the 1000 ms pre-occlusion condition).  This suggests 
that participants’ internal representation of the action unfolded slower than the real action; in 
other words, that their simulation of the action dynamics was slower than the real action 
dynamics.  This result is in contrast to the results observed in Experiments 1 and 2 of Chapter 2 
which suggested participants were generally simulating the action faster than the real action 
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dynamics and in turn predicting the action states ahead of time, which falls in line with many 
representational momentum studies (e.g. Jarraya, Amorim, & Bardy, 2005). Here, we see an 
opposing result. 
Cross et al., (2011) used a similar paradigm to the current study to examine action prediction in an 
fMRI study.  Participants watched gymnasts and wind-up toys moving behind an occluding panel 
and were required to press a button when they expected the agent to reappear. With this similar 
paradigm, they also found that participants generally responded later than the actual 
reappearance of the agent.  Our results in this response time study are consistent with those 
obtained by Cross et al. (2011) in terms of participants’ responses being slower than the action 
dynamics. That is to say, in both our present study and Cross and colleagues (2011) study of 
action prediction with response time as the principal measure, participants’ internal action 
simulation was slower than the real action’s spatiotemporal dynamics and no anticipation bias 
was observed before motor training. 
Similarly, as commented earlier in the thesis, Sparenberg and colleagues (2012), using a two-
alternative forced choice task, demonstrated that participants had a negative PSE overall, 
indicating that simulation of the observed actions took longer than the action itself.  Results of 
action prediction studies have therefore not always been consistent, with some studies 
demonstrating a positive prediction error, and others demonstrating a negative prediction error.  
As commented in Chapter 2, the reasons for such inconsistencies may lie in the details of the 
experimental paradigm used, the actions to be simulated, familiarity of such actions, and the task 
requirements.  In our present study, the same stimuli were used as in our previous set of 
behavioural experiments, and most elements of the paradigm remained the same with the 
exception of the participants’ response task.  It may be the mere act of providing a motor 
response that has influenced action prediction performance in a contrasting way in this study 
compared to that previously reported. Although this behavioural result was not expanded upon 
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by Cross and colleagues (2011), we would like to speculate why these differences may have 
occurred. 
Let us consider the task of trying to hit an approaching ball.  The information required to 
complete the task includes the visual aspects of the time-to-arrival of the ball at a specific point in 
space, as well as the motoric information relating to the individual’s capacity to act, which 
requires initiating an action response at a specific time before arrival of the ball. Although in this 
study we do not ask participants to provide a motor response of this kind, we try to emulate it 
with the coincidence anticipation task, requiring a coinciding motor response at the time-of-lift. In 
this coincidence anticipation task, participants must take into account the time required to initiate 
an action to provide their response, as well as assess the time of lift.  We would speculate that in 
this study perhaps participants are not accounting for the intervening time interval accurately, 
and thus respond with a longer latency than the actual time-of-lift.  This is particularly the case for 
both action perspectives before any motor training of the action.  In our study, the observed 
result of a longer latency of response compared to the actual object lift-point may be a 
consequence of unfamiliarity of providing such a response rather than a more natural coinciding 
action (such as hitting a ball with a bat), and in turn not accounting for the motor intervention 
time interval. If, according to Gibson (1979), perception is for action, then the more a task 
requirement is separated from the action actually required (or separated from what the system 
evolved for), then the more inaccurate the perceptual processes are likely to be (Bootsma, 1989). 
An alternative explanation would relate to the type of motor response required.  As the action 
itself does not exactly equate to the action being observed, that is, grasping and lifting the object 
with a full hand movement, but rather an index finger lift, this motor act may actually interfere 
with the perception and prediction of the observed action.  Several studies have already 
demonstrated that performing an incoherent action to that being observed negatively affects 
performance of the observation (Hamilton, Wolpert, & Frith, 2004) and prediction of actions 
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(Springer et al., 2011).  If the motor act required to provide a response mapped more accurately 
onto the action being observed, perhaps we would have observed an anticipation bias, or faster 
simulation (faster response times than the lift-point), as we see in our first set of experiments 
before motor priming. 
However, the slower action simulation result observed may be explained in simpler terms, 
particularly as simulation is much slowed when less time is available to participants between 
occlusion onset and object lift-point.  The main effect of pre-occlusion action duration shows that 
when more information is provided prior to occlusion, prediction error is greater. In this study 
two jittered pre-occlusion action durations were provided (700 ms and 1000 ms), with trials 
providing 700 ms of action prior to occlusion eliciting improved action prediction performance 
compared to trials with 1000 ms of action prior to occlusion.  This is in contrast to results reported 
by Parkinson et al (2012), who showed that more information prior to occlusion onset generated 
improved performance.  However, their study employed a psychophysics paradigm much like that 
reported in the first three empirical chapters of this thesis.  In contrast, the current study requires 
participants to provide a motor response during the occlusion period.  In this regard, in trials in 
which more information is provided prior to occlusion onset, less time transpires during the 
occlusion before the object lift-time-point and before the participant would be expected to 
provide a response.  As such, a longer pre-occlusion action duration equates to a shorter period 
during which participants can switch from a perceptual processing system to a simulation system 
in the occlusion phase.  This perception-to-simulation switching process was speculated to 
account for the prediction error in the Sparenberg et al., (2012) study.  In the current study, 
participants would therefore have less time to engage a simulation process and also prepare a 
motor response to coincide with the actual object lift-time-point.  For conditions in which 
participants have more time to engage simulation processes and prepare a motor response, 
participants are much more accurate, irrespective of the frame of reference. 
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More interestingly in relation to the principal aims of this chapter are the results observed in 
Experiment 8 in which participants perform the actions-to-be-observed before completing the 
same task as in Experiment 7.  This simple and brief motor experience (picking up each object just 
four times) provides an improvement in action prediction accuracy.  However, the three-way 
interaction between perspective, motor priming and the length of pre-occlusion action available 
demonstrates that the advantage provided by motor priming appears to be highly selective. We 
observe that when participants have less time to engage a simulation process system and prepare 
a motor response, 3PP actions are selectively improved following motor priming.  
Although we see a replication of the pattern of findings from Experiments 4 and 5 (Chapter 3) in 
terms of motor priming improving action prediction as hypothesised, in our first set of studies this 
effect was selective to 1PP actions. In contrast, in this current study, we observe that 3PP 
observed actions are improved following motor priming when there is limited time to engage 
simulation processes.   
This result was somewhat unexpected.  It was predicted that both 1PP and 3PP actions would see 
an improvement in spatiotemporal prediction following motor priming, whereas we observe that 
following motor priming, and with less time to engage a simulation process and/or a motor 
response, 3PP actions are selectively improved.  Our reasoning for our initial hypothesis goes 
some way to explain the result observed. It was anticipated that the involvement of a motor act 
as a response would tap into a different processing system.  This processing system may be that 
used in a more natural action anticipation context in a real world environment where we 
generally need to provide a motor response in relation to an action performed by another, as we 
see in interceptive actions or in coincidence timing actions required when interacting and 
cooperating with others.  In our previous spatiotemporal judgement tasks of Experiments 1 to 5, 
visual coherence of the reach-grasp action has to be assessed.  In the present button release task, 
a coupled perception-action coincidence task is required of participants. The type of task 
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requirements in this chapter therefore may tap into processing mechanisms that are more 
attuned to perception and prediction of others’ actions (3PP actions) for the purposes of 
interaction – whether this be to coincide movements and cooperate, or for interception. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigated the spatiotemporal prediction of action with an alternative paradigm to 
that used previously to determine whether the same effects of motor priming and perspective on 
action prediction performance could be observed with a coincidence anticipation task as opposed 
to a spatiotemporal judgement task.   With this alternative paradigm, while some results are 
replicated others are in sharp contrast to those previously reported.  Without motor training of 
the actions to be observed, participants’ tended to simulate the actions slower than the real 
spatiotemporal dynamics of the action when there is limited time to prepare a response, in both 
first- and third- person perspective actions.  However, following motor priming, participants’ 
performance is improved, with 3PP actions becoming preferentially influenced, generating faster 
response times, or in other terms eliciting faster simulation mechanisms.  This said, only when 
participants have less time to engage a simulation process and engage a motor response during 
the occlusion phase are 3PP actions selectively improved following motor priming.  This selective 
improvement of 3PP action compared to 1PP actions contrasts sharply with results from 
experiments in previous chapters demonstrating a selective improvement of 1PP actions following 
motor priming.  The reason for this shift in prediction performance within the two perspectives 
may largely be due to the task requirement in this study.  The fact that participants are required 
to provide a motor response to coincide with a particular element of the unfolding action is more 
akin to action prediction tasks that one might encounter in the real world, in that when making 
predictions about observed actions, an individual likely has to provide a response towards an 
action initiated by another individual, as when intercepting an action or coinciding movements 
with another person for cooperation.  As such, the coincidence anticipation task, employing a 
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perception-action coupled response, may draw upon one’s motor repertoire and engage 
underlying prediction mechanisms that are more sensitive to actions observed from a third 
person perspective. 
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CHAPTER 6. Individual differences in action prediction and its 
relation to time perception and motor control 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters have examined spatiotemporal prediction accuracy of observed transitive 
actions, as determined across groups of participants.  In this chapter, this spatiotemporal action 
prediction is examined in relation to cognitive measures of time perception, as well as motor 
control.  Motion processing, and intrinsic to this, spatiotemporal processing of action, are 
inextricably linked with temporal processing, and temporal processing has its implications for 
motor control processes.  This chapter thus begins to examine interdependencies between 
measures of these three areas of sensory perception and motor processing.  In examining the 
relations between these, the current chapter explores individual differences in the abilities to 
accurately process spatiotemporal dynamics of action and how these differences may be 
explained by variability in processing accuracy of temporal information and/or motor control 
mechanisms. 
The perception of motor sensory stimuli / motion processing 
Any perceptual stimulus that is dynamic in nature evolves over both dimensions of space and 
time.  This is the case whether it be in the auditory, somatosensory or visual mode.  The sensory 
stimulus is not purely spatial or temporal in nature, but requires evaluation of patterns of activity 
in both of these domains.  In tight relation to this, action observation and prediction mechanisms, 
which draw upon motion processing, are reliant to a large extent on temporal perception abilities.  
To accurately determine where in space an action state should be within its unfolding dynamic 
trajectory at a given moment, it is essential to simultaneously and adequately process the 
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evolution of time. To internally simulate an action effectively in order to make judgements about 
where an action state should be in space (as in the paradigm used in the first three empirical 
chapters of this thesis), or to determine when a transitive action reaches a particular state (as in 
the previous chapter) thus require analysis of the temporal elements of the percept.  In order to 
gain an understanding of how the brain processes complex dynamic real word events that 
mediate both our own actions and the understanding of others’ actions, we therefore need an 
understanding of the mechanisms underpinning our ability to process order, intervals and 
duration of sensory and motor events. 
Neuroimaging studies in healthy adults of temporal monitoring, involving time estimation, 
reproduction and production, have implicated several cortical and subcortical cerebral structures, 
including the cerebellum (Bueti, Bahrami, & Walsh, 2008; Lewis & Miall, 2003; Lee et al., 2007); 
prefrontal cortex (Pouthas et al., 2005; Tregellas, Davalos, & Rojas, 2006; Koch et al., 2002); the 
premotor cortex, supplementary motor area (SMA) and pre-SMA (Ferrandez et al., 2003; Macar, 
Anton, Bonnet, & Vidal, 2004; Schubotz, Friederici, & von Cramon, 2000; Tregellas et al., 2006); 
parietal cortex (Bueti et al., 2008), IFG pars opercularis (Schubotz et al., 2000; Tipples, Brattan, & 
Johnston, 2013) as well as basal ganglia, putamen and caudate nucleus (Pouthas et al., 2005; Rao, 
Mayer, & Harrington, 2001). Such studies suggest that time perception is attributed to a 
distributed cortico-subcortical network, which includes contributions of neural activity within 
sensory and motor areas.  As Schubotz et al. (2000) highlight, the neural structures underlying 
time perception include the same network responsible for motor planning and coordination of 
movements.  Some of the cerebral regions in this temporal processing network, therefore, are 
also shared with the mirror neuron system and responsible for motor simulation (including the 
pre-motor cortex, IFG, IPL and STS)  (Tipples et al., 2013).  
Given such neuroimaging evidence, it is quite plausible to assume that when observing actions 
and engaging motor simulation processes, we are recruiting not only brain regions associated 
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with the execution of those movements being observed/simulated, but also the temporal 
patterning of the unfolding action.  
Motor production and control 
As stated previously, the mirror neuron system is so called as the neural regions that comprise it 
are activated when producing movement as well as when observing a movement being produced 
by another.  Subcomponents of the mirror neuron system would thus apparently be involved in 
producing movement, observing and predicting movement, as well as processing of temporal 
information.  In fact, as producing movements involves coordinated changes in muscle activation 
over time, in the order of tens of milliseconds, motor control and timing are inextricably related 
(Mauk & Buonomano, 2004).  
Considering the evidence that the motor system plays a significant role in action observation, 
prediction, and potentially intention understanding in others, it is plausible that a dysfunctional 
motor control/planning system may lead to an ineffective action prediction mechanism.  In this 
study, we therefore assess the fine and gross motor skills of individuals in order to examine the 
relationship between motor control and performance on the action prediction task previously 
reported. 
Autistic spectrum disorder 
In close relation to this, there is growing research interest in the motor skills and deficiencies in 
individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD).  Although not formally assessed or considered 
within the diagnostic criteria for ASD, motor function impairments have been reported to 
characterise ASD in a large amount of research in both children and adults (eg. Gowen & Miall, 
2005; Hallet et al., 1993; Jansiewicz et al., 2006; Rinehart, Bradshaw, Brereton, & Tonge, 2001; 
Forti et al., 2011). 
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Typically developing infants engage in co-ordinated vocal and facial interactions with caregivers 
from an early age. These reciprocal vocalisations, imitations of oro-facial expressions, and 
following of eye gaze (coordinated on a fine timing scale) form the very beginnings of the natural 
to-and-fro of conversation that develops over the first few years of life, and the very bases of 
social reciprocal communication.  Some research has demonstrated that motor synchrony in 
infant-mother dyadic interactions predicts socio-emotional development in typically developing 
children (Feldman, Greenbaum, Yirmiya, & Mayes, 1996).  Furthermore, Yirmiya et al., (2006) 
found weaker motor synchrony in these dyadic interactions in a high risk ASD group (siblings of 
children diagnosed with ASD) compared to a low risk group.  Moreover, studies have 
demonstrated impairments in individuals with ASD to anticipate or predict actions and respond 
appropriately (Brisson, Warreyn, Serres, Foussier, & Adrien-Louis, 2012; Cattaneo et al., 2007; 
Martineau, Schmitz, Assaiante, Blanc, & Barthélémy, 2004; Schmitz, Martineau, Barthélémy, & 
Assaiante, 2003).  These studies have indicated that individuals with ASD may have an impairment 
in feed-forward mechanisms making effective anticipation of events difficult, and instead are 
more reliant on feedback processes, as compared to neurotypicals.  
A dysfunction in a common mechanism for motor control and action observation/ prediction may 
thus be the underlying reason for both these types of impairment observed in ASD, which in turn 
have consequences for an individual’s capacity for social reciprocal communication (Leary & Hill, 
1996).  That is, a dysfunctional motor circuitry may lead to impairments seen in ASD (Fabbri-
destro, Gizzonio, & Avanzini, 2013). 
Given such research, variability in performance in action prediction across individuals in a sample 
may be related to other cognitive and neurophysiological factors.  As such, this chapter examines 
action prediction in relation to scores on a motor control assessment, measures of time 
perception, as well as the pre-screening tool used in ASD diagnosis, the Autism Quotient (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, & Martin, 2001).  More specifically, this chapter aims to determine 
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the extent to which performance variance on the spatiotemporal prediction task outlined in the 
previous chapter can be accounted for uniquely by the motor practice provided prior to the task, 
or in addition by time perception ability, motor control, as well as levels of autistic traits. 
Each participant in the study detailed in the previous chapter also undertook four additional 
assessments to the coincidence anticipation task.  Participants were assessed on an explicit and 
an implicit time perception task (the temporal bisection task, and variable foreperiod task 
respectively), a complete motor control assessment of fine and gross motor skills (PANESS, 
Denckla, 1985), and also completed the pre-screening autism measure, the Autism Quotient (AQ, 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
Based on the neuroimaging literature that suggests time perception, motor production, 
observation, and prediction may share common networks (eg. Schubotz et al., 2000), at least in 
part, and the relatively recent speculations that a dysfunctional motor production system may 
underlie deficits in ASD (Fabbri-destro et al., 2013), it was hypothesised that measures of time 
perception performance, basic motor skills and indices of autistic traits would demonstrate 
interdependencies among each other and with the measures of action prediction.  Furthermore, if 
these variables do share common underlying mechanisms, and all are essential to the coincidence 
anticipation task employed in this study, we would expect that not only the Experiment 
Assignment (whether participants received motor priming or not) would contribute to the 
variance in performance on the action prediction task, but also that these additional variables 
would contribute significantly to the variance on the action prediction task.         
The results of Chapter 5 indicate that the advantage afforded by motor priming appears to be 
highly selective (with only 3PP observed action being improved following motor priming and 
when participants have less time to engage a simulation mechanism), and data demonstrate 
greater variation in performance when participants are presented with 1000 ms pre-occlusion 
(less time to switch to a simulation mechanism).  Therefore, it is expected that Experiment 
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Assignment would be a significant contributor to variance in performance when participants 
receive 1000 ms of visual input pre-occlusion, but not when they receive 700 ms of input; that is, 
Experiment Assignment will be a significant predictor of performance when participants have less 
time between visual offset and point of lift to switch to a simulation process (1000 pre-occlusion), 
compared to when they receive more time to switch (700 ms pre-occlusion).  As such, a 
regression analysis was conducted on the coincidence anticipation performance data relating to 
these two conditions of pre-occlusion duration separately.   
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6.2. METHODS 
6.2.1. Participants 
The same participants as those who undertook the action prediction experiment in the previous 
chapter (in both the with- and without-motor priming conditions) also undertook the experiments 
and tasks described below (please see sections 5.2.1.1 and 5.3.1.1). 
6.2.2 TASKS 
All tasks described below were conducted under the same testing conditions as in the action 
prediction task described in the previous chapter.  For both computer based experiments 
described below (the Temporal Bisection and Variable Foreperiod tasks), presentation of visual 
stimuli and response recording were programmed in PsychoPy v1.73 (Peirce, 2007, 2008). Visual 
stimuli were presented on a 1280x1024 CRT monitor, with images presented on a black surround, 
at a viewing distance of 64cm, subtending a visual angle of 28x15 degrees, at a 60Hz screen 
refresh rate. 
6.2.2.1. Temporal Bisection 
2.2.1.1. Materials 
The image used for the presentation of the temporal stimuli in the bisection task was a blue 
colour filled circle, 7.5 cm in diameter, presented in the centre of the monitor. During the pre-
training and training phases, visual feedback was given following participants’ responses in the 
form of a green tick or a red cross.  
2.2.1.2. Design and Procedure 
The paradigm involved three phases: pre-training, training, followed by the main experimental 
phase. In the pre-training phase, participants were familiarised with two anchor durations of 200 
ms and 800 ms, representing ‘short’ and ‘long’ durations respectively.  To do this, a blue circle was 
Chapter 6 | 142 
 
 
 
  
presented on the screen alternately for a ‘short’ then ‘long’ period of time for a total of eight 
trials.  Participants were informed of this sequence and were required to indicate after each trial 
whether the stimulus appeared for a ‘short’ or ‘long’ duration by pressing the corresponding 
response key.  Following a response, visual feedback was provided in the form of a green tick or a 
red cross for correct and incorrect responses, respectively. This feedback was presented for two 
seconds before the next temporal trial was presented.  In the following training phase, the blue 
circle was presented for a further eight trials, with the ‘short’ and ‘long’ durations being 
presented in a random order.  Participants were required to discriminate between the two anchor 
durations, indicating with a key press whether they believed the blue circle appeared for a ‘short’ 
or a ‘long’ duration.  Participants again received visual feedback following their response on each 
trial.  Training terminated when the participant made no errors in the block of eight training trials. 
Following these pre-training and training phases, participants completed the main experimental 
task.  In the experimental phase, in each trial, participants were presented with the blue circle 
that appeared in the centre of the screen for a duration of time that was either one of the anchor 
durations, or one of five intermediate durations (i.e. 7 test durations: 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 
700, 800 milliseconds).  A black screen was subsequently presented and participants were 
required to respond with the corresponding key press whether the length for which the blue 
circle appeared was closer to the ‘short’ or closer to the ‘long’ duration previously learned in the 
pre-training and training phases. Participants were required to provide a response as soon as 
possible after the blue circle disappeared and had no more than two seconds in which to respond 
before the next temporal trial was presented.  In the main experimental task, feedback was not 
provided. The next trial began on providing a key response, with the blue circle appearing 1000 
ms into the start of the trial. 
The blue circle appeared for these seven time trials in ten consecutive blocks, with each anchor 
and intermediate duration being presented once per block (70 trials in total).  The temporal 
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stimuli were presented in random order within each block. Figure 6.1 depicts a schema of a trial in 
the Temporal Bisection task. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Temporal Bisection task paradigm.  A blue circle appeared for a duration of time equal 
to one of the anchor durations (200 or 800 milliseconds), or one of the intermediate durations 
(300, 400, 500, 600 or 700 milliseconds).  Participants had a maximum of two seconds to respond 
as to whether the blue circle appeared for a period of time closer to the ‘short’ or ‘long’ anchor 
duration learned in the pre-training and training phases.  Participants received feedback in the 
training phase, but did not during the main experimental testing phase.  Following a response (or 
feedback in the training), a blank screen was presented for 1000 ms before the next test duration 
was presented.  
 
2.2.1.3. Data analysis 
The proportion of ‘long’ responses (pLong), produced at each test duration was calculated for 
each individual. This was achieved for a given duration, by dividing the number of ‘long’ responses 
by the sum of short and long responses.  Logistic psychometric functions were fitted to each 
participants’ proportion of ‘long’ responses for each temporal duration condition by minimising 
the mean squared error of the fit. 
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These psychophysical functions allow extrapolation and quantification of indexes of timing 
sensitivity and ability: The duration that produces 50% pLong responses (when the individual is 
equally likely to classify the duration presented as ‘short’ or ‘long’) is known as the bisection point 
(BP) or point of subjective equality (PSE).  In human timing, the PSE is usually around the 
arithmetic mean of the two anchor durations (Wearden, 1991). 
2.2.2. Variable Foreperiod task 
2.2.2.1. Materials 
At the beginning of each trial, a 1,500 Hz pure tone auditory stimulus was presented for 50 ms. 
The visual stimuli consisted of a yellow cross of 5cm squared which served as the cue stimulus.  
This fixation cross was presented for the duration of the foreperiod length, which was varied.  
Three foreperiod conditions were used: 800, 1600 and 2400 milliseconds.  The imperative (target) 
stimulus consisted of a downward pointing white arrow (a 1.5 x 1 cm bar attached to an 
arrowhead with a maximum width of 2 cm). The imperative stimulus replaced the cue/foreperiod 
stimulus and was presented for 500 ms. Stimuli were presented on a black background. 
2.2.2.2. Design and Procedure 
This task consisted of two phases, a practice phase and an experimental phase.  In the practice 
phase, participants were presented with each of the three foreperiod durations just once, in a 
random order.  That is, the auditory 1500 Hz pure tone was presented for 50 ms. Simultaneously 
with the auditory tone, the visual cue stimulus (yellow cross) was presented on the screen for one 
of the foreperiod durations (800, 1600 or 2400 ms). Immediately following this, the imperative 
stimulus (the white downward-pointing arrow) was presented for a fixed duration of 500 ms.  
Participants were required to press the space bar as soon as possible on seeing the imperative 
stimulus (the white arrow). The time limit for response was 2000 ms after the arrow’s onset.  The 
following trial began 1000 ms following the participant’s response.  These three trials were simply 
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to ensure that the participant could follow the instructions and understood what was required of 
them. 
Following the practice phase, participants undertook the main experimental phase.  Each trial in 
this phase was exactly the same as in the practise phase.  Participants received 60 consecutive 
trials in total, with each of the three foreperiod conditions presented 20 times in a random order.  
The task was presented as a velocity game, with participants being requested to respond by 
pressing the space bar as quickly as possible when they saw the white arrow. 
 
Figure 6.2. Schema of a trial in the Variable Foreperiod task.  Participants were presented with an 
auditory tone for 50ms simultaneously with the visual presentation of a yellow cross.  This cue 
stimulus appeared for one of the temporal conditions (800, 1600, 2400 ms) that represented the 
variable foreperiod.  Following the yellow cross, the target stimulus comprising a white arrow was 
presented for 500 ms.  Participants were required to provide a key response as soon as possible on 
seeing the target stimulus, and had no more than 2000 ms in which to respond. ITI = Inter-trial 
interval. 
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2.2.2.3. Data analysis 
Participants’ response time (RT) data were analysed, with RT calculated relative to the onset of 
the imperative stimulus (white arrow presentation).  Trials were treated as errors and removed 
from the RT analysis if a response was made during the foreperiod itself or during the first 100 ms 
after imperative stimulus onset (premature responses), if the RT was slower than 1500 ms 
(delayed responses) or no response was provided (null responses).   
As time elapses during the foreperiod without the target stimulus being presented, the 
probability of the target stimulus occurring in the next time interval increases. The cognitive 
system is believed to utilise this probability to endogenously increase response preparation.  As 
such, mean reaction time decreases as a function of increasing foreperiod length (the variable 
foreperiod effect; Woodrow, 1914).  To examine individual differences in the foreperiod effect, a 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient was calculated per participant to determine the relationship 
between the foreperiod interval and response time. 
2.2.3. The Physical and Neurological Examination for Subtle Signs (PANESS) 
Participants were also asked to undertake an assessment of their basic motor functions.  The 
PANESS (Denckla, 1985) allows examination of the complete range of neurological subtle signs of 
motor function, including both fine and gross motor skills. Although primarily used in previous 
research to assess children’s motor skills, having been standardised to allow for the assessor to 
account for the chronological age of the participant, in this study the PANESS was employed with 
the adult participants, with any errors being noted regardless of age. 
The PANESS allows for the assessment of several different tasks of motor control.  These include 
stressed gaits, balance, coordination, motor persistence, repetitive timed movements, involuntary 
movements (such as choreiform and tremors), overflow on the gaits and timed movements, and 
dysrhythmia.  
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The PANESS assessment is provided as Appendix C, which details each of the tasks required of the 
participant.  Regarding scoring, for each of the forward, backward and sides-of-feet gait tasks, the 
examiner scored the number of errors in ten steps, and recorded presence of overflow (i.e. 
extension of hand at the wrist).  For balance tasks, the number of hops (maximum of 50) and 
seconds standing (maximum of 30 for each foot) was recorded. For the motor persistence task, 
the time during which the participant maintained eyes closed during stance was recorded 
(maximum of 20 seconds for each stance).  For repetitive timed movements, the time to complete 
a set number of movements was recorded using a stopwatch, as well as the presence of overflow 
(proximal, oro-facial, and mirror movements) and dysrhythmia.  Abnormal movements (i.e. 
choreiform movements and tremor) were also recorded throughout.  
Errors were recorded for the measures of gait, balance, motor persistence, overflow, and 
dysrhythmia, and ordinal scores (0, 1, and 2) were given, with higher scores indicating increasing 
abnormal performance. Ordinal scores were summed across the right and left sides of the body 
for all measures to create summary scores for the following categories: (1) Gaits – error scores for 
heel, toe, sides of feet, and tandem gaits; (2) Balance – error scores for one-footed hops and 
stands; (3) Speed of repetitive timed movements – z-scores were summed; (4) Dysrhythmia – on 
timed movements; (6) Overflow – on gait and timed movements. 
The assessor demonstrated each task to be performed whilst providing verbal instructions from 
the test description. Higher scores on the PANESS indicate increased errors, dysrhythmia and 
overflow.  The PANESS scoring sheet is provided as Appendix D.  
2.2.4. Autism Quotient 
The Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a self-report measure developed for use in the 
general population to assess autistic traits in individuals with normal IQ (>70).  In the study 
conducted by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) and in more recent studies, individuals with ASD score 
significantly higher than members of the general population (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Hoekstra, 
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Bartels, Cath, & Boomsma, 2008; Ketelaars et al., 2008).  Comprised of 50 questions, it 
quantitatively assesses characteristics related to the triad of impairments (language and 
communication, social reciprocal communication, and stereotyped and repetitive behaviours) 
that form the diagnostic criteria of autism spectrum disorder according to the diagnostic manual 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2000). Although the more recent DSM-V (APA, 
2013) has now updated diagnostic criteria to reduce the three domains to two domains (social 
communication and interaction, and restricted and repetitive behaviours or interests), there is not 
as yet an updated version of the Autism Quotient.   
There is currently some debate about the subscales inherent within the measure.  Research has 
demonstrated that the AQ assesses five subscales (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) – Social skills, 
Communication, Imagination, Attention to Detail and Attention-Switching.  However, other 
research has demonstrated a three-factor structure of the assessment (Social skills, 
Details/Patterns, Communication/Mind-reading) (Austin, 2005; Hurst, Mitchell, Kimbrel, Kwapil, & 
Nelson-Gray, 2007) and a four-factor structure (Stewart & Austin, 2009).  Nevertheless, it remains 
the only major screen to examine autistic traits in the general population, and the AQ is currently 
used as a screening tool for referral to diagnostic services as recommended by the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidelines (NICE, 2012).  The Autism Quotient is 
provided as Appendix E. A four-point Likert scale was used to score the AQ. 
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6.3. RESULTS 
Multiple linear mixed regression analyses were conducted to determine the amount of variance in 
performance on the coincidence anticipation task uniquely accounted for by motor practice, time 
perception, motor skills and autistic traits, in both the 1PP and 3PP conditions.  Predictors thus 
included the categorical variable of Experiment Assignment (no motor priming vs motor priming); 
and four continuous predictor variables: the Point of Subjective Equality (PSE) on the Temporal 
Bisection task (explicit time perception measure); the Correlation Coefficient from the Variable 
Foreperiod task (implicit time perception measure); Physical and Neurological Examination of 
Subtle Signs (PANESS) score (motor skill assessment); and the Autism Quotient (AQ) (measure of 
autistic-like traits).  Descriptive statistics (means, standard errors (SE), maxima and minima values, 
and variances) for each of these continuous variables are provided in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics (means, minima, maxima, standard errors and variances) for each of 
the continuous predictor variables. 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
Error 
Variance 
PSE 485.00 348.37 613.73 9.22 4078.31 
VF Coefficient -0.87 -1.00 0.61 0.04 .06 
PANESS score 17.96 5 38 1.27 77.11 
AQ 106.48 78 152 2.07 206.30 
Note: PSE = Point of subjective equality on the Temporal Bisection task; VF = Variable Foreperiod; 
PANESS = Physical and neurological examination of subtle signs; AQ = Autism quotient. 
 
As the predictor variable determined from the Variable Foreperiod coefficient had close to zero 
variance in the sample, this predictor violates the assumption of zero-variances.  For this reason, 
this predictor variable was excluded from further analysis in the regression. 
Two regression analyses were conducted: One examining the predictor variables in relation to the 
coincidence anticipation data when participants receive 700 ms of action sequence prior to 
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occlusion (which resulted in more time to switch from perception to simulation during occlusion), 
for the first and third person perspectives; and a second analysis examining the predictor 
variables in relation to the coincidence anticipation data when participants receive 1000 ms of 
action sequence prior to occlusion (less time to switch to a simulation process during occlusion). 
A hierarchical regression method was employed, with the categorical variable of Experiment 
Assignment (motor vs no-motor practice) entered into the model first, PSE on the Temporal 
Bisection task entered second, and PANESS score and AQ entered third in a forced entry manner.  
The rationale for this method was that based on the series of studies presented so far in the 
thesis, whether or not participants received motor practice prior to undertaking the action 
prediction task was deemed likely to predict performance on the coincidence anticipation task.  
As such, the categorical variable of Experiment Assignment was entered first.  The explicit time 
perception measure of PSE on the Temporal Bisection task was entered into the model second as 
it was considered the next most important variable likely to predict performance given the close 
relationship between the spatiotemporal coincidence detection task and the need to accurately 
determine the elapse of time.  The results of the multiple linear mixed regression analyses are 
provided in Tables 6.2 (DV = action prediction with 700 ms pre-occlusion), and 6.3 (DV = action 
prediction with 1000 ms pre-occlusion).  
All continuous data entered into the regression models met the assumption of non-zero variances 
(PSE variance = 4078.31; PANESS variance = 77.11; AQ variance = 206.30, RT 1PP 700 ms pre-
occlusion variance = 46107.89; RT 3PP 700 ms pre-occlusion variance = 52750.66; RT 1PP 1000 ms 
pre-occlusion variance = 27246.02; RT 3PP 1000 ms pre-occlusion variance = 31064.40).  Data also 
met the assumptions of normally distributed errors, homoscedasticity and linearity.  Tests 
confirmed that data met the assumption of collinearity (all predictors’ tolerances > 0.1; all 
predictors’ variance inflation factor (VIF) < 10.0). Furthermore, there were no significant 
correlations among the predictor variables (all r ≤ .11) indicating there was no multicollinearity.  
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For the regression analysis of action prediction data with 700 ms pre-occlusion, an analysis of 
standard residuals was carried out, which showed that the data contained no outliers (1PP: 
Standard Residual Min = -2.06, Max = 1.68; 3PP Standard Residual Min: -2.27, Max: 1.61).  The 
data also met the assumption of independent errors (1PP: Durbin-Watson = 1.76; 3PP: Durbin-
Watson = 1.80).  Similarly, for the regression analysis of action prediction data with 1000 ms of 
visual input pre-occlusion, an analysis of standard residuals was carried out, which also showed 
that the data contained no outliers (1PP: Standard Residual Min = -2.07, Max = 1.62; 3PP Standard 
Residual Min: -2.65, Max: 1.67).  These data also met the assumption of independent errors (1PP: 
Durbin-Watson = 1.87; 3PP: Durbin-Watson = 1.83). 
The regression analysis of performance data when 700ms of visual input were presented pre-
occlusion demonstrates that none of the predictor variables entered into the three models can 
account for the variance in participant performance on the action prediction (coincidence 
anticipation) task.  Whilst an increase in explained variance occurs from Model 1 (just Experiment 
Assignment entered as a predictor) to Model 2 (Experiment Assignment and Temporal perception 
measure entered as predictors), the change in variance explained does not reach significance.  
This is the case for action prediction performance when actions are presented in both the first 
and third person perspectives. 
In contrast, the regression analysis of performance data when 1000ms of visual input are 
presented pre-occlusion (less time to switch from perception to simulation processes) 
demonstrates that, when actions are presented in the third person perspective, only the 
Experiment Assignment predictor makes a significant contribution to the model, in all three 
models. 
In the 1000 3PP analysis, the experiment assignment accounts for 7% of the variability in 
performance on the action prediction task.  When PSE (time perception sensitivity) is included in 
the model, this increases to 13%, then 17% of the variance when all four predictors are included 
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in the model.  Temporal perception therefore accounts for 6% of the variation, and together 
motor skill and AQ traits account for 5% of variation.  The change in amount of variance that can 
be explained only approaches significance in the case of Model 1 (when Experiment Assignment is 
included in the model). When other predictors are included in the model (Models 2 and 3), the 
change in variance accounted for by the predictors is non-significant. 
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Table 6.2. Results of the multiple linear mixed regression analysis of factors predicting the variance 
in the coincidence anticipation task, in first and third person perspectives, when participants 
receive 700 ms of action pre-occlusion. 
  First Person Perspective 
 
   Model 1 
 
   Model 2   Model 3  
Variable 
 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 
 
-12.06 43.94  334.25 237.73  99.46 333.61  
Experiment 
 
54.30 62.14 .13 61.53 61.55 .15 66.50 61.75 .16 
PSE 
 
   -.72 .49 -.22 -.67 .49 -.20 
PANESS  
 
      4.41 3.56 .18 
AQ       1.21 2.17 .08 
 
R2 
 
  .02   .06   .10  
ΔR2 
 
 .02   .05   .04  
F for ΔR2  .76   2.20   .97  
  Third Person Perspective 
 
   Model 1 
 
   Model 2   Model 3  
Variable 
 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 
 
-26.80 46.94  326.65 254.46  65.61 355.91  
Experiment 
 
62.77 66.38 .14 70.15 65.88 .15 75.71 65.88 .17 
PSE 
 
   -.74 .52 -.21 -.68 .52 -.19 
PANESS  
 
      5.13 3.80 .20 
AQ 
 
      1.29 2.32 .08 
R2 
 
 .02   .06   .11  
ΔR2 
 
 .02   .04   .05  
F for ΔR2  .89   2.00   1.12  
Note: PSE = Point of subjective equality on the temporal bisection task; PANESS = Physical and 
neurological examination for subtle signs score; AQ = Autism Quotient; ΔR2 = Change in R2. 
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Table 6.3. Results of the multiple linear mixed regression analysis of factors predicting the variance 
in the coincidence anticipation task, in the first and third person perspectives, when participants 
receive 1000 ms of action pre-occlusion. 
  First Person Perspective 
 
   Model 1 
 
   Model 
2 
  Model 3  
Variable 
 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 
 
-109.83 33.74  189.37 181.37  30.58 254.37  
Experiment 
 
44.02 47.73 .14 50.28 46.96 .15 53.73 47.09 .16 
PSE 
 
   -.62 .37 -.24 -.58 .37 -.22 
PANESS  
 
      3.59 2.72 .19 
AQ       .67 1.66 .06 
 
R2 
 
  .02   .08   .12  
ΔR2 
 
 .02   .06   .04  
F for ΔR2  .85   2.82   1.00  
  Third Person Perspective 
 
   Model 1 
 
   Model 
2 
  Model 3  
Variable 
 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 
 
-98.07 35.09  223.11 188.21  -3.24 262.65  
Experiment 
 
91.63 49.62 .26* 98.33 48.73 .28** 103.0
5 
48.62 .30** 
PSE 
 
   -.67 .39 -.24 -.63 .39 -.23 
PANESS  
 
      3.67 2.81 .18 
AQ 
 
      1.31 1.71 .11 
R2 
 
 .07   .13   .17  
ΔR2 
 
 .07   .06   .05  
F for ΔR2  3.41*   3.01   1.22  
Note: PSE = Point of subjective equality on the temporal bisection task; PANESS = Physical and 
neurological examination for subtle signs score; AQ = Autism Quotient. ΔR2 = Change in R2; * p=.07, 
**p ≤.05. 
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6.4. DISCUSSION 
The present study aimed to determine whether variability in performance across individuals on 
the coincidence anticipation task could be accounted for solely by the experiment to which 
participants were assigned; that is, whether they received motor practice of the actions to be 
observed or not, or whether other factors might also contribute to the individual differences in 
performance.  These other factors included temporal perception ability, motor control and 
autistic-like traits.    
All participants in the study undertook the coincidence anticipation task, as described in Chapter 
5.  The task elicited a response time (RT) for each participant that provided a measure of 
participants’ action prediction ability.  This action prediction ability was determined for two 
variables: First, participants received 700 or 1000 ms of visual input prior to action occlusion, 
which resulted in longer (700ms preview) and shorter (1000ms preview) periods during occlusion 
before response was required.  Second, half of all participants in the study received motor 
priming of the actions to be observed prior to undertaking the computer-based task.  Additionally, 
all participants completed four additional assessments: a temporal bisection task, an explicit 
measure of time perception ability; a variable foreperiod task, an implicit measure of time 
perception; the PANESS, an assessment of motor control; and the Autism Quotient, a self-report 
questionnaire to assess autistic-like traits in an individual. 
In order to determine the unique variance that the motor priming contributed to the action 
prediction performance, multiple linear mixed regression analyses were conducted.  This allowed 
an examination of the degree to which each predictor variable affected the outcome when the 
effects of all other predictors were held constant.  A regression analysis was conducted on 
performance data for the two pre-occlusion action durations separately. 
The results of the regression analysis demonstrated that the Experiment Assignment predicted 
participants’ action prediction performance, but only for performance of 3PP actions when 1000 
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ms of action was presented pre-occlusion (time between visual offset and point of object lift was 
less compared to 700 ms of action pre-occlusion). Moreover, this relationship was not moderated 
by time perception ability, motor skill or autistic traits.  Experiment Assignment therefore 
accounted for considerable variance in participants’ action prediction performance after 
controlling for these additional factors.  Experiment Assignment was not a significant predictor in 
any of the other performance conditions.  The three variables of motor control, time perception 
and autistic traits did not account significantly to the variance in action prediction performance in 
any of the conditions assessed.  
The results thus support the original hypothesis that whether participants receive motor practice 
or not would significantly contribute to the individual differences in performance when 
participants observe 3PP actions and receive less time to switch from a perception to a simulation 
process during occlusion before the point of object lift.  Importantly, we observe that this effect is 
not modulated by individual differences in time perception ability, motor control or autistic like 
traits.  This result therefore re-affirms conclusions drawn in Chapter 5 of the thesis that highlight 
the importance of experience and motor repertoire in improved accuracy of internal simulation 
and prediction of the spatiotemporal dynamics of observed actions.  In this particular coincidence 
anticipation task, the effect of motor priming is particularly salient for 3PP actions when 
individuals have less time to switch to a simulation process from a perceptual process, necessary 
when no visual input is received in order to estimate the time point of object lift. 
Surprisingly, however, action prediction performance in this study was unrelated to time 
perception, in contrast to the original hypothesis. To perform well on the coincidence anticipation 
task, it was hypothesised that participants would have to draw upon neural networks of time 
perception to accurately estimate the elapse of time, which in itself is crucial in order to 
determine the moment the object is likely to be lifted from the table.  However, the regression 
analysis demonstrated that a non-significant amount of variance in the action prediction 
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performance in both the 1PP and 3PP conditions was explained by participants’ time perception 
performance.  The hypothesis was therefore not supported.  This was similarly the case regarding 
motor control ability, assessed using the PANESS, and autistic traits, assessed using the AQ. 
Surprisingly still, is that no correlations were observed between time perception, motor control 
performance and autistic traits in the participant sample in this study.  The results of the 
regression and correlation analysis do not support the original hypothesis that these three 
predictors would contribute significantly to action prediction performance, and furthermore 
appear contrary to research and opinion papers drawing close relations between time perception 
and ASD (Allman, DeLeon, & Wearden, 2011; Allman, 2011), action prediction and motor control 
(Schubotz, 2007; Schubotz, 2004), action prediction and ASD (Brisson et al., 2012; Cattaneo et al., 
2007; Martineau et al., 2004; Schmitz et al., 2003) and the tight coupling between spatiotemporal 
monitoring of motion processing and time perception.  Even more surprising is the result given 
the evidence from neuroimaging data indicating that these mechanisms are underpinned by 
largely overlapping neural networks (Schubotz et al., 2000; Tipples et al., 2013). 
However, the results of the present study may be due less to a dissociation among these predictor 
factors, and more a consequence of the limitations of the study.  Firstly, the sample size is 
arguably low for the number of predictor variables examined in this study (Green, 1991; Miles & 
Shevlin, 2001).  Secondly, a small section of the PANESS motor assessment involved converting 
the times of particular motor movements to z-scores normed on 17 year old’s data.  This part of 
the assessment may not therefore be sensitive enough to the variability in timed motor 
movements of the sample with an average age of 20 years.  Nevertheless, this element of the 
assessment formed only a small part of the overall examination, and aimed mainly to provide 
preliminary insight into the potential relationship between motor control and action prediction. 
Thirdly, the sample population was derived from an undergraduate student population from a 
Russell group University, largely in their late teens-early twenties.  The sample would be 
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considered to be in the highest percentile in terms of cognitive and physical abilities, and thus 
performance on each of the tasks employed would not have the variance which would be 
observable if sampling from a more varied population.  Nevertheless, this study aimed to provide 
a pilot sample to begin to explore the interdependencies between these predictor variables from 
a behavioural perspective. With a larger sample size and a more heterogeneous sample 
population, more representative of the general population, we might observe the behavioural 
interdependencies increasingly suggested by neuroimaging and behavioural research.       
 
6.5. CONCLUSION 
This present study aimed to provide preliminary data to examine individual differences in 
performance on the coincidence anticipation task in relation to other cognitive and 
neurophysiological measures of time perception, motor control and autistic traits, and to 
determine the unique variance accounted for in action prediction performance by motor priming.  
The multiple regression analyses conducted demonstrated that time perception, motor skill and 
autistic traits were not significant predictors of performance on the action prediction task.  Only 
the predictor factor of whether participants received motor priming or not prior to undertaking 
the coincidence anticipation task contributed significantly to individual differences in 
performance.  However, this was only the case when participants observed actions in the third 
person perspective and received a reduced amount of time during occlusion before accurate 
response was required (1000ms pre-occlusion vision), that is, when they had less time to begin to 
internally simulate the action before the point which had to be anticipated (time point of object 
lift).  The results of the study therefore support the results of the previous chapter, and indeed of 
previous studies throughout the thesis, which demonstrate the importance of motor experience 
in the ability to effectively simulate and anticipate the spatiotemporal dynamics of action.  These 
final two empirical chapters, however, highlight how the fine details of the task (such as the 
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jittered length of action prior to occlusion) and the frame of reference in which the action is 
observed are all contributing factors to how effectively an individual is able to anticipate action 
dynamics and the extent to which motor experience can impact on this ability.  
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 RESEARCH AIMS 
The aims of the present thesis were multifold.  The broader, overarching, objective of the thesis 
was to interrogate theories postulating that the existence of a fronto-parietal neural network, 
evidenced as active in both production and perception of actions, may have evolved for the 
purposes of intention understanding in other people (e.g. Iacoboni et al., 2005; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004).  Opposing theories (Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001) suggest, 
however, that this perception-action coupled system facilitates action monitoring of one’s own 
actions, and thus postulate that its main purpose is for fine grain motor control; to allow us to 
make appropriate timely adjustments to our own motor planning and commands. 
In order to interrogate these theories, the present work explored the fine grain spatiotemporal 
dynamics of internal action simulation, and in turn prediction of transitive action sequences.  
Importantly a major manipulation in the experiments throughout the thesis was the frame of 
reference in which the perceived actions were presented; that is, either from a first-person or a 
third-person perspective.  First-person perspective actions closely represent the visual input one 
would receive if performing an action oneself; whereas the display of third-person perspective 
actions could only be visually resolved as another person performing the action. 
With the use of two types of behavioural paradigm and an electroencephalography study, the 
thesis aimed to determine whether action prediction performance was more accurate in one of 
these perspectives over another, under the assumption that if the action-perception coupled 
system evolved for the purposes of interpretation of others’ actions and/or social interaction, 
performance would be better in the third-person perspective than, or at least equal to, 
performance when actions are presented in the first-person perspective. 
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7.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 2 
The first empirical chapter of the thesis, Chapter 2, provides a proof of concept of the use of an 
occlusion paradigm to interrogate action prediction mechanisms in the spatiotemporal domain.  
The psychophysics method of a two-alternative forced choice design proved useful and effective 
in determining action simulation and prediction performance in the tens of milliseconds range.  
The first two studies of the thesis, without any priming in the visual or motor domains, indicate 
that individuals have a tendency to perceptually anticipate actions ahead of their actual state.  
The extent of this anticipation seems to be equal for actions in the 1PP and 3PP. 
The first two experiments detailed in this chapter replicate findings from alternative methods of 
examination of action prediction, such as is seen in representational momentum studies (e.g. 
Thornton & Hayes, 2004).  However, our findings are in contrast to some recent research using a 
similar paradigm (Sparenberg et al., 2012), which showed a simulation lag when observing 
actions, and suggests that this may be due to a perception-to-simulation switching cost. That is, 
the delay in switching into simulation mode resulted in the simulation running a little behind 
reality. This said, these incongruent findings may be the result of fine details of the experimental 
stimuli employed in the two studies. 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 is an extension of the first empirical chapter in that it employs the same experimental 
design as in the first empirical chapter, and examines the effects of visual priming, visual and 
motor priming, and motor priming alone on action simulation processes and prediction 
performance.  The three experiments that comprise the chapter are then examined and discussed 
in relation to the last study of Chapter 2, used as a baseline experiment, without any priming 
manipulation.  The set of studies suggest we have an anticipatory bias when observing actions of 
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which we have little or no first-hand experience, but which reduces as we gain physical 
experience of these actions. Interestingly, the priming studies indicate that motor priming has a 
selective effect on spatiotemporal prediction of 1PP actions, with little to no effect on prediction 
of 3PP action, at least within the context of the paradigm employed in this set of studies.   
The effect of motor priming observed in this set of studies would indicate that the principal role of 
action simulation and prediction processes, and their underlying neural mechanisms, is to 
facilitate one’s own actions.  However, the observed results do not preclude the possibility of the 
same mechanisms being used beyond such a process, to facilitate anticipation of others’ actions.  
It merely suggests that the system may be more finely attuned to one’s own action monitoring.  
This said, the greater prediction error which continues to be observed for 3PP actions, even 
following motor priming, may grant important social advantages of dealing with the 
unpredictability of others.  
Chapter 4 
This chapter employed EEG to examine neuronal signals, specifically event related potentials, 
associated with observation and prediction of action in first- and third-person perspectives 
following motor priming, with the aim to determine whether the same differences observed 
behaviourally following motor priming were also evident neuronally. In terms of the earlier ERP of 
the oERN (observed some 100-200ms post occlusion offset) a greater negative deflection was 
observed when participants were processing 1PP compared to 3PP actions, albeit for trials that 
were coherent with the occlusion duration.  The fact that the greater deflection was for coherent 
rather than incoherent trials is likely due to the response conflict generated by the paradigm 
used, as participants are required to provide a response of ‘Early/’Late’ even for the coherent 
(correct) trials.  With such response conflict generating a greater deflection for coherent trials, the 
fact that 1PP actions elicited a greater deflection than 3PP actions is in line with previous studies 
(Knolle et al., 2013) that have demonstrated greater deflections for self-generated 
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deviants/mismatches as opposed to externally-generated deviants/mismatches, and importantly 
is consistent with the earlier behavioural findings of this thesis, suggesting 1PP actions are more 
salient than 3PP actions for the deviance detection and action prediction mechanism.   
With respect to the examination of the later ERP – the P300 (observed some 350-450 ms post 
occlusion offset), we observed a greater positive deflection for the incoherent trials (Earlier and 
Later conditions as opposed to the coherent condition), as predicted by deviance detection 
studies (e.g. Knolle et al., 2013).  However, in the case of this ERP, a greater deflection was elicited 
for the observation of spatiotemporal deviance in actions in 3PP.  Considering previous 
neuroimaging research, this result may be interpreted in terms of the 3PP actions being more 
computationally difficult for the underpinning mechanism to process, thus leading to greater 
neuronal excitation for 3PP compared to 1PP when the spatiotemporal dynamics of the simulated 
action are not as predicted.  The contrasting neuronal responses observed with regard to the two 
perspectives, within the ERPs associated with the two distinct time-windows of interest, are 
speculatively interpreted in terms of different levels of conscious processing associated with the 
timecourse of neuronal activity. 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 turns back to behavioural measures of action prediction mechanisms, this time with an 
alternative paradigm to that used in previous chapters.  In this paradigm, participants were 
required to provide a motor response, whilst the action being observed was occluded, at the 
point in time the participant thought the object was lifted from the table.  Two experiments were 
presented; one without motor priming, and a second in which participants received motor 
experience of the actions to be observed prior to undertaking the same task.  This allowed a direct 
comparison with Experiments 2 and 4 of Chapters 2 and 3 respectively.  This change in 
experimental design – a coincidence anticipation task - elicited somewhat differing results from 
the studies that employed a psychophysics method of interrogation.   
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In this instance, in general, it would appear that simulation processes are slower than the real 
action dynamics when participants have little experience of the actions, with participants 
providing a motor response after the actual time of object lift.  This is the case for 1PP and 3PP 
actions, and also for both jittered pre-occlusion action lengths shown, which was an additional 
manipulation in this study.  When a greater length of action time pre-occlusion was shown, 
however, prediction performance was much poorer compared to when less action was shown 
pre-occlusion.  In the case of the former, this equates to less time between occlusion onset and 
object lift point, and thus participants potentially have less time to switch from perception 
processes to simulation without vision.  This potentially leads to greater error in response timing. 
Moreover, with this paradigm, the most salient difference was observed following motor priming 
of the action, which led to an improvement in prediction performance as previously seen, but 
selectively for 3PP actions and when participants had less time between occlusion onset and 
object lift point.   
These two experiments again highlight the importance of motor priming in being able to 
accurately internally simulate and predict the dynamics of action in the spatiotemporal domain. 
And yet, what this chapter most clearly indicates is that the task demands can tap into quite 
different processes.  In this case, the coincidence anticipation task, requiring a motor response 
during non-visual simulation, arguably has a more tightly coupled action-perception nature, and 
as such taps into mechanisms that are more attuned to 3PP actions.  This processing system may 
be that used in a more natural action anticipation context, where we provide a motor response in 
relation to an action performed by another person, as we see in interceptive actions or in 
coincidence timing actions, required when interacting and cooperating with others.   
Chapter 6 
This final empirical chapter was an initial exploration of individual differences in action prediction 
performance elicited by the coincidence anticipation task of Chapter 5 in relation to other 
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cognitive and neurophysiological measures of time perception, motor control and autistic traits.  
The chapter aimed to determine the unique variance in performance accounted for by the effects 
of motor priming and these additional measures.  Somewhat surprisingly, only motor experience 
of the actions to be observed accounted for a significant amount of variance in participants’ 
performance on the coincidence anticipation task, and this was not modulated by any of the 
other predictor variables.  However, the variance in individual performance was only accounted 
for in the third person perspective condition when participants had less time between occlusion 
onset and object lift time; i.e. when they had less time to internally simulate the action before the 
point which had to be anticipated.  For all other conditions, none of the predictor variables 
accounted for a significant amount of variance in performance across individuals.  Whilst the 
results of this final empirical chapter supported the notion of the importance of motor experience 
in the ability to effectively simulate and anticipate the spatiotemporal dynamics of action, they 
equally highlight that other contributing factors are at play in such prediction tasks.  These other 
factors are above and beyond the effects of perspective and any of the other cognitive, motoric or 
social traits measured as part of this study (given the small to null percentage of variance in 
performance explained by these factors).  As such, the chapter underlines the need for continuing 
research in the area to further elucidate the contributing processes and mechanisms that 
facilitate action anticipation systems. 
7.3 IMPLICATIONS 
The set of studies outlined in this thesis have gone some way to expand on previous literature 
examining prediction of observed actions.  Whilst Graf et al. (2007) and Parkinson et al. (2011) 
studies suggested our internal simulation of action runs in real time with the real action dynamics, 
our studies suggest that other factors are at play.  Conclusions from these earlier studies were 
clouded by their use of a mixture of transitive and intransitive, familiar and unfamiliar actions.  In 
this thesis, using stimuli that were more controlled, we can make some firm conclusions regarding 
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the spatiotemporal prediction of simple single limb transitive actions. In particular, the familiarity 
and/or motor experience of the observed action can determine the speed of the simulation 
process, as does the frame of reference of the observed action.  Employing the same paradigm as 
these earlier studies we find that we generally have an anticipation bias, simulating action faster 
than the real action dynamics.  However, following motor experience of actions, predictive 
mechanisms become more accurate.   
Pertinent to this thesis are the conclusions drawn regarding the different frames of reference of 
the observed action.  Interestingly, it would appear that this motor experience can impact 
positively on prediction of observed actions in both first-person and third-person perspectives. 
However, this is only revealed when interrogating prediction processes via convergent methods of 
investigation.  1PP actions were seen to be selectively improved when using psychophysics 
methods of examination, whilst 3PP actions were selectively improved following motor priming 
when a coincidence anticipation task was used, this latter method likely employing processes 
similar to those engaged when reacting to external events.  The contrasting methods seemingly 
tap into, or facilitate, differing mechanisms which may underlie observation and prediction of 
actions performed in different frames of reference.   
This leads to two main implications with regards to the literature: Firstly, the perception-action 
coupled neural system (AON/MNS) may have emerged for both self-generated actions, potentially 
for fine-grained motor control and adjustment purposes, as well as for other-generated actions, 
potentially for social interaction purposes.  As such, the series of studies supports the notion 
offered by authors such as Blakemore and Frith (2005) and Wolpert and Flanagan (2001), who 
suggest the forward modelling of action may be used not only for sensorimotor prediction, but 
the same computations may also facilitate observation of others to allow us to predict others’ 
reactions and respond in a timely manner to external events.  
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Secondly, this set of studies highlights how it is essential to use various methods of investigation 
when interrogating matters of cognitive processes. The stimuli employed as well as the task 
demands should be considered.  Any results obtained and conclusions drawn from them are 
limited to within the context of the method, until converging methods are employed.  
7.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Whilst this thesis has provided some insight into the cognitive processes underpinning fine-
grained spatiotemporal dynamics of simulation and predictive processes, the research has 
brought to light some limitations of the studies conducted and the ensuing conclusions, and in 
doing so invites proposals and opportunities for future research.   
One of the areas of limitation relates to how familiar objects are associated with multiple actions 
depending on the actor’s goal (Ansuini et al., 2006; Ansuini, Giosa, Turella, Altoè, & Castiello, 
2008) and the time course of priming effects for these different action types.  Two types of action 
come to mind: prehensile actions (precision and power grips), used to grasp and move objects; 
and functional use actions, which are strongly linked to object identity (Buxbaum, Veramonti, & 
Schwartz, 2000) and are associated with activation of conceptual information (Buxbaum & 
Saffran, 1998).  An object, such as a pair of scissors for example, may thus afford two potential 
actions: a grip within the handles to cut with the scissors, or a grasp by the blades to move or pass 
the scissors to someone else.  Thus, there are ‘conflict’ objects that afford more than one type of 
action, and ‘non-conflict’ objects which afford the same action in order to grasp-to-move or 
grasp-to-use. 
Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that grasp-to-move and grasp-to-use actions are 
associated with different activation patterns (Buxbaum, Kyle, Tang, & Detre, 2006; Creem-Regehr 
& Lee, 2005; Culham & Valyear, 2006; Johnson-Frey, 2004) and furthermore are disrupted by 
lesions in different neuroanatomical regions (Buxbaum, Kyle, Grossman, & Coslett, 2007; 
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Buxbaum, Sirigu, Schwartz, & Klatzky, 2003).  As such, two different routes to action have been 
proposed (Johnson-Frey, 2004; Pisella, Binkofski, Lasek, Toni, & Rossetti, 2006).  One is specialised 
for object acquisition (grasp-to-move) and is a bilateral system localized in part to the superior 
parietal lobules and intraparietal sulci.  This “grasp” system would seem to encode action 
constraints imposed by the body or environment and may operate independent of long-term 
conceptual information (Cant, Westwood, Valyear, & Goodale, 2005; Garofeanu, Króliczak, 
Goodale, & Humphrey, 2004).  The other is specialised for grasp-to-use and is a left lateralised 
system localised to the inferior parietal lobule.  This “use” system has been shown to subserve 
conceptual knowledge about functional actions (Buxbaum & Saffran, 1998). 
Whilst priming in the conceptual system has been shown to last weeks (Cave, 1997), priming of 
grasping actions and other dorso-dorsal stream functions has been shown to last only short 
periods of time (Jax & Rosenbaum, 2007, 2009). This evidence would thus predict different 
longevities of the priming effect for grasp versus functional use actions in an action prediction 
task.    More specifically, it would predict that motor priming (with or without visual input) would 
have a longer lasting beneficial effect on action prediction performance in the grasp-to-use 
actions compared to the grasp-to-move actions. 
By using a similar design to the action prediction occlusion paradigm employed in the first two 
chapters of this thesis, using dynamic video images of grasp-to-move and grasp-to-use actions in a 
within-participants design, this hypothesis could be interrogated.  Such a study would allow 
measurement of action prediction performance at different time points post motor priming to 
examine the decay time of the priming effect on these two action types.  If the priming effect has 
different longevities for the two action types, it would provide evidence in support of the notion 
that a dorso-dorsal stream does not store information for long periods of time and that it evolved 
to process information in a dynamically changing environment, processing information online de 
novo, drawing only on very recent experience. 
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The study would tease apart prediction mechanisms related to different types of action, which are 
said to employ different neural pathways.  More specifically, the study would primarily (i) 
determine whether motor priming of actions (whereby the participants perform the actions to be 
observed) facilitates both action types; (ii) determine whether the beneficial motor priming effect 
on action prediction has different longevities for different types of action, and in turn (iii) 
determine whether prediction mechanisms that draw on motor experience have access to a 
generative model (feedback connections) via the two neural pathways corresponding to the two 
types of action.  This would have consequences for the predictive coding account of action 
prediction and theories of the mirror neuron system.  
A second limitation of the current work relates to the direction of hand and object trajectory in 
the video stimuli used.  Considering specifically the conclusions drawn from the first two empirical 
chapters, it may be suggested that the results observed are partly due to the fact that the stimuli 
involve the object being removed towards the actor.  In the 1PP, this may be observed as the 
object being moved closer towards the observer; that is, into the observer’s peripersonal space, 
whereas in the 3PP the object is removed from the table in a direction further away from the 
observer. This ushers the question as to whether the 3PP stimuli may  be interpreted as less 
socially relevant to the observer than the 1PP actions, which in turn may lead to reduced 
prediction performance in the spatiotemporal judgement task.   
Kilner et al. (2006) and Frenkel-Toledo et al., (2013) investigated the effect of perspective on 
alpha suppression (used as an indicator of action simulation), utilising MEG and EEG respectively.  
In both studies, participants watched videos of actors that were either facing towards the 
observer (allocentric) or facing away with their back to the observer (egocentric), performing 
simple arm movements.   In both studies alpha suppression was found to be greatest in the 
allocentric condition compared to the egocentric condition.  However, in both the Frenkel-Toledo 
et al. (2013) and Kilner et al. (2006) studies, the ‘egocentric’ condition was not the typical view 
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that would be seen if the observer were making the action.  Instead, an alternative third-person 
perspective is employed again, with the actor’s back to the observer.  This is an important 
distinction. These differing patterns may reflect a process modulated by social relevance of the 
person observed. A person with their back to us has greatly reduced social salience.  In a similar 
vein, one might argue that transitive actions that involve the object being removed from the 
peripersonal space of the observer have less social relevance than those that involve an object 
being placed closer towards the observer. In fact, Griffiths and Tipper (2009) showed that action 
simulation, where reach path was primed by observing another person’s reach around an 
obstacle, was only activated when the observed stimuli and actions were in the observer’s 
peripersonal space.  In turn, this may lead to reduced prediction performance for those 3PP 
actions, as the action is no longer of significance to us as the action would not require a response 
from us. 
A potential study would involve presenting stimuli whereby the transitive actions involve actors 
grasping the objects to pass them across the table, as opposed to removing them in the direction 
of the actor.  This would mean that in the 1PP, the object is passed further away from the 
observer, and in the 3PP the object is moved into the peripersonal space of the observer.  The 
study would have two potential hypotheses: Firstly, the results from the first set of studies may 
be replicated whereby the prediction is superior in the 1PP, which would support the notion that 
predictive mechanisms first and foremost serve a self-oriented purpose of facilitating motor 
control.  However, an alternative hypothesis would be that this study would elicit contrary results 
to the first set of studies, with prediction being superior in the 3PP following motor priming, or at 
least on par with 1PP actions.  This result would support a notion that prediction mechanisms are 
used also for prediction of others’ action, but specifically when the actions are of social 
significance to us and potentially require a response from us. 
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7.5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The principal aim of the present thesis was to interrogate theories relating to the principal 
function of the neural mechanisms underpinning action observation, simulation and prediction.  
Whilst some theorists have postulated that the action-perception coupled neural system (the 
AON/MNS) evolved for the purposes of monitoring others’ actions for social interaction (e.g. 
Blakemore & Frith, 2005; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Iacoboni et al., 2005), others posit that the 
system emerged to facilitate the monitoring of one’s own actions for fine-grain motor control and 
adjustment (Miall & Wolpert, 1996).  In a series of studies designed to examine the 
spatiotemporal prediction of action, with actions presented from different frames of reference, 
this thesis has demonstrated that we have a general tendency to anticipate action dynamics 
ahead of the actual action trajectory when we have little-to-no experience of that action.  Having 
first-hand motor experience of observed actions enables us to make our predictions more precise, 
but only for observed action in the first person perspective.  This would suggest that when all 
other sensory input is held constant (i.e. no proprioception), our motor experience facilitates the 
updating of forward models of action and our predictions, but potentially only for self-generated 
actions, and therefore suggests that the system predominantly facilitates the monitoring of one’s 
own actions, for appropriate readjustment of kinematics for action completion.  An EEG study of 
the event related potentials relating to expectancy violation also indicates the saliency of first-
person perspective actions over third-person perspective actions. 
Nevertheless, with the use of an alternative paradigm, a coincidence anticipation task, to 
interrogate spatiotemporal prediction of action, third-person perspective action prediction is 
facilitated following motor priming. The differing task demands required in this paradigm appear 
to draw on different mechanisms and may be more evocative of processes employed when 
intercepting actions or coinciding movements with others, which may thus explain the facilitation 
of third-person perceptive actions over first-person perspective actions.  A preliminary 
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exploratory study demonstrates that it is predominantly motor experience that accounts for 
individual differences in performance, and that factors including time perception, motor control 
and autistic traits do not account for any variance in performance on the spatiotemporal 
prediction task, although a future study with a more varied sample population may yield different 
results.  This set of studies overall highlights how the mechanisms underpinning action simulation 
and prediction may effectively be employed in the forward modelling and prediction of not only 
one’s own actions but also those of others, potentially to facilitate cooperative behaviours, and 
that one must consider the experimental design and stimuli employed, as well as task demands 
when interpreting results as such factors may have a significant impact on the results obtained 
and conclusions drawn.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Chapter 2 
Leave-One-Object-Out (LOOO) Analysis  
A 5 (object) x 2 (perspective) ANOVA combining data from both Experiments 1 and 2 
demonstrated a main effect of object on the PSE (F(3.34,156.85) = 72.63; p<.001, 2p = .61, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected).  There was no main effect of perspective (F(1,47)=2.23; p=.14). 
Importantly, there was no object x perspective interaction (F(4,188) = 1.08; p=.37) indicating that 
the pattern of similarity in the PSE for 1PP and 3PP observed action was similar across transitive 
action type.  
This same pattern of results was observed for the spread of the data: Combining data across 
Experiments 1 and 2, the 5 (object) x 2 (perspective) ANOVA demonstrated a main effect of object 
on the spread of the data (F(2.23, 104.93) = 10.92; p<.001, 2p = .19, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected). There was no main effect of perspective (F(1,47)=.05; p=.83), and again importantly 
there was no object x perspective interaction (F(2.46,115.53) = .73; p=.57, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected) indicating that the pattern of similarity in the spread for 1PP and 3PP observed action 
was similar across transitive action type.  
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APPENDIX B 
Chapter 3 
Leave-One-Object-Out (LOOO) Analysis 
Experiment 3 – Visual Priming in 3PP 
A 5 (object) x 2 (perspective) ANOVA of Experiment 3 demonstrated a main effect of object on the 
PSE (F(2.31, 53,61) = 14.47; p<.001, 2p = .37, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected).  There was no main 
effect of perspective (F(1,23)= .89; p=.36), and no object x perspective interaction (F(4,92) = 1.74; 
p=.15) indicating that the pattern of similarity in the PSE for 1PP and 3PP observed action was 
similar across transitive action type.  
Experiment 4 – Visual and Motor Priming in 1PP 
A 5 (object) x 2 (perspective) ANOVA of Experiment 4 demonstrated a main effect of object on the 
PSE (F(2.54, 58.41) = 39.15; p<.001, 2p = .63, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected).  There was a main 
effect of perspective (F(1,23)= 7.57; p=.01).  Importantly, there was no object x perspective 
interaction (F(2.71,62.34) = .30; p=.88, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) indicating that the pattern 
of contrast in PSE for 1PP and 3PP observed action was similar across transitive action type. That 
is, for each object presented in the experiment, the PSE was smaller for 1PP action compared to 
3PP actions. 
Experiment 5 – Motor Priming (no visual input) in 1PP 
A 5 (object) x 2 (perspective) ANOVA of Experiment 5 demonstrated a main effect of object on the 
PSE (F(2.45, 56.40) = 12.92; p<.001, 2p = .36, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected).  There was a main 
effect of perspective (F(1,23)= 6.22; p=.02).  Importantly, there was no object x perspective 
interaction (F(2.16, 49.72) = .43; p=.79) indicating that the pattern of contrast in PSE between 1PP 
and 3PP observed action was similar across transitive action type. Thus, the same pattern of 
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results was observed in this current experiment as in Experiment 4.  That is, for each object 
presented in the experiment, the PSE was smaller for 1PP action compared to 3PP actions. 
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APPENDIX C 
Physical and Neurological Examination for Subtle Signs 
NAME:       ID:      
 
BIRTHDATE:  / /    DATE EXAM:  / /  
 
PRESENT AGE:      EXAMINER:    
 
GENDER:      
LATERAL PREFERENCE PATTERN                            Circle “R” or “L” after each 
item 
Note:  Use a piece of paper with a small hole in it and hand to child. It 
is important to have child use both hands to hold the object. 
 
"Make believe that this is a camera and you’re looking at 
me to take my picture.”  
 
1. EYE:   Look through hole in paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L 
 
 
 
 
 
R 
 
 
 
 
Code EYE 
R      L 
 
“Now I'm going to ask you to 'make believe' a lot of actions. OK?”  
   
Note:  Done with child standing 
 
“Show me how you…” 
 
2. FOOT:  Kick ball 
  Stamp out fire 
 
 
 
L 
L 
 
 
 
R 
R 
 
 
 
Code FOOT 
R    L   Mixed 
Note:  Done with child sitting 
 
“Show me how you…” 
 
3. HAND:   Comb hair  
 Brush teeth  
 Cut with scissors  
 Throw ball 
 Hit ball with bat  
 Hit ball with racket  
 Hammer 
 Use Screwdriver  
 Saw 
 Flip Coin 
 (Open Door with key) 
*If child commits BPO error, prompt 
saying “Now show me what it would look 
like if you were holding the ___.” 
 
 
 
 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
 
 
 
 
 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
 
 
 
 
 
Code HAND 
 
R    
 
L    
 
*Mixed   
 
*if 3 or more items are 
performed with nondominant 
hand, code as “mixed” and 
use L-handed norms 
 
 
Observations (e.g., body part as object errors): 
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GROSS MOTOR – GAITS 
Errors for gait items include falling, incorrect foot placement, or discontinuing task early.  Wiggling, 
squirming, awkward body use, tics, posturing (e.g., clinched fist, cortical thumb), pronation of palm 
inward, etc., should be noted qualitatively in the observations section, but do not constitute errors. Also 
look for asymmetries in movements of arms and legs during normal, unstressed walking. Hands should 
not be in pockets, and cuffs should be rolled up if necessary so child’s hands are visible.  If child puts 
hands in pockets or on hips, say “Hands at your side” For all Gaits except backward gaits, the child 
should walk towards the examiner.  The examiner should remain close enough to protect the child from 
falling. 
 
Tell the child at the beginning of each Gaits item, “Begin with your arms relaxed by your side.” 
 
1. GAIT - On Heels (10 steps) 
"First, walk on your heels toward me, like this.”  
  [Demonstrate:  Walk while up on the heels of the feet; arms hanging naturally. Examiner should stand several feet 
in front of the child to allow enough room to walk 10 steps towards the examiner.]  
 
 R L 
Errors:  0 
  1 – 2 
  3 or > 3 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
Tried but failed (couldn't do) CD CD 
Child refused. Didn’t test CR CR 
No data (did not examine, etc.) ND ND 
   
   
Hand overflow/postures present? 
(If NO, circle 0, if YES, circle R, L, or Both) 
0       R L       B 
 
Observations (specify R/L)______________________________________________________________  
(e.g., awkward body use, tics, posturing, asymmetrical or reduced arm swing, odd hand postures, etc.) 
 
2. GAIT - On Toes (10 steps) 
“Go back to where you started and walk toward me again, this time on your toes.” 
[Demonstrate:  Walk with arms at side, walking on balls of feet. Do NOT describe as walking on tippy toes.  If child 
tries to get up on toes like ballet "en pointe" demonstrate moderate position for toe-walk and explain, “Not tippy-
toes, medium toes.”] 
 
 
 R L 
Errors:  0 
  1 – 2 
  3 or > 3 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
Tried but failed (couldn't do) CD CD 
Child refused. Didn’t test CR CR 
No data (did not examine, etc.) ND ND 
   
   
Hand overflow/postures present? 
(If NO, circle 0, if YES, circle R, L, or Both) 
0       R L       B 
 
Observations (specify R/L)______________________________________________________________  
 (e.g., awkward body use, tics, posturing, asymmetrical or reduced arm swing, odd hand postures, etc.) 
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3. GAIT - On Sides of Feet (10 steps)  
Administer and score for all ages; however, when transferring scores to the coding sheet, pay particular attention to age 
(errors are not considered abnormal if child is < 9 years old). 
 
“Now walk on the sides of your feet, like you are at the beach, and you’re trying to protect the bottom of your feet from the  
hot sand.” [Demonstrate:  Arms at your side, walk on outer border of feet, showing eversion position.  If necessary, 
elaborate, “Walk on the tough outer part of your feet, like this. ]  
 
 R L 
Errors:  0 
  1 – 2 
  3 or > 3 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
Tried but failed (couldn't do) CD CD 
Child refused. Didn’t test CR CR 
No data (did not examine, etc.) ND ND 
   
Hand overflow/postures present? 
(If NO, circle 0, if YES, circle R, L, or Both) 
0       R L       B 
 
Observations (specify R/L)______________________________________________________________  
 (e.g., awkward body use, tics, posturing, asymmetrical or reduced arm swing, odd hand postures, etc.) 
 
4. TANDEM GAIT (heel to toe) Forward (10 steps) 
“Now I want you to walk like a tightrope walker.  Be sure you put your heel right up against your toe and go as far as you 
can like that. Don’t leave any space in between your feet and don’t step on your foot.”  
[Demonstrate heel-toe walking and remain at the end so child walks toward you]  
 
  
Errors:  0 
  1 – 2 
  3 or > 3 
0 
1 
2 
Tried but failed (couldn't do) CD 
Child refused. Didn’t test CR 
No data (did not examine, etc.) ND 
 
Observations (specify R/L)______________________________________________________________  
 (e.g., asymmetrical or reduced arm swing, odd hand postures) 
 
5. TANDEM GAIT (heel to toe) Backward (10 steps)  
Administer and score for all ages; however, when transferring scores to the coding sheet, pay attention to age, as errors are 
only abnormal for children 10 and older. 
 
“Now do the same thing backwards, with one foot behind the other, touching heel to toe.  Again, don’t leave any space 
between your feet and don’t step on your heels.” 
[Demonstrate. If necessary, elaborate, “I want you to really go backwards, so you can’t see.”  
  
Errors:  0 
  1 – 2 
  3 or > 3 
0 
1 
2 
Tried but failed (couldn't do) CD 
Child refused. Didn’t test CR 
No data (did not examine, etc.) ND 
 
Observations (specify R/L)______________________________________________________________  
 (e.g., awkward body use, tics, posturing, asymmetrical or reduced arm swing, odd hand postures, etc.) 
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6. TANDEM – Stand Heel to Toe.  Eyes Closed. – 20”   
Administer and score for all ages; however, when transferring scores to the coding sheet, pay particular attention to age, as 
errors are only abnormal for children ages 10 and older. 
“Now I want you to put one foot in front of the other, just as you did when you were walking before.  This time, 
though, I want you to close your eyes and stay that way as long as you can, or until I tell you to relax.”  
[Demonstrate how to stand on narrow tandem base. Time with stopwatch for the duration of success or up to 20 
sec.] 
 
*If the child does not meet 20”, record time here: _________  
 
20  seconds 
 
19 – 10  seconds 
 
< 10  seconds 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
Tried but failed (couldn't do) 
 
CD 
Child refused. Didn’t test CR 
No data (did not examine, etc.) ND 
 
FL Tendency to fall? Y N 
BL Arm(s) out to help balance?  Y N 
IP  Impersistence (opens eyes)?  Y N 
 
Observations (specify R/L)______________________________________________________________  
 (e.g., awkward body use, tics, posturing, odd hand postures, etc.) 
 
 
7. STAND Feet Close, Eyes Closed, Arms & Fingers Outstretched – 20" 
 “Now I want you to stand like Frankenstein.  Put your feet next to each other, close side -by-side, and raise your 
arms level with shoulders like this.  Now, spread all your fingers apart, close your eyes, and stay as still as you 
can like this for as long as you can or until I say relax.”  
[Demonstrate stance, arms up and straight out at shoulder level, fingers abducted, eyes closed. Time with stopwatch for the 
duration of success or up to 20 sec. Watch for involuntary movements.] 
 
*If the child does not meet 20”, record time here: _________  
 
20  seconds 
 
19 – 10  seconds 
 
< 10  seconds 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
Tried but failed (couldn't do) 
 
CD 
Child refused. Didn’t test CR 
No data (did not examine, etc.) ND 
 
FL Tendency to fall? Y N 
BL Arm(s) out to help balance? Y N 
IP Impersistence (opens eyes/drops arms)? Y N 
CF Choreiform (Abnormal arm/finger movements)? Y N      (R     L     B) 
 
Observations (specify R/L)______________________________________________________________  
 (e.g., awkward body use, tics, posturing, odd hand postures, etc.) 
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8. FINGER-TO-NOSE (Testing coordination in 4 quadrants in space) 
 
Note:  This is done with child standing.  
 
“Now I am going to test your aim.  Choose one pointer finger and put it on the tip of your nose.”  [Examiner 
holds own pointer finger directly in front of child’s nose and far enough out that the child needs to extend his/her 
arm fully without leaning forward to reach examiner’s finger] “Now, I want you to aim for the very tip of my 
finger and then go home to your nose. Go ahead and do it.” [Wait for child to perform action] “Good.  Now, I 
am going to move my finger, and I want you to look for the very tip of my f inger and aim for it, and then go home 
to your nose.” [Examiner moves finger to four points of an imaginary square, i.e. up and right, down and right, 
up and left, and down and left of the middle point].  If necessary, reiterate,  “Aim for the very tip of my 
finger.”After completing one hand, say“Now we’re going to do it with the other pointer finger.” 
 
 R L 
Normal 
Mild dysmetria, minor limb tremor
a
 
Intention tremor
b
, past-pointing 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
Tried but failed (couldn't do) CD CD 
Child refused. Didn’t test CR CR 
No data (did not examine, etc.) ND ND 
 
 Note: 
a
Score 1 point if child does not reach the tip of the finger.   
b
An Intention tremor is characterized by horizontal movement (e.g., at a right angle to the target) and tends 
to become larger as approaches target.  
 
Observations (specify R/L)______________________________________________________________  
 (e.g., awkward body use, tics, posturing, odd hand postures, etc.) 
 
9. STICK Out Tongue for 20", Eves Closed 
“Now, relax a minute. Keep your arms relaxed, stand in a comfortable way, but when I say go, close your eyes, 
open your mouth, and gently stick out your tongue. Keep your tongue as still and steady as you can for as long 
as you can or until I say relax.”  
[Demonstrate relaxed but eyes-closed stance, tongue gently protruded and kept steady]  
 
Note:  Child should not clamp tongue with teeth or lips, or protrude tongue so forcefully that it causes 
discomfort or gagging.  If necessary, elaborate, “No, you just have to show me enough so that I can see it.”  
 
Observe sustained and/or involuntary darting tongue movements (e.g., tongue moves in and out of mouth, or side 
to side). A natural curl to the tongue is not considered a choreiform movement.  
 
*If the child does not meet 20”, record time here: _________  
 
20  seconds 
19 – 10  seconds 
< 10  seconds 
0 
1 
2 
Tried but failed (couldn't do) CD 
Child refused. Didn’t test CR 
No data (did not examine, etc.) ND 
 
AM Choreiform (“reptile”) tongue (writhing or darting tongue movements)?  Y      N 
 IP  Impersistence (opens eyes or closes mouth)? Y      N  
 
Observations (specify R/L)______________________________________________________________  
 (e.g., any nonspecific tremor, awkward body use, tics, posturing, odd hand postures, etc.) 
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10. STAND on One Foot for 30” (eyes open) 
“Now I want you to stand on one leg for as long as you can.  I'll tell you when to relax.” 
[Demonstrate balance by standing on one leg with arms relaxed at side and one leg lifted off floor, bent back at knee.  
Correct any exaggerated or "ballet" postures of raised leg attempted by examinee and re-demonstrate.  If child 
attempts to hold their foot up or use another compensation strategy, allow the activity, but repeat the task again, 
stating, “This time try it without holding your foot,” and score best attempt.]  
 
Note:  Allow to choose which leg to stand on first, and record choice. 
 
*If the child does not meet 30”, record time here: R ____  L _____  
 
Circle foot used first    R        L 
 
R L 
30  seconds 
 
29 – 20  seconds 
 
< 20  seconds 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
Tried but failed (couldn't do) 
 
CD 
 
CD 
Child refused. Didn’t test CR CR 
No data (did not examine, etc.) ND ND 
 
Observations (specify R/L)______________________________________________________________  
 
11. HOP on one foot 
Allow child to hop as many times as they can, up to 50 hops.  Note, however, that only 25 successful hops are required to 
receive maximum credit at age 7 or 8. 
 
“Next, I want you to hop on one foot.  Make sure to hop in the same spot, not moving across the room, but more like a 
'Jack-in-the-Box.' Choose whichever foot you like to hop first; then we'll do the other. Keep hopping till 1 stop 
counting”  
 [Demonstrate hopping in place and gently correct if hopping is of progressive moving type.  Allow child to choose 
which foot to hop on first] 
 
“Ready? Now! "  
 [Count in a “whispery voice” for duration of success or up to 50 hops, providing encouragement if needed]  
 
Repeat for second foot, allowing child to rest first if necessary:   
"Now do the same hopping on the other foot.  Ready? Now!”  
 
*If the child does not make 25/50 hops, record number of hops here: R_____    L ______ 
 
Circle foot used first    R        L 
 
R L 
 8 yrs (25 hops) 
 
 24 – 12 
 
 < 12 
 9 yrs (50 hops) 
 
 49 – 25 
 
 < 25 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
Tried but failed (couldn't do) 
  
CD 
 
CD 
Child refused. Didn’t test  CR CR 
No data (did not examine, etc.)  ND ND 
 
Observations (specify R/L)______________________________________________________________  
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 (e.g., dysrhythmia) 
RAPID/SEQUENTIAL MOVEMENTS  
 
Position child on chair directly across from examiner. Say, “Sit up straight in chair, feet flat on floor 
and hands on lap with palms facing down.” 
 
 “Now we are going to see how fast you can move your feet, hands, fingers and tongue - all your 
fast muscles. Each time we do a movement, you can choose which side to do first. Watch me first 
and I'll show you how to do each one.”  
 
[Demonstrate each item.  Keep shoes on unless either examiner or examinee has on high heels or 
platform soles, in which case remove shoes. Be sure the height of the chair allows the child’s feet 
to rest flat on the floor.] 
 
For timed items, 
 Each movement should start in the same position: Sitting up straight in chair, feet flat on 
floor and hands on lap with palms face down. 
 Circle the first side chosen for each item.  
 Record time in seconds to two decimal points for milliseconds. 
 ALLOW PATIENT TO GET INTO SET BEFORE BEGINNING TO TIME.  
Qualitative observations are made throughout, but SCORE TIME only after they have gotten 
into set. 
 Number of taps, pats, or sets to be timed is indicated in parentheses next to each item.  
 Code extraneous overflow and dysrhythmic movements (0 if absent, 1 if present). 
 Code the following in the time slot if  
 Child tried but failed or couldn’t do – code as CD 
 Child refused – code as CR 
 Item was not examined – code as ND 
 
 
 
Proximal Overflow:  Errors on the same side involving larger muscle groups, even if a different limb 
(e.g., mimicking foot movement with hand).  Finger flapping on Finger Sequence is coded as a 
Proximal Overflow 
 
Mirror movement:  Errors on the same limb on the opposite side.  Coded even if only observed at the 
beginning of the task and then disappears.  Code even if observed during practice. 
 
Sequencing errors on Finger Sequence are coded as a Dysrhythmia 
 
If Child CAN’T DO the movement (CD), also score “1” for Dysrhythmia for each side unable to be 
completed. 
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Position subject on chair directly across from 
examiner. Say, “Sit up straight in chair, feet flat on 
floor and hands on lap with palms facing down.” 
 
OVERFLOW 
DYS-
RHYTHMIC/ 
SEQUENCING 
ERROR 
“I’m going to ask you to do some 
movements as fast as you can but you also 
need to do them as well as you can.” 
Time 
******
* 
Record to 
2 
decimals 
PROXIMA
L 
(CEPHAL) 
ORO-
FACIAL 
MIRROR 
Foot tap  (20 taps) 
 
“First, choose one foot and tap it like this, like you are 
impatiently waiting for someone, on the floor. Keep the heel 
of your foot on the floor and tap the front of the foot fast, 
like this. Ready? Now!"  [Complete one trial of first foot]  
"Now the same with the other foot. Ready? Now!” [Repeat 
for second side.] 
 
L:         
 
 
R:         
 
0 1 
 
 
0 1 
 
0
 
1 
 
 
0
 
1 
 
0 1 
 
 
0 1 
 
0 1 
 
 
0 1 
Foot heel-toe tap  (10 sets) 
 
“Now, rock one foot back and forth, heel-toe, heel-toe, as 
fast as you can, like this. Ready? Now!” [Repeat for second 
side.] 
L:         
 
R:         
0 1 
 
0 1 
0
 
1 
 
0
 
1 
0 1 
 
0 1 
0 1 
 
0 1 
Hand pat  (20 pats) 
 
“Now we are up to the hands. Choose one hand and pat it 
on your lap, like this, as fast as you can. Keep your arm 
steady and just use your wrist.  Ready? Now!" 
(Demonstrate rapid patting. Correct, if slaps hard, to gentle 
fast pats.) 
 
L:         
 
R:         
 
0 1 
 
0 1 
 
0
 
1 
 
0
 
1 
 
0 1 
 
0 1 
 
0 1 
 
0 1 
Hand pronate/supinate  (10 sets) 
 
“The next thing we do with the hands is patting, like this, 
back and palm, flip-flop, flip-flop, as fast as you can. Keep 
your arm close against your side.  Choose one hand and-
Ready? Now!” [Demonstrate hand pronation and supina-
tion alternating pats on lap.] 
 
Note:  Correct “rolling” on the elbow or arm by saying, 
“It’s a real ‘pat,’ pat the palm, pat the back, pat the palm, 
pat the back…” 
 
L:         
 
 
R:         
 
0 1 
 
 
0 1 
 
0
 
1 
 
 
0
 
1 
 
0 1 
 
 
0 1 
 
OK < 9yo, 
but circle 
anyway 
 
0 1 
 
 
0 1 
Finger tap  (20 taps) 
 
"Were up to the fingers. I want you to tap the thumb and 
index finger together as fast as you can. Ready? Now!” 
[Demonstrate thumb/index finger rapid tapping.] 
L:         
 
R:         
0 1 
 
0 1 
0
 
1 
 
0
 
1 
0 1 
 
0          
1 
0 1 
 
0 1 
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Appose finger succession  (5 sets) 
 
“Now this is the hardest one we do. Watch me; tap each 
finger against the thumb in order, then do them again, like 
this. Do not go backwards, always this way -  pointer, 
middle, ring, pinkie, 1, 2, 3, 4. Try it.”  [If necessary, can 
make the sound of different tones as fingers hit thumb] O. 
K. Now try it on the other hand. Good. Now get ready to 
choose one hand and do these taps in order as fast as you 
can. Ready? Now!” [If necessary, cue to keep thumb still 
and move fingers down to thumb rather than vice versa.  
Count 20 taps, even if sequencing is wrong but each finger 
should tap the thumb, not roll across the thumb] 
 
L:         
 
R:         
 
0 1 
 
0 1 
 
0
 
1 
 
0
 
1 
 
0 1 
 
0 1 
 
OK < 
13yo, but 
circle 
anyway 
 
0 1 
 
0 1 
Tongue side to side  (10 sets) 
 
“Now we need to do tongue-wiggling. Move your tongue 
side-to-side like a dog wagging its tail.  Like this…touch 
each corner of your lips, then the other, back and forth as 
fast as you can. Ready?” [Demonstrate tongue going 
laterally, from one angle of lips to other. Correct if does 
in/out rotatory movement and re-demonstrate.] 
 
  
 
 
0 1  
(Jaw Synkinesis = 
 Shifting of lower jaw 
back and forth) 
 
 
 
0 1 
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APPENDIX D  
PANESS Scoring Sheet 
 
 
Name/Subject #:    DoE:    Age:   
Gender:      DoB:     
 
 
Lateral Preference:  EYE:   R      L FOOT:   R      L     Mixed HAND:   R      L     
*Mixed  
 
 Code PANESS scores below. Note that some movements are coded differently depending upon age. 
 If “CD” is circled on the PANESS, code as a “2” if movement is expected to be WNL for age group. 
 Tandems, Stand, and Tongue have unilateral scores only.  
GAITS R       L                              
 
1. Heels  0       1       2 0       1       2 
2. Toes   0       1       2 0       1       2 
3. Sides  0       1       2 0       1       2 
 (Code errors only if age 9 yo; if age  8, code as 0 regardless of errors) 
4. Forward Tandem  0       1       2  
5. Backward Tandem  0       1       2  
 (Code errors only if age 10 yo; if age  9, code as 0 regardless of errors) 
 
STATIONS R       L                              
 
6. Tandem 0       1       2 
 (Code errors only if age 10 yo)   
7. Stand with Two Feet 0       1       2 Right Axial  = 
_______  (R side #1-3, 10, 11) 
   (Range 0-10) 
10. Stand on one foot 0       1       2 0       1       2 Left Axial  = 
_______  (L side #1-3, 10, 11) 
   (Range 0-10) 
11. Hop (Unilateral) 0       1       2 0       1       2 Total Axial = 
_______  (R + L + 4,5, 6, 7) 
   (Range 0-28) 
 
OVERFLOW GAITS  R       L                              
 
1. Heels  0       1        0       1       *Right Overflow  = 
_______ 
 (Code errors only if age 6 yo)      (Range 0-3)     
2. Toes   0       1        0       1       *Left Overflow = 
_______ 
 (Code errors only if age 6 yo)      (Range 0-3)   
3. Sides  0       1        0       1       *Total Overflow = 
_______   
 (Code errors only if age 9 yo)       (Range 0-6)   
 
INVOLUNTARY MOVEMENTS  R       L                              
7. Choreiform  0       1        0       1       
 (Abnormal arm/finger movements)  
 
8. Tremor   0       1       2 0       1       2 
 (Finger to nose) 
 
9. Choreiform  0       1       
 (Reptile tongue)  
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MISC. OBSERVATIONS  R       L                              
    
 Posture Hemiparetic 0       1        0       1       Miscellaneous and 
Involuntary Totals 
 Posture Dystonic 0       1        0       1       Right = _______  
 (R Invol. 7 + R Invol. 8 + R Misc.) 
        (Range 0-7)   
 Nystagmus 0       1        0       1       Left = _______   
(L Invol. 7 + L Invol. 8 + L Misc.) 
         (Range 0-7)   
 Strabismus 0       1        0       1       Total = _______   
(R Misc. & Invol. + L Misc.& Invol + Invol. 9) 
      (Range 0-15) 
 Right Misc.  _______ Left Misc.  _______    
     (Range 0-7)      (Range 0-7)   
 
Total Gaits and Stations  = __________________     (Total Axial + *Total Overflow + Total 
Miscellaneous & Involuntary) 
   (0-49)  (0-28)   (0-6)  (0-15) 
 
PANESS Timed Movements 
 
OVERFLOW – TIMED MOVEMENTS      R  PANESS Score                  L      PANESS Score 
 
 Foot Tap (FT)   0       1       2                  0       1       2                 
  
 
 Heel/toe tap (HT)   0       1       2                  0       1       2                  
 Hand Pat (HP)  0       1       2                  0       1       2 
                  
 Hand Pronate/Supinate (HPS)   0       1       2 *  0       1       2*  
 (For Mirror, Code errors only if age 9 yo)  
 
 Finger Tap (FR)  0       1       2                  0       1       2                 
  
 Finger Apposition (FS)  0       1       2 *  0       1       2*  
 (For Mirror, Code errors only if age 13 yo)  
  *Timed Right Overflow                      *Timed Left Overflow                  
                                   
   (Range 0-12)    
(Range 0-12)   
 
Under R and L, transfer scores directly from PANESS. Code as a  
Score of 0  if no overflow is present regardless of age appropriateness.  
Score of 1 if only Proximal or Oro-Facial or Mirror are present     or if both Proximal AND Oro-facial 
Score of 2 if Both Proximal AND Mirror    or  if both Oro-facial AND Mirror       or Proximal AND  Oro-facial AND 
Mirror        
 
Under PANESS Score, directly transfer scores from answers recorded under Right and Left, except when asterisk is 
present. If *, copy the score to the PANESS Score only if score is abnormal for age; otherwise, if age appropriate, change 
score to 0 in this column. 
 
 Tongue (jaw synkinesis)  0       1        
 
 
 *Total Timed Overflow                          (Sum R Overflow + L Overflow 
+ Tongue) 
    (Range 0-25)   
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DYSRHYTHMIA – TIMED MOVEMENTS  R    L  
 
 Foot Tap (FT)   0       1         0       1          
 
 Heel/toe tap (HT)   0       1          0       1        
 Hand Pat (HP)  0       1          0       1        
 Hand Pronate/Supinate (HPS)   0       1          0       1        
 Finger Tap (FR)  0       1          0       1        
 Finger Apposition (FS)  0       1          0       1         
  Right Dysrhythmia       Left Dysrhythmia   
   (Range 0-6)     (Range 0-6)   
 
 Tongue   0       1        
 
   Total Dysrhythmia                          (Sum R Dysrhythmia + L 
Dysrhythmia + Tongue) 
    (Range 0-13)   
 
MISC. TIMED OBSERVATIONS  R    L  
 
 Choreoathetoid  0       1         0       1       
 (Extended arm/elbow turned outward) 
  
 Hemiparetic  0       1         0       1       
 (Flexed elbow) 
  
 Other ( ____________________ )  0       1          0       1        
  Right Timed Misc.       Left Timed Misc.    
    (Range 0-3)      (Range 0-3)   
 
 Total Timed Misc.      
    (Range 0-6)   
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TIMED MOVEMENTS (SFA Scores) 
  Right    Left   
         Seconds  z-Score  SFA Score   Seconds           Z-Score   SFA Score 
FT                     0       1       2                              0       1       2 
HT                     0       1       2                              0       1       2 
HP                    0       1       2                            0       1       2 
HPS                    0       1       2                            0       1       2 
FR                    0       1       2                            0       1       2 
FS                    0       1       2                            0       1       2 
 
 Right SFA     Left SFA    
(Range 0-12)    (Range 0-12)   
Under Seconds, copy times in seconds to decimal points for each Right and Left sided movement. 
Under z-Score, calculate z-values using Mean and Standard Deviation from the PANESS Timed Motor Movements Norms.  
 Normative data are stratified by child’s age, gender, and handedness. 
 Use right-handed norms for left-handed children 11 years or older.   
 Calculate reverse scored z-values [(Normative score - Child’s Score) / Standard Deviation (SD)] so that positive scores 
indicate better performance.  
To determine SFA score: 
 If z-score is greater than -1 SD below the mean (i.e., Child is WNL or Child is more than 1 SD above the mean, thus 
faster), SFA = 0 
 If z-score is between -1 SD and -2 SD below the mean, SFA = 1 
 If z-score is less than  -2 SD below the mean (i.e., indicating very poor performance), SFA = 2 
 
 Tongue                    0                2 
 (jaw synkinesis) 
 
Circle 0 or 2 for the tongue. If the child is: 
For children age 5-9, the mean is < 6 seconds:    For children Age 10 and above, the 
mean is <3 seconds: 
 If Time is  6 seconds, score as 0.   If time > 6 seconds, score as 2. If Time is  3 seconds, score as 0.   If time 
> 3 seconds, score as 2. 
  
 *Total SFA                           (Sum R SFA + L SFA + Tongue SFA) 
    (Range 0-26)   
 
TOTALS  
 
Total Right Overflow      (*Right Overflow [pg 1] + *Timed Right Overflow [pg 2]) 
  (Range 0-15)   (Range 0-3)   (Range 0-12)   
 
Total Left Overflow    (*Left Overflow [pg 1] + *Timed Left Overflow [pg 2]) 
   (Range 0-15)    (Range 0-3)   (Range 0-12)   
 
Total Overflow    (*Total Overflow [pg 1] + * Total Timed Overflow [pg 2]) 
   (Range 0-31)    (Range 0-6)   (Range 0-25)   
 
Total Gaits & Stations      (Total Axial [pg 1] + *Total Overflow [pg 1] + Total 
Miscellaneous & Involuntary [pg 1]) 
   (Range 0-49)     (0-28)    (0-6)       (0-15) 
 
Total Timed    (Total Timed Overflow [pg 2] + Total Dysrhythmia [pg 2] + Total Timed Misc. 
[pg 2] + Total SFA [pg 3]) 
                    (Range 0-70)  (Range 0-25)   (Range 0-13)  (Range 0-15)  (Range 0-26)   
 
Total PANESS    (Total Gaits and Stations + Total Timed) 
   (Range 0-119)   (Range 0-49)     (Range 0-70) 
 
* Indicate totals in which only abnormal scores for age group are included. 
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APPENDIX E 
The Adult Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ)  
Ages 16+ 
 
SPECIMEN, FOR RESEARCH USE ONLY. 
 
For full details, please see: 
 
S. Baron-Cohen, S. Wheelwright, R. Skinner, J. Martin and E. Clubley, (2001) 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) : Evidence from Asperger Syndrome/High Functioning 
Autism, Males and Females, Scientists and Mathematicians 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 31:5-17 
 
 
 
Name:...........................................     Sex:........................................... 
 
Date of birth:...................................     Today’s Date................................. 
 
 
How to fill out the questionnaire 
Below are a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully and rate how strongly you 
agree or disagree with it by circling your answer. 
 
 DO NOT MISS ANY STATEMENT OUT. 
Examples 
E1. I am willing to take risks. definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
E2. I like playing board games. definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
E3. I find learning to play musical instruments easy. definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
E4. I am fascinated by other cultures. definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
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1. I prefer to do things with others rather than on 
my own. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
2. I prefer to do things the same way over and over 
again. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy 
to create a picture in my mind. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one 
thing that I lose sight of other things. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
5. I often notice small sounds when others do not. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
6. I usually notice car number plates or similar 
strings of information. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve 
said is impolite, even though I think it is polite. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine 
what the characters might look like. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
9. I am fascinated by dates. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of 
several different people’s conversations. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
11. I find social situations easy. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
12. I tend to notice details that others do not. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
13. I would rather go to a library than a party. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
14. I find making up stories easy. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
15. I find myself drawn more strongly to people than 
to things. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
16. I tend to have very strong interests which I get 
upset about if I can’t pursue. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
17. I enjoy social chit-chat. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get 
a word in edgeways. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
19. I am fascinated by numbers. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
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20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to 
work out the characters’ intentions. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
21. I don’t particularly enjoy reading fiction. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
22. I find it hard to make new friends. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
23. I notice patterns in things all the time. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
24. I would rather go to the theatre than a museum. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
25. It does not upset me if my daily routine is 
disturbed. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
26. I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a 
conversation going. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
27. I find it easy to “read between the lines” when 
someone is talking to me. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
28. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, 
rather than the small details. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
29. I am not very good at remembering phone 
numbers. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
30. I don’t usually notice small changes in a 
situation, or a person’s appearance. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
31. I know how to tell if someone listening to me is 
getting bored. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
32. I find it easy to do more than one thing at once. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s 
my turn to speak. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
34. I enjoy doing things spontaneously. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
35. I am often the last to understand the point of a 
joke. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
36. I find it easy to work out what someone is 
thinking or feeling just by looking at their face. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to 
what I was doing very quickly.  
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
38. I am good at social chit-chat. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
39. People often tell me that I keep going on and on definitely slightly slightly definitely 
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about the same thing. 
 
agree agree disagree disagree 
40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing 
games involving pretending with other children. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
41. I like to collect information about categories of 
things (e.g. types of car, types of bird, types of 
train, types of plant, etc.). 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like 
to be someone else. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
43. I like to plan any activities I participate in 
carefully. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
44. I enjoy social occasions. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
45. I find it difficult to work out people’s intentions. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
46. New situations make me anxious. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
47. I enjoy meeting new people. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
48. I am a good diplomat. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
49. I am not very good at remembering people’s date 
of birth. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
50. I find it very easy to play games with children 
that involve pretending. 
 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
 
Developed by: 
The Autism Research Centre 
University of Cambridge 
 
 
 
 MRC-SBC/SJW Feb 1998 
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